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Abstract
Agent based computational economics (ACE), as a research field,
has been using co-evolutionary algorithms for modelling the socio-
economic learning and adaptation process of players within games
that model socio-economic interactions. In addition, it has also been
using these algorithms for optimising towards the game equilibria via
socio-economic learning. However, the field has been diverging from
evolutionary computation, specifically co-evolutionary algorithm de-
sign research. It is common practice in ACE to explain the process and
outcomes of such co-evolutionary simulations in socio-economic terms.
However, co-evolutionary algorithms are known to have unexpected
dynamics that lead to unexpected outcomes. This has often lead
to mis-interpretations of the process and outcomes in socio-economic
terms, a case in point being the lack of a methodical use of the term
bounded rationality. This mis-interpretation can be attributed to the
lack of a proper consideration of the solution concept being imple-
mented by the co-evolutionary algorithm used for the simulation.
We propose a holistic methodical framework for analysing and de-
signing co-evolut- ionary simulations, such that mis-interpretations
of socio-economic phenomena be methodically avoided, disabling the
algorithm from being mis-interpreted in socio-economic terms, aimed
at benefiting ACE as a research field. More specifically, we consider
the methodical treatment of co-evolutionary algorithms, as enabled
by the framework, such that mis-interpretations of bounded rational-
ity be avoided when these algorithms are used to optimise towards
equilibrium solutions in bargaining games. The framework can be
broken down into two parts:
• Analysing and refining co-evolution for ACE, using the notion
behind co-evolut- ionary solution concepts from co-evolutionary
algorithm design research: Challenging the value of the implicit
assumption of bounded rationality within co-evolutionary sim-
ulations, which leads to it being mis-interpreted, we show that
convergence to the equilibrium solutions can be achieved with
boundedly rational agents by working on the elements of the im-
plemented co-evolutionary solution concept, as opposed to previ-
ous studies where bounded rationality was seen as the cause for
deviations from equilibrium. Analysis and refinements guided
by the presence of top-down equilibrium solutions, allow for a
top-down avoidance of mis-interpretations of bounded rational-
ity within simulations.
• Analysing and refining co-evolution for ACE, using the notion
behind reconciliation variables proposed in the thesis: Reason-
ably associating mis-interpreted socio-economic phenomena of
interest with the elements of the implemented co-evolutionary
solution concept, parametrising and quantifying the elements, we
obtain our reconciliation variables. Systematically analysing the
simulation for its relationship with the reconciliation variables
or for its closeness to desired behaviour, using this parametri-
sation, is the suggested idea. Bounded rationality is taken as a
reconciliation variable, reasonably associated with agent strate-
gies, parametrised and quantified, and analysis of simulations
with respect to this variable carried out. Analysis and refine-
ments based on such an explicit expression of bounded rational-
ity, as opposed to the erstwhile implicit assumption, allow for a
bottom-up avoidance of mis-interpretations of bounded rational-
ity within simulations.
We thus remove the causes that lead to bounded rationality being mis-
interpreted altogether using this framework. We see this framework
as one next step in ACE socio-economic learning simulation research,
which must not be overlooked.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Co-evolutionary algorithms often exhibit unexpected dynamics that
lead to unexpected outcomes. These algorithms are used for modelling
the socio-economic learning process within the field of agent based com-
putational economics (ACE), thus simulating the learning and adap-
tation process of players or agents within socio-economic games. In-
terpreting the co-evolutionary process and outcomes in socio-economic
terms, when using these algorithms off-the-shelf as is often the case,
results in the algorithm being mis-interpreted in socio-economic terms.
For example, the term bounded rationality is generally assumed to be
an implicit property of these algorithms and the results from the al-
gorithms mis-interpreted based on it. How might we scrutinise co-
evolutionary algorithms for carrying out socio-economic simulations
so that such mis-interpretations be methodically avoided?
This is essentially what this thesis is about. There is a need for understanding
and scrutinising co-evolutionary algorithms in a methodical manner such that
they can be better understood as models of socio-economic learning, with a view
that they may not be mis-interpreted in socio-economic terms.
Agent based computational economics (ACE), as a research field, has ardently
been using co-evolutionary algorithms for socio-economic simulations for various
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purposes. Some of these are, modelling socio-economic learning and adaptation
[1, 5, 39, 59], modelling market mechanisms [94], understanding the emergence
of behavioural norms [12, 159], understanding the emergence of market structure
[144], amongst others. The choice of the algorithm for the above mentioned pur-
poses is however ad-hoc [39] or off-the-shelf [145]. There is empirical evidence
in favour of the use of co-evolutionary algorithms for simulating socio-economic
learning, i.e sometimes they seem to satisfy expectation [39], for example, if
we want them to evolve towards the equilibrium solutions or model human be-
haviour within socio-economic games, they seem to suggest that sometimes they
can. Quoting Dawid [39] commenting on some empirical work with genetic al-
gorithms used to simulate socio-economic learning, “The fact that all these com-
parisons yield positive results may be an indicator that some of the features of
genetic algorithms are indeed a good representation of effects appearing in learn-
ing populations”. However, there is a gap that still remains. It has been firmly
expressed that the “unconsidered adoption” [145] of co-evolutionary algorithms
for socio-economic simulations is problematic [1, 39, 145]. When simulating socio-
economic learning, it is generally accepted by the ACE research practitioners to
give a socio-economic interpretation to the algorithm considered, which, in our
case, would be an off-the-shelf co-evolutionary algorithm. For example, socio-
economic terms are used to describe the intricacies of the algorithm, a running
example throughout the thesis being the use of the term bounded rationality to
describe the behaviour of agents as they learn and act by trial and error. As such,
the algorithm is treated as explaining or modelling socio-economic phenomena di-
rectly or with little consideration for a rigorous match with the socio-economic
phenomena it is supposed to model to be established first. This can lead to
mis-interpretations of the algorithm in the socio-economic context. It is easy to
understand why there may be mis-interpretations.
As far as a methodical choice of an algorithm goes, it is common within the
field of ACE to consider one of the two class of algorithms (also known as levels
of learning) for the purpose of simulations, these classes being individual learning
and social learning. These two classes stem from the initial work carried out
in the field of evolutionary computation, more specifically evolutionary learning,
whereby two approaches (or schools of thought) known as the Michigan [74] and
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Pittsburg [42] approach to evolutionary learning were made prominent. These
approaches differ in the way a solution to the problem is constituted from an
evolving population of solutions. In the Michigan approach, the population as a
whole constitutes a solution (individual being partial solutions), whereas in the
Pittsburg approach, each individual in the evolving population constitutes a so-
lution to the problem. Considering one agent (or the strategy used by the agent
to play a game) as being this solution discussed above, these two approaches
directly map to the individual learning and social learning classes commonly con-
sidered to make a choice of an algorithm within ACE. Choosing an algorithm
residing in one of these two classes, even because of a class being more popular
amongst practitioners [152], rather than a due to a rigorous study backing the
usage, is not uncommon. Thus, there is a lack of a methodology for making a
choice of an algorithm, rendering this choice to generally be off-the-shelf. Given
the off-the-shelf nature of the application of these algorithms, it is hard to say
with any confidence that a particular interpretation is reliable. Moreover, it has
further been shown that there is a need for considering socio-economic and algo-
rithmic parameters separately, for certain algorithmic parameters may not have
a direct socio-economic interpretation (for example, changing the population size
can change the dynamic and outcomes from the simulation [2], specifically when
using the social learning class of algorithms, as described above, for simulations).
The simulations should thus be robust to changes in values of such parameters
[1].
In addition, co-evolutionary algorithm design, as a research field, has grown
largely independently of ACE. The link between the two fields, barring a few ex-
ceptions [1, 8, 39, 96], has only been the application of these algorithms in ACE,
and using socio-economic problems considered in ACE as test beds to study and
understand co-evolutionary algorithms, without informing ACE1 (in particular,
1Much of the work presented in this thesis links the notion behind co-evolutionary solution
concepts (see Glossary for a definition) from co-evolutionary algorithm design research, con-
sidered by Ficici in his PhD thesis [53], and the application of an off-the-shelf co-evolutionary
algorithm within ACE for the case of bargaining games, which was considered by Gerding in
his PhD thesis [58]. Both these theses were awarded in the same year, i.e. 2004, and do not
cite each other. They both however cite one of the early works considering the link between
co-evolution and ACE [39] (from 1996) ephemerally, which in fact argues against the ‘ad-hoc’
usage of co-evolutionary algorithms within ACE. As such, there has clearly been a divergence
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the sub field of modelling socio-economic learning and adaptation). The field
of co-evolutionary algorithm design has discovered many issues that these algo-
rithms have, from the point of view of them doing what is expected of them. For
example, there may be intransitivities in the search space such that the algorithm
may end up cycling within the space [106], amongst other issues (further issues
with these algorithms are discussed in Chapter 2). These issues were mostly
discovered due the co-evolutionary algorithm in question behaving unexpectedly.
The unexpected dynamics and results from co-evolutionary algorithms necessi-
tate deeper analysis of these algorithms, as opposed to prematurely using socio-
economic terms to explain the workings of the algorithms. Such explanations can
easily lead to mis-interpreting the algorithms in socio-economic terms, as these
issues may seep into simulations with an ad-hoc approach to the usage of these
algorithms. All these issues within co-evolutionary algorithms have now been de-
scribed as branching out of one essential issue with co-evolution in [53]. This issue
is the lack of rigour in the definition of a solution concept that co-evolutionary
algorithms are meant to implement. According to [53], every search algorithm
implements a solution concept. In other words, every search/learning problem
has a solution concept associated with it, and the solution concept is realised
by implementing a search algorithm. It would then seem that it is the solution
concept implemented that must be scrutinised before interpreting the algorithm
in socio-economic terms, or there is a danger of mis-interpreting the algorithm,
and indeed, mis-interpreting or mis-representing socio-economic terms within the
simulation, i.e. mis-interpreting the role of the socio-economic phenomena that
are denoted by the terms within the simulation.
A solution concept is a notion borrowed from game theory. It specifies whether
a strategy played by an agent adheres to a set of standards that make the strategy
preferable to be used in a problem over other strategies, and thus, retained as
a solution to the problem. It separates solution strategies from those that are
not preferred or desired as solutions, almost like a filter through which the whole
search space of strategies is passed, retaining only the desired strategy or strate-
gies. We do not have the luxury of explicitly scrutinising each strategy in the
search space, which leads to sampling strategies (via exploration of the strategy
in the two fields.
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space), evaluating them, and following a gradient in the search space towards
the desired solution strategies. The solution concept can thus be specified as
using the gradient to separate potentially preferable strategies from those that
are not. Co-evolution, which helps specify the solution concept and thus helps
solve the search problem of finding the desired solutions, makes specifying this
gradient harder however, because the evaluation of strategies is relative to the
strategies sampled, and not against a static/absolute function that needs opti-
mising. The pressure towards filtering out the desired strategies is built on by
channeling the strategies along a certain path in the search space. This path in
the search space is however laid out based on an incomplete and changing view
of the space, the current (at any point during the course of the search process)
strategies themselves representing the incomplete view of the search space. This
is very important in co-evolution because the incomplete view of the search space
is also reactive, in the sense that it adapts, to the strategies representing the cur-
rent state of the algorithm, i.e it is important to find which strategies to interact
with so that these strategies (used for the interaction, and in turn, as opponents
for evaluation) react or adapt favourably/usefully towards laying out the path. A
secondary search problem (requiring search effort) thus results, that of searching
who the strategies must interact with. The opponent strategies that describe the
incomplete yet useful view of the search space to adapt with or evaluate against,
need attention in their discovery and use. Most of the problems in co-evolution
stem from a lack of rigour in designing the elements of co-evolution that make up
the algorithm, which then implements the solution concept it is aimed at, such
that the requisite search effort is indeed expended.
Our view in this thesis is that there is a dissonance between interpreting
co-evolution as a socio-economic simulator and viewing co-evolution as a search
process. When taking co-evolutionary algorithms as simulators, socio-economic
phenomena like bounded rationality (which happens to be a widely accepted phe-
nomenon for describing human decision making in economics since [138]), have
been assumed as a hindrance to these simulations achieving the desired goals,
without much scrutiny. According to [21], these simulations do involve soft fac-
tors that are difficult to quantify, for instance bounded rationality, yet they are
seen as the “only game in town” [21] in order to model the situation at hand,
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which in our case would be a socio-economic one. However, these algorithms
do provide for the flexibility to tune the complexity of agents, including their
degree of rationality [21], and understand the affect of this complexity on the
emergent process and outcomes, apart from the algorithms themselves having
the flexibility to be tuned per se. Still, bounded rationality is generally assumed
within co-evolutionary algorithmic simulations of socio-economic situations. A re-
cent comprehensive survey of evolutionary methods, when used as socio-economic
simulators, corroborates this practice [131]. Essentially, bounded rationality is as-
sumed to be implicit in these simulations, i.e. the specific choices made about the
components of the algorithm are assumed to define it [131]. Such lack of scrutiny
leads to mis-interpretations. On the other hand, when taking these algorithms
as a search process, the multiple issues that are now seen as due to the lack of
rigour in the proper definition of the co-evolutionary solution concept, are seen
as a hindrance to co-evolution achieving the desired goals. It is clear that given
co-evolutionary algorithms already have issues, they will not go away if they are
taken off-the-shelf, with little scrutiny, and used for socio-economic simulations.
Hence the dissonance.
The former (interpreting co-evolution as a socio-economic simulator) has not
considered refining the co-evolutionary process in a methodical manner when it
comes to socio-economic interpretations of co-evolutionary algorithms. Socio-
economic phenomena may not have an obvious algorithmic interpretation and
thus the algorithm may have to be refined. Note that this is in contrast to [1],
where algorithm parameters may not have a socio-economic interpretation and
so one needs to be careful about the robustness of the algorithms to a change in
values of these parameters. Also, although simulations can be calibrated [96] to
real world data, we may not have enough data for such calibrations in reality,
thus bringing in other issues of research to be dealt with in case one goes this
route. In any case, refining the process at a fundamental algorithmic level in a
more methodical manner has not been much explored within ACE. Refinements
have been looked at from purely the algorithmic viewpoint in [8], but the idea
there was to compare two off-the-shelf algorithms and understand how one can
inform and emulate the other, instead of dealing with assumed socio-economic
phenomena that can lead to socio-economic mis-interpretations of simulations.
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The latter (viewing co-evolution as a search process), does promote the idea of
refinements to the search such that the envisaged goals are indeed achievable [53].
One way this can be done is by considering the notion behind co-evolutionary
solution concepts and tangibly working on the elements that the algorithm is
composed of in a systematic manner, as we will show in this thesis in Chapter 3.
This enables us to understand the reasons for discrepancies between the desired
and actual outcomes from the co-evolutionary process, and thus understand what
the problems are, followed by tackling them. One cannot tackle a problem if one
does not know what the problem is in the first place. The notion behind co-
evolutionary solution concepts provides a way of thinking about refinements to
the algorithmic workings and systematic disciplining of co-evolution.
Game theory provides a powerful framework to understand interactions be-
tween entities. These entities could be players with complete knowledge of their
environment, players with incomplete knowledge of the environment, and more
pertinently, computational agents interacting with each other under various as-
sumptions about their deliberative abilities. Theoretical results from game the-
ory, e.g. a single selected Nash Equilibrium or the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SPE) [133] as it is called in a sequential game (which we will consider in detail
in Chapter 2), give us a useful idealised result in terms of what outcomes one
may expect with players interacting under theoretical assumptions of perfect ra-
tionality and complete knowledge. Although these theoretical assumption are far
too strict and do not in any way model the reality of the particular interaction
or game under question, they are indeed required for a closed form or top-down
solution to the game. The value of these theoretical outcomes is arguable, at least
in economics and psychology research. However, for the purpose of understand-
ing and disciplining bottom-up approaches like co-evolution, they are indeed a
boon. These solutions give us a solution concept to aim for, thus enabling vali-
dating the simulations. Be it simulating real world socio-economic learning and
outcomes thereof, or simulating equilibrium selection via socio-economic learning,
using co-evolutionary algorithms in a more methodical manner applies to both.
The advantage with equilibrium selection is for there being a solution concept
at hand, whereas with real world problems, one has to deal with experiments
with (or at least experimental data from socio-economic games with) humans,
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and that is beyond the scope of this thesis.
As a case study, we focus on bounded rationality as the socio-economic phe-
nomenon of interest causing a dissonance between interpreting co-evolution as
a socio-economic simulator and viewing co-evolution as a search process, thus
being mis-interpreted in simulations. This is done to elaborate on and establish
the link between co-evolutionary algorithm design research and socio-economic
learning, such that the algorithms be tangibly refined in a more methodical man-
ner for their application in the latter. We do this in the context of bargaining
games. These games have been considered in ACE in order to simulate conver-
gence to equilibrium solutions (more specifically the subgame perfect equilibrium)
via socio-economic learning and adaptation using co-evolutionary algorithms [58].
Bounded rationality was seen as the cause for the co-evolutionary algorithm de-
viating from the desired goal of converging to the subgame perfect equilibrium
solution with little scrutiny, i.e. it was assumed (both as implicit in the simula-
tion, as generally done in ACE, and as the cause for deviations), hence attracting
interest from the point of view of this thesis. Moreover, this game has had many
applications in real world situations, e.g. bargaining problems concerning inter-
national trade, industrial organisation, political economy etc. [135]. This gives
further motivation for us to consider it.
1.2 Objectives
We want to lay down a methodical framework for analysing and refining (also
referred to as engineering in the thesis) co-evolutionary algorithms, when used as
models of socio-economic learning within ACE simulations. The main character-
istic of the framework is for it to be used for analysing and refining these simu-
lations, such that there is no room left for mis-interpretations of socio-economic
phenomena, which are often used to explain the co-evolutionary process or out-
comes, within simulations. As a result, the co-evolutionary process and outcomes
are not allowed to be mis-interpreted in socio-economic terms which were being
mis-interpreted within simulations in the first place.
We want to utilise this framework to remove the causes that may lead to mis-
interpreting bounded rationality (the socio-economic phenomenon of interest to
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us) within co-evolutionary simulations altogether. We want to do this in the con-
text of using co-evolutionary algorithms as modelling socio-economic learning to
optimise towards the equilibrium solutions in bargaining games. The framework
is composed of two integral parts, which together explain the framework, laying
out and applying them forming the main objective of this research. These two
can, in the context of applying the framework for the case of the socio-economic
phenomenon of interest of bounded rationality, be stated as follows:
• We want to show how the implicit assumption of bounded rationality within
ACE simulations can be challenged for its inadequacy using the notion be-
hind co-evolutionary solution concepts from co-evolutionary algorithm de-
sign research, such that it becomes apparent as to what it does not mean
in these simulations, suggesting that it was indeed being mis-interpreted,
and that the co-evolutionary algorithm was being mis-interpreted in socio-
economic terms. We want to show that bounded rationality does not explain
the co-evolutionary simulations not converging towards the equilibrium so-
lutions, by making the co-evolutionary simulations converge to these solu-
tions in the presence of bounded rationality. Thus, we want to show how to
avoid mis-interpretations of socio-economic phenomena within simulations
from the top-down (via guidance provided by top-down desired solutions),
using the notion behind co-evolutionary solution concepts. This becomes
the idea behind the first integral part of the methodical framework.
• We then want to show how bounded rationality may be explicitly expressed
within simulations using the notion behind reconciliation variables that we
propose in this thesis, leading to understanding the role of bounded ra-
tionality within simulations in explicit algorithmic terms. This shows the
explicit hold that we can have on this socio-economic phenomenon of in-
terest, thus leaving no room for its mis-interpretation. Thus, we want to
show how to avoid mis-interpretations of socio-economic phenomena within
simulations from the bottom-up (via an explicit bottom-up expression of
the phenomena within simulations), using the notion behind reconciliation
variables. This becomes the idea behind the second integral part of the
methodical framework.
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The above two mis-interpretation avoidance scenarios holistically specify the
framework we want to put forth for the ACE community to follow.
1.3 Contributions
Given the motivation and objectives, we now look at the contributions this thesis
makes. Laying out of a holistic methodical framework for co-evolutionary algo-
rithm analysis and refinement, such that mis-interpretations of socio-economic
phenomena of interest be avoided within co-evolutionary simulations, forms the
main theme of the thesis. The framework is composed of two integral parts,
which together specify the framework, and are two essential contributions of the
thesis. The framework, thus specified and then applied to previous work, is also
a contribution. Following is a summary of the two integral parts and their appli-
cation towards the avoidance of mis-interpretations of bounded rationality within
simulations.
Summary Statement of Part 1 of the Framework:
Analysing and refining co-evolution for ACE, using the notion be-
hind co-evolutionary solution concepts, empowered by the existence of
top-down solutions, from co-evolutionary algorithm design research.
Socio-economic phenomena which may have been mis-interpreted within
simulations, can be challenged using this notion, and their mis-interpre-
tation revealed. As such, analysis and refinements of co-evolutionary
simulations, guided by the presence of top-down solutions, allow for a
top-down avoidance of mis-interpretations of socio-economic
phenomena of interest within simulations.
Application of Part 1 of the Framework:
We look at the implemented co-evolutionary solution concept from previous
work [59]. This co-evolutionary solution concept took bounded rationality for
granted, assuming it to be causing deviations from the expected behaviour of
the algorithm. We show that, by working on the elements of the implemented
co-evolutionary solution concept systematically, and scrutinising as to what may
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have caused the deviations from the expected behaviour algorithmically, we can
say the following:
• We now understand, in explicit algorithmic terms, what the assumption
of bounded rationality actually means in previous work. Specifically, the
design choices for the algorithm result in the aforesaid deviations, the re-
lationship between the design choice and deviations having gone unnoticed
in previous work, and the choices implicitly assumed to mean bounded ra-
tionality.
• We discover that, changing the implemented co-evolutionary solution con-
cept, specifically changing the variation, interaction and evaluation details,
results in achieving the originally envisaged goal of converging to the sub-
game perfect equilibrium solution. We thus achieve equilibrium selection
with boundedly rational agents. In fact, practically speaking, we achieve
convergence to the equilibrium solution via simulation for the games in
which the previous algorithm could not. As such, we can say that the pre-
vious work was not implementing the envisaged solution concept. This tells
us the importance of considering the notion behind co-evolutionary solu-
tion concepts for ACE research. Not considering it, ACE is in danger of
going off track, being mislead, and remaining immature as a field when it
comes to the method of adopting co-evolutionary algorithms as simulating
socio-economic learning.
• In effect, since we do achieve convergence to the equilibrium with bound-
edly rational agents, we have also understood what bounded rationality, as
a socio-economic phenomenon, does not mean in the context of the socio-
economic simulations using the co-evolutionary algorithm considered in pre-
vious work. Note that although this understanding is with respect to the
bargaining games and the co-evolutionary algorithm considered in previous
work, the method of understanding the simulations through the lenses of
co-evolutionary solutions concepts is generally applicable. It also calls into
question the general practice within ACE of leaving bounded rationality
unscrutinised and assuming it to be implicitly defined by the specification
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of the algorithms used for simulations. Thus, challenging socio-economic
assumptions or phenomena of interest from the co-evolutionary solution
concept perspective is indeed a methodology worth consideration, and fur-
ther exploration.
Scaling up to more complex problems incorrectly, mis-interpreting, and thus
being mislead, is worse than not scaling up but being correct for the problems
an algorithm can solve. We have not looked into how our refined algorithm or
simulation scales up to more complex games other than bargaining games with
multiple rounds (more details about the games to follow in Chapters 2 and 3) in
this thesis, however, it is correct for what it can do. We note that there is still a
possibility of bounded rationality getting mis-interpreted within our simulation,
because, using the first part of the framework we are only able to say the role
bounded rationality does not play in the simulation. Since the focus of the thesis is
to avoid mis-interpretations of socio-economic phenomena within simulations in a
holistic manner, as laid out in the objectives in Section 1.2, we thus want to show
how to understand bounded rationality better within such a simulation, instead
of using the term to explain away the non-conformance between simulation and
reality (for example, assuming bounded rationality causing deviations not only in
simple, but more complex games in previous work [59]), without the simulation
being correctly or thoroughly understood.
We are interested in socio-economic simulations, and reality (as verified by
experimental economics research) does not conform with rational game theoretic
equilibria. In reality, bounded rationality is indeed a cause or at least a reasonable
assumption and indeed a widely accepted phenomenon to be a cause for devia-
tions from rational outcomes. So, we take bounded rationality as causing this
non-conformance seriously now, i.e. we want to know how to achieve various
levels of non-conformance, in order to systematically understand its relationship
with co-evolutionary simulations more deeply, and to analyse the simulations for
their closeness to desired outcomes with respect to it. In essence, we want to
understand how to grow deviating outcomes, given our algorithm, such that it al-
lows us to understand what bounded rationality means within simulations. Note
that we do not match simulation and reality in this thesis, but instead understand
the affect that bounded rationality has on the co-evolutionary simulations, which
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is a contribution to ACE research in itself, considering our methodology, which
we summarise next.
We have an algorithm which tells us how to get to the equilibrium in the
presence of implicitly present bounded rationality, so by systematically and ex-
plicitly quantifying/expressing and denoting bounded rationality as, what we call,
a ‘reconciliation variable’, we can understand how it really affects socio-economic
simulations if we want to model and simulate the above non-conformance, and
more importantly for the purposes of this thesis, rule out the possibility of it
being mis-interpreted within simulations. The fact that we call bounded ratio-
nality a reconciliation variable is simply because we want to stress the fact that
we show how to reconcile deviations or non-conforming outcomes with simulated
outcomes, i.e simulate deviations, by expressing bounded rationality as a variable,
wherein, varying bounded rationality causes deviations. The next contribution is
thus, the notion and use of reconciliation variables that we propose in this the-
sis, and the second part of the methodical framework which allows us to use the
notion. Following is a summary of the second part and its application towards
the avoidance of mis-interpretations of bounded rationality.
Summary Statement of Part 2 of the Framework:
Analysing and refining co-evolution for ACE, using the notion behind
reconciliation variables proposed in the thesis. Reasonably associating
mis-interpreted socio-economic phenomena of interest with the ele-
ments of the implemented co-evolutionary solution concept, parametris-
ing and quantifying the elements, we obtain our reconciliation vari-
ables. Systematically analysing the simulation for its relationship with
the reconciliation variables or for its closeness to desired behaviour,
using this parametrisation, is the suggested idea. Analysis and re-
finements based on such an explicit expression of the socio-economic
phenomena of interest, allow for a bottom-up avoidance of mis-
interpretations of the phenomena within simulations.
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Application of Part 2 of the Framework:
We thus explore bounded rationality as the phenomenon of interest even fur-
ther. A methodology is presented which allows tangible and systematic handling
of the co-evolutionary algorithm from the point of view of the phenomenon of
interest. We can thus say the following:
• We show how bounded rationality can be associated with the elements of
the implemented co-evolutionary solution concept. This is done by finding
reasonable explanations of the phenomenon in socio-economic literature,
and the elements that are most likely to implement those explanations. We
thus have a link. We associate bounded rationality with the representation
(an element of the implemented co-evolutionary solution concept), given
the explanation from one of the founders of bounded rationality research
[133] in economics (the notion of a trembling hand), and recent work using
this explanation [79, 122]. We use these explanations in socio-economic
literature to define three types of bounded rationality: implementation er-
rors, perception errors, and a combination of the two. This gives us a firm
hold on the phenomenon of interest since we can indeed implement the rep-
resentation in various ways, specifically with the aforementioned types of
bounds.
• We then parametrise the associated elements (representation in our case)
as this allows us to quantify the phenomenon of interest explicitly. We use
two parameters, viz. trembling probability (T ) and randomness in moves
(r), to model the three types of bounds within the representation. As such,
we get a hold on the malleability of the phenomenon in explicit quantitative
terms. Bounded rationality can thus be explicitly expressed and becomes,
what we call, our reconciliation variable.
• We then define the characteristics of the implemented co-evolutionary solu-
tion concept that we are interested in understanding, i.e. evaluation metrics
against which the role of bounded rationality within the simulations could
be measured. Given the explicit quantitative implementation of the phe-
nomenon, tangibly varying the phenomenon (i.e. varying T and r, given one
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of the three types of bound), and analysing the relationship that the algo-
rithm has with the phenomenon is thus made possible. This allows for the
avoidance of mis-interpretations of the phenomenon from the bottom-up.
• We can see how bounded rationality affects the convergence characteristics
of the implemented co-evolutionary solution concept, as opposed to leav-
ing bounded rationality unchallenged and assuming its affects (as done in
previous work [59]).
• We show how the three types of bounded rationality are related to the con-
vergence characteristics and to each other, thus enabling a more methodical
understanding of the algorithm in terms of bounded rationality, for its use
as a model for socio-economic learning simulations in ACE.
Missing from ACE literature and thus a contribution, this exercise lets us
discover the true algorithmic meaning of the phenomenon of interest, in addi-
tion to the way it affects co-evolutionary simulations. Note that this is in stark
contrast to making unassessed assumption about the phenomenon. Reasonably
(phenomenon having a backing in socio-economic literature – in our case it is lit-
erature on bounded rationality) associating (connecting the backed phenomenon
with the algorithm), the phenomenon of interest with the algorithms, makes this
exercise worthy of being conducted. Given this backing, one can at least be sure
of the inner workings of the phenomenon, thus avoiding mis-interpretations of
the phenomenon, and this can follow a systematic study.
Note that, it is not necessary to associate the phenomenon of interest with
one particular element of the implemented co-evolutionary solution concept, nor
it is necessary to use one particular explanation of the phenomenon from socio-
economic literature. This methodology allows for reasonably associating socio-
economic phenomena with one or more elements and analysing the effect that
the changes in the parametrised and quantified elements (in turn, phenomena of
interest) have on the envisaged goals from the simulation.
Final Statement About the Framework:
We thus provide a holistic framework for studying socio-economic phenomena
of interest such that mis-interpretations of the phenomena be avoided altogether
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from within socio-economic simulations. This framework is empowered by the
analyses and refinements of simulations from the point of view of co-evolutionary
solution concepts and reconciliation variables. We see this as one next step in
ACE socio-economic learning simulation research, which must not be overlooked.
1.4 Thesis Outline
We now outline the structure of the thesis, giving a short summary for each
Chapter that follows:
• Chapter 2: This Chapter covers the literature allowing us to assess the
need for a bridge between the two fields viz. co-evolutionary algorithm de-
sign research and ACE, the latter when using co-evolutionary algorithms
to model socio-economic learning and adaptation. We go through the his-
tory of economic games, in particular bargaining games, leading to under-
standing the need for computational approaches and socio-economic sim-
ulations therein. This is followed by covering research in the two fields
mentioned above including, co-evolutionary algorithm design research, the
use of co-evolutionary algorithms to simulate learning and adaptation in
socio-economic games, the view of bounded rationality in economics and
within these algorithms when used as simulations, the need for disciplining
the use of these algorithms and, some significant efforts in the direction of
disciplining the use of these algorithms. The Chapter ends with highlighting
the missing link (which the thesis tries to then build in the following Chap-
ters) between co-evolutionary algorithm design research and socio-economic
learning simulation research within ACE.
• Chapter 3: This Chapter describes and applies the first part of the holis-
tic framework that we propose for the analysis and refinements of co-
evolutionary algorithms, specifically for a top-down avoidance of mis-interpr-
etations of socio-economic phenomena within simulations. The Chapter
thus promotes the idea behind co-evolutionary solution concepts from co-
evolutionary algorithm design research, within ACE. A systematic study of
previous work is carried out. This work mis-interprets the co-evolutionary
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algorithm used therein in socio-economic terms, showing that a socio-econo-
mic phenomenon (bounded rationality) used for interpretations, explains
the deviations of the algorithm from the envisaged goals (achieving con-
vergence to the subgame perfect equilibrium solution in bargaining games).
We study the work through the lenses of co-evolutionary solutions con-
cepts. We see that we can indeed achieve the envisaged goals from the
simulation by working on the implemented co-evolutionary solution con-
cept, without using the socio-economic phenomenon for explanations. In
effect, we challenge the interpretation of the socio-economic phenomenon
in order for mis-interpretations of the phenomenon to be avoided, using the
notion of co-evolutionary solution concepts. This allows us to understand
what the socio-economic phenomenon does not mean. This further allows
us to bridge the two fields and understand the link in greater detail by want-
ing to understand what the socio-economic phenomenon may mean within
simulations, the methodology for which we then show in the next Chapter.
Part of the work considered in this Chapter, in particular Sections 3.6.3.1
and 3.6.3.2, were published in [26].
• Chapter 4: This Chapter describes and applies the second part of the
holistic framework that we propose for the analysis and refinements of
co-evolutionary algorithms, specifically for a bottom-up avoidance of mis-
interpretations of socio-economic phenomena within simulations. The Chap-
ter thus proposes a methodology which allows for an explicit understanding
of co-evolutionary simulations from the point of view of the socio-economic
phenomena of interest under question. We show that we can reasonably as-
sociate socio-economic phenomena of interest with the elements of the im-
plemented co-evolutionary solution concept. This allows us to parametrise
and quantify the phenomena in explicit terms, by way of parametrising and
quantifying the associated elements. We term the phenomena of interest
thus quantified, as reconciliation variables. We then show how the rela-
tionship between the phenomena of interest and the algorithm (and thus
the model of socio-economic learning and adaptation), can be understood
in a systematic manner. Together with the first part of the framework,
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this methodology relieves us from making implicit assumptions about the
socio-economic phenomena of interest, which previously have been carried
into the simulations unassessed and thus been mis-interpreted, specially
phenomena which do not have an obvious connection with the algorithms
(like bounded rationality, which has generally been assumed to be implic-
itly present in simulations). This helps make the co-evolutionary algorithm
tangible, from the point of view of socio-economic phenomena of interest,
such that the mis-interpretation of the phenomena be altogether avoided
via this tangibility.
• Chapter 5: We conclude in this Chapter, elucidating the grasp on co-
evolutionary algorithms that our framework, which is composed of the use
of co-evolutionary solution concepts and reconciliation variables for analy-
sis and refinements of these algorithms, offers to ACE. Thus we lay out the
contributions of this thesis. We then cover further observations about our
framework, specifically how it complements other work on socio-economic
learning simulation research within ACE, and the weaknesses that still re-
main within the framework. We also cover future research directions our
work enables foreseeing.
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Background
2.1 Introduction
In this Chapter we consider a review of the literature covering the history of socio-
economic games, in particular bargaining games (Section 2.2), as we use these
games as a test bed in order to study co-evolutionary algorithms, in particular
for their usage in socio-economic simulations within ACE. A need for computa-
tional approaches for simulating learning in socio-economic games is highlighted.
This follows a review of co-evolutionary algorithm design research (Section 2.3),
where we highlight the issues that have marred co-evolutionary algorithms and
the manner in which these have been understood and tackled, in particular using
notion behind co-evolutionary solution concepts. These issues can seep into socio-
economic simulations within ACE, as co-evolutionary algorithms are often used
off-the-shelf for these simulations. We thus review their usage in ACE (Section
2.4), highlighting the possible breadth of application of these algorithms and their
unaddressed issues, hence the affected application domains within ACE. We then
review literature on the socio-economic phenomenon of bounded rationality, since
the thesis takes this phenomenon as a case study to scrutinise the off-the-shelf
usage of co-evolutionary algorithms (Section 2.5). Finally, we review the efforts
that have been made in making the adoption of co-evolutionary algorithms more
methodical within the agent based community (Section 2.6), specifically when
using them for simulating socio-economic learning (the domain of application of
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co-evolutionary algorithms within ACE that we are mainly concerned with in this
thesis) and highlight the gap that still remains (Section 2.7). This gap is what
we try to fill in the remainder of the thesis.
2.2 Bargaining
Bargaining, according to [135], and as the name suggests, is a socio-economic
problem in which two individuals meet and cooperate towards the creation of a
commonly desired surplus, where the actual distribution of the surplus puts them
in conflict.
Suppose an individual wants to sell a commodity and another wants to buy it.
Both have a common interest in the transfer of this commodity. Since there can
be many prices at which the commodity can be sold, where the seller prefers a
higher price and the buyer lower, conflict may arise. Note here that the monetary
difference in what the seller wants and what the buyer wants to pay is termed as
surplus. So, if the two do not cooperate, there would be no commodity transfer
and hence, no surplus. In order to resolve the potential deadlock so as not to lose
out on the joint gains (commodity at a lower price for the buyer and a good price
for the commodity for the seller) that come about as a result of the commodity
transfer, they have to find some way to reach an agreement on the price. Various
social, economic and political scenarios which fit the definition are listed in [135],
for example, a couple deciding on how to split intra-household chores, negotiations
on a labour contract between a firm and a union, two unfriendly nations trying to
reach a lasting peace agreement. Of more relevance to this research is a parallel
scenario, with potential that may help understand and inform the above scenarios
better, that of computational agents deciding on how much of a certain resource
they might need. More on this theme will be elaborated on shortly.
According to [135], a bargaining problem essentially has three basic elements:
an arrangement that is expected to take place when the involved parties are
unable to reach an agreement (also called the disagreement point or the status-
quo situation); the existence of mutual gains from cooperation; and the multitude
of possible cooperative arrangements in case of an agreement leading to a split of
the surplus.
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2.2.1 Bargaining Before Game Theory
Bargaining problems were initially called bilateral monopolies and were deemed
indeterminate [45] in orthodox economics [69]. It was argued in [150], that the
most one can say about the problem was that the result (or solution) will lie in
the bargaining set.
If a solution is in the bargaining set then it is said to be both individually and
collectively rational. Individual rationality means that neither party should end
up with pay-offs worse than what they get if an agreement is not reached (i.e.
worse than the status-quo). Collective rationality refers to the concept of Pareto
efficiency. An outcome is Pareto efficient if no outcome exists which is strictly
preferred by one player and not less preferred by any other. Deviating from this
outcome would make one player better off at the expense of the other. Pareto
efficient outcomes are also referred to as outcomes lying on the contract curve
[45] or the pareto-efficient frontier.
According to [69], Zeuthen attempted to provide a more determinate predic-
tion (antedating the theory of games [150]) where the solution to the bargaining
problem could be dictated by the parties’ attitudes towards risk of a breakdown.
If a party’s readiness to risk a conflict (also termed as determination) is greater
than the other, then the other party tends to make a concession. The process
involves each party making a concession until no more concessions are possible
due to the indivisibility of the monetary unit, setting a lower limit on the size of
the admissible concessions. In the symmetric case (where the determination of
each party is equal), an equal division of the bargaining surplus is obtained (a
determinate solution!).
2.2.2 Assumptions in Game Theory and the Need for
Computational Approaches
To make mathematical analysis possible, game theory often makes simplifying
assumptions. Two of the most common assumptions made being players having
complete information and them being perfectly rational.
Complete information refers to the fact that every player of the game knows
the strategies and payoffs available to the other players. The players may not
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however have knowledge inside the game. If they do then the game is thought of
being that of perfect information. For example, in the case of prisoner’s dilemma,
complete information about the strategies and the payoffs available to the players
may be known but the players do not necessarily know the moves of the opponent
in any particular round of the game (or in the first round, depending on it being
a one shot or a repeated game). This lack of information or uncertainty inside the
game makes it a game of imperfect information. On the contrary, a sequential
game (for example, the bargaining game that we consider in this thesis in the
Chapters to follow) where, at each decision point, the choices that have previously
been made are known, is said to be that of perfect information.
A game is that of incomplete information if something about the circumstances
in which the game is being played is not known to the players [58]. For example,
the utility functions (or preferences) of the players (in the bargaining context) may
not be known. In such a game however, the players may be forced to consider
an infinite (because any piece of information has infinite hierarchical levels of
being known, in terms of knowledge of the knowledge ad infinitum) hierarchy of
beliefs1 [18, 70]. Incomplete information of other player’s preferences and beliefs
is modelled by game theorists by specifying a limited number of player types
[58, 70]. Types essentially determine the preferences and beliefs uniquely. Players
are not certain about the opponent’s type but the probability that the opponent
is of a certain type, i.e. probability of a type of the opponent conditioned on
the opponent, is common knowledge2. The game is then said to be transformed
into that of imperfect information. Imperfect information games are useful for
studying phenomenon like reputation building [128]. The assumption of perfect
rationality follows from the assumption of common knowledge on how players
reason.
These assumptions limit the practical applicability of game theoretic solu-
tions. Moreover, real life trading situations do not assume complete information
and perfect rationality. Both humans and computational agents have limited
information and forward looking capabilities. As stated in [58], many tasks are
1Beliefs are probabilities of events happening about which the player is uncertain.
2Knowing information about players, and the players knowing that the information is
known, and knowing that the players know that the information is known, ad infinitum, de-
scribes the notion of common knowledge.
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learnt through a process of trial and error (i.e. through experience). Additionally,
agents may be programmed by different parties implying them having different
capabilities. Assuming perfect rationality about their behaviours will thus be
erroneous. Indeed, an agent “satisfices” [138] (see Section 2.5), given the infor-
mation it has, when it has it.
According to [129], if an agent has little a-priori knowledge about the environ-
ment and it gradually adapts in the quest for an optimal solution (by interacting
with its environment through a process of trial and error), it can be said to be
boundedly rational [60, 133, 138] (see Section 2.5).
In a computational scenario with intelligent agents, due to the advent of new
computational modelling tools, the limiting game theoretic assumptions of full
rationality and complete information are unnecessary and not required anymore.
This is because the behaviour of agents can be modelled directly [58] in their
“full dynamic capacity” [145]. Agents can use machine learning techniques to
improve on their strategies (after being put into the environment with a certain
strategy). After a period of learning, the agents may be able to exhibit behaviours
resembling rational and fully informed agents.
Considering the above, computational techniques are thus a positive way for-
ward and may have many advantages, two of which, for the kind of application of
these techniques that this thesis is concerned with, being: the ability to be used
for understanding game play in realistic environments and the ability to analyse
game theoretic settings which are too complex to be analysed analytically, thus
cumbersome or even intractable.
2.2.3 Game Theoretic Approaches to Bargaining
There are essentially two branches of bargaining theory and game theory in gen-
eral: cooperative or axiomatic and non-cooperative or strategic.
In cooperative game theory, pre-play communication is allowed and the players
can co-operate into reaching binding agreements. Given a set of feasible outcomes
(the bargaining set) which are the outcomes that can be jointly achieved by play-
ers concerned, finding a solution from within this set without calling into question
how the players reach it, is the main idea behind the cooperative approach. A
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number of properties (or axioms or assumptions) that the solution to the bargain-
ing problem should have are proposed and the outcome which best agrees with
these properties is chosen as the solution. This theory was born with Nash [101].
The theory answers the question of how bargaining should be resolved between
rational parties in accordance with some desirable principles [135].
The non-cooperative approach, initiated by Nash [103, 104] relies on the exact
specification of the situation under study (bargaining or negotiation in the current
context) as games and the identification of the behaviours occurring in these
games. Here, an exact specification signifies specification of the protocol using
which the players interact, the strategies the players can use, the payoffs they
can get, the information available etc. This approach to game theoretic problems
and bargaining in particular describes how the bargaining process may evolve or
proceed in the presence of common knowledge of rationality ([135]).
An overview of the bargaining literature from these two branches of game
theory is considered next.
2.2.3.1 Cooperative/Axiomatic Approach
Nash [101] was the first to contribute to the axiomatic theory of bargaining. A
bargaining problem (more specifically, a Nash bargaining problem) is represented
by a pair (S, d) in utility1 space where S is a closed, bounded above and convex
subset of R2 and is the set of feasible2 utility pairs, and d is the point in S
representing the payoffs that players get in case of a disagreement. Accordingly,
a solution (also referred to as a solution concept3) to the bargaining problem
is a function that maps a feasible set of utility pairs to one of its feasible points,
i.e. F : (S, d)→ s, where the utility pair s ∈ S, in the above context. Note that
the nature of S dictates the validity of a solution concept.
An example of a solution concept is the disagreement solution [135] which as-
signs the point d to the bargaining problem and is rather pessimistic (as evident).
This solution is not pareto-efficient as it does not exploit the gains from reaching
1Utility can also be seen as the payoff a party or player gets.
2A point is feasible if it is possible to select it, in the sense that, it can represent a feasible
pair of payoffs that may result from a game between two players.
3See Glossary.
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a cooperative agreement. The dictatorial solution [88], where one bargainer acts
as a dictator, assigns the point in the bargaining set where the other bargainer
receives zero utility as the solution to the problem. As can be seen, this solution
seems unfair.
Nash [101] proposed four desirable properties that a bargaining solution should
possess:
1. The final outcome does not depend on how the utility scales are calibrated
as different utility functions can be used to model the same preferences.
2. The agreed payoff pair should be in the bargaining set (individually and
collectively rational).
3. Certain utility pairs are irrelevant in that if players agree on a pair s when t
is also feasible, then t is never agreed on when s is feasible. The decision on
choosing s does not depend on t whether or not t is present in the feasible
region. This axiom is also called independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA).
4. Both players get the same in symmetric situations (if the player’s labels are
reversed, each will still receive the same payoff).
The solution proposed by Nash [101], satisfying the four properties above, is
the utility pair s = (u1, u2), where u1 and u2 are utilities or payoffs of the players,
which maximises the Nash product (u1−d1)(u2−d2), where d = (d1, d2)1 and this
solution is unique [101]. If one relaxes the symmetry axiom, the bargaining powers
(does not mean bargaining skills due to the assumption of perfect rationality, but
possibly, strength due to market positions for instance) of players dictates the
solution (according to [19], this is also called the generalised Nash bargaining
solution). It is the payoff pair s = (u1, u2) which maximises the product (u1 −
d1)α(u2 − d2)β, where α and β are the bargaining powers of the players.
Attitudes of bargainers towards the risk of a breakdown or disagreement also
effects the payoff that they receive if one follows Nash’s solution concept. Consider
1d1 and d2 are the payoffs that the players get on a disagreement. They could well be zero,
in which case the Nash product is simply u1u2.
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Figure 2.1: Possible utility functions for risk averse and risk neutral bargainers.
the utility functions in Figure 2.1. These are of the form u(s) = sα, where
0 < α ≤ 1 and the smaller the α, the more risk averse the bargainer is (risk
averse player 1 is more risk averse than risk averse player 2 in the figure). In the
symmetric case (when the bargaining powers are equal), a more risk averse player
gets a lower portion of the surplus, as shown in [19] and [135]. A risk neutral
bargainer (α = 1) will get a higher share of the surplus when confronting either
of the other two players shown in the figure.
Nash’s IIA axiom was the subject of severe criticism [92]. As per [135], Nash’s
solution does not consider global issues (in terms of the bargaining situation
at hand) such as the highest utility each bargainer can obtain. An alternative
solution to the Nash’s bargaining solution was proposed in [83]. They define the
notion of having a utopia point. If ai(S) be the highest utility player i can achieve
(also called aspiration level) then the utopia point is the point in R2 (typically
not feasible) denoting the aspiration levels of each player (a1(S), a2(S)). The
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution thus selects the maximum element on the line that
joins the disagreement point (d1, d2) with the utopia point (a1(S), a2(S)) and in
the bargaining set. Other solution concepts replacing the IIA axiom can be found
in [125] and [146].
Another solution concept is that of egalitarianism [100]. An egalitarian solu-
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tion is a point on the pareto-efficient frontier where utilities for the players are
equal. This solution is more tied to ethical behaviour than to principles governing
bargaining between rational individuals. Also, if a bargaining solution maximises
the sum of the utilities, it is said to be a utilitarian solution [100]. Due to inter-
personal comparisons of utilities being possible in both egalitarian and utilitarian
solution concepts, Nash’s axiom of solutions being independent of utility calibra-
tions does not hold. Cooperative theories of bargaining are discussed in greater
detail in [126].
Traditionally, bargaining problems have involved parties trying to reach an
agreement over a single issue e.g. the division of a surplus (price of a commodity
for instance). Such bargaining situations are termed as distributive [15] in that
a gain for one player always creates a loss for the other. The above mentioned
solution concepts were initially developed for single issue bargaining problems.
Often though, individuals have several goals which they want to achieve, mo-
tivated by self-interest. This, in economic literature, is termed as individuals
having multiple issues to deal with (e.g. price of a commodity, delivery time,
quantity etc.). A very important point with multi-issue bargaining situations is
that parties have preference relations between issues such that when dealing with
another party, a mutually beneficial outcome can be agreed upon by exploring
the trade-offs that the issues present. As opposed to distributive bargaining, it
becomes possible for one side to gain without the other side getting less. Such
negotiation scenarios are termed integrative [15]. Moreover, due to the existence
of trade-off agreements, multi-issue bargaining is less competitive as opposed to
single issue scenarios which are often also termed as competitive negotiations [68].
In the case where multiple issues are involved, these concepts can still be ap-
plied provided we can transform the combined utility space (each issue occupying
one dimension in the space) into a single issue utility space. This can be done
by utilising a multi-attribute utility function [58, 120] 1. This utility mapping is
appropriate only if the issues are independent (i.e. contribution of one issue is
1A multi-attribute utility function defines utility over multiple weighted attributes (or is-
sues). The relationships or trade-offs between issues are assumed given in this case and are the
weights assigned to each issue. The weights indicate preferences or the relative importance one
gives to the issues. The utility is thus calculated by multiplying the outcome on each attribute
(outcome on each issue) with the weight associated with it and adding across all the issues.
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independent of the values of the others). Once the preferences of the bargainers
are mapped onto the multi-attribute utility function, the problem reduces to that
of a single issue. Examples of such problems can be found in [120].
2.2.3.2 Non-cooperative/Strategic Approach
As mentioned previously, details of the negotiation process are specified in this
case. There are various protocols (which may be called games) that researchers
have used to specify the bargaining process. The idea is that bargainers will
use these protocols while deciding on the division of the surplus and some be-
haviour will emerge. The goal is to study procedures that are reasonable (specify
the interaction procedure or protocol in a simplistic yet realistic manner) and
identify rational behaviour within them. To determine rational outcomes of a
game, the concept of equilibrium is used in this approach. The two most widely
used equilibrium concepts are Nash equilibrium due to [102] and Subgame perfect
equilibrium due to [133]:
Nash Equilibrium: If no player can benefit by unilaterally changing its strategy,
then the strategies chosen by all players are said to be in a Nash equilibrium.
Every finite game has at least one such equilibrium point ([102, 103]).
A game is said to be one of extensive form if it can be represented by a tree
and the players can make decisions sequentially at various stages or rounds of the
game (at nodes of the tree which are also called decision points).
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Considering an extensive form game, the
strategies are said to be in subgame perfect equilibrium if they constitute a Nash
equilibrium at every decision point.
To illustrate the difference between Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect
equilibrium, let us consider the simple version of a two round Chain-Store game
[134] with the game tree structure and the payoff matrix as shown in Figure 2.2.
The tree illustrates the extensive form version of the game, whereas the matrix
shows the normal form version. The idea is that there is an incumbent firm having
a monopoly in a market. It is threatened by a new entrant firm which may or
may not enter (IN and OUT moves). In case the entrant enters, the options
for the incumbent are to FIGHT or NOT FIGHT the entrant. The payoffs are
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as shown in Figure 2.2. It can be seen that, in the normal form version, if the
incumbent chooses to NOT FIGHT, the rational choice for the entrant is IN (and
vice versa, if the entrant chooses IN, the rational choice for the incumbent is to
NOT FIGHT), thus NOT FIGHT and IN are one Nash equilibrium. There is
another Nash equilibrium, that where, if the incumbent chooses to FIGHT, the
rational thing to do for the entrant is to stay OUT (and vice versa, if the entrant
stays OUT, the incumbent will have to be choosing or intending to choose FIGHT,
otherwise the entrant will choose to get IN). So, there are two Nash equilibria
in the game. One of these however is more attractive if we expand the game
into its extensive form. Taking this view, the players move sequentially with the
entrant choosing their move first and the incumbent choosing once the entrant
has made a choice. Fully rational players will have the tree laid out in front of
them with the respective payoffs, from the very start. If so, the entrant will know
that the only way it is getting a positive payoff once the incumbent has made
its choice in the next round, is by entering (IN) and that the incumbent will
have to choose to NOT FIGHT, otherwise it will get a negative payoff. Thus,
there is an equilibrium where the entrant chooses to go IN and the incumbent
choose to NOT FIGHT. Taking the sub tree depicted in the Figure, which is
known as the subgame, the best the incumbent can do is to NOT FIGHT, and
this happens given the entrant choose to move IN. Thus, this subgame has an
equilibrium too. We can see that in the extensive form version of the game, every
subgame (including the full game tree) has the same Nash (because it satisfies
the definition of no player unilaterally choosing to play differently) equilibrium.
This is the subgame perfect equilibrium. The process of looking at the entire tree
and working out the best moves, given the opponents best moves from the last
to the first round is called backward induction and we will see later how this can
be used for the bargaining case.
We now consider some games studied in strategic bargaining literature. The
first bargaining model to be considered as a non-cooperative game was introduced
in [104]. This is called the Nash demand game. The idea is that two players simul-
taneously demand a utility level or a part of the surplus. There is no knowledge
of the other player’s demand. If the sum of the demands exceeds the surplus, the
players receive their disagreement payoff otherwise they get their respective parts.
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Figure 2.2: Example of the simple two round Chain-Store game [134] showing
the difference between Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
This game admits an infinite number of Nash equilibria. The outcomes on the
pareto-efficient frontier (i.e. collectively rational payoff pairs) are all equilibrium
points. Moreover, the disagreement point is also a Nash equilibrium. Suppose
the players chose a point on the pareto-frontier. It can be easily seen that any
player would only decrease their payoff by moving away from the frontier. Also, if
both demand more than the entire surplus, they will get the disagreement payoff
even if they unilaterally want change their strategy.
Another game, considered less competitive and more generous from the point
of view of throwing away of the surplus (which may easily happen in the Nash
demand game), is the Ultimatum game [19]. It provides a model for the simplest
of all bargaining procedures and is realistic in the sense, it is the bargaining
procedure normally employed by us in stores [19]. This is a one or two round
game in which the second round is similar to the Nash demand game. In the
first round, one player proposes a split of the surplus and the other player has
to decide on whether to accept or reject the offer. In case the offer is rejected,
both players either get nothing or the Nash demand game is played. The usual
definition says that the game ends in case the responder rejects the offer and both
players get nothing [19]. This game has a subgame (trivially, the entire game)
and has a subgame perfect equilibrium in the event where one player demands
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the whole surplus and the second accepts this deal. The game again admits a
continuum of Nash equilibrium outcomes (the pareto efficient outcomes).
One of the most elegant protocols [58] extends the aforementioned ultimatum
game to multiple rounds. It models negotiations as they take place over time and
is referred to as the alternating offers game. This game is considered throughout
the thesis. As mentioned in [58] and [135], work on this bargaining model has
been pioneered by Stahl. The game can be characterised as being that of either a
finite horizon (or finite number of rounds/periods) or an infinite horizon (studied
by Rubinstein [127]). Assuming the surplus is of size 1, in period 0, Player 1
starts by making a proposal (a division of the surplus, proposing x for himself).
Player 2 can either accept or reject the proposal. If he accepts, Player 1 gets x
and Player 2, 1−x. If he rejects, they meet again at the negotiation table after a
period of time and then (period 1) the roles of the players switch. Now Player 2
makes a counter offer, which Player 1 then accepts or rejects (sending the game
to the next round). In the finite horizon game, there is a finite number of rounds
i.e. there is a deadline. If an agreement has not been reached until the deadline,
both players receive zero payoff. In the infinite horizon game there is always a
new proposal in the follow up periods until an agreement is reached. Starting at
the last stage of the game and working backwards inductively leads to the identi-
fication of optimal strategies for rational players with perfect information. This
approach is similar to dynamic programming and is also the idea behind finding
equilibrium strategies which are optimal responses at every point in the game
and not just at the beginning of the game for all players concerned. The strate-
gies thus obtained are in subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). To predict optimal
outcomes in dynamic games such as the alternating offers game, one often comes
across the term discount factor. A discount factor models the utility of a future
outcome as present valuations as expectations. In other words, a player values
future events but not as much as present events, but not because he does not ap-
preciate the future event happening, instead, because he may be unsure of them
happening. In effect, a discount factor models how impatient a player is.
To give an idea of how this backward induction mechanism and discount
factors work, lets consider a two stage alternating offers game. Suppose the
surplus size is 1 and the utility functions are linear. We know that SPE in an
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ultimatum game is (1, 0), where the first player gets the whole of the surplus
leaving the second with nothing. Suppose, in the two round game, a node is
reached where Player 2 has to make an offer. This round on is a subgame of the
actual game and can be seen as an ultimatum game by Player 2. In this case,
Player 2 will play his SPE strategy and offer (0, 1), i.e., full surplus for himself.
The expected payoff at this node is dictated by the discount factors of both
players (say δ1 and δ2). The expected utilities will thus be (0.δ1, 1.δ2) = (0, δ2).
Now, if we traverse backwards into the previous round of the game, Player 1’s
optimal move, with what is expected in the next round known, would be to make
an offer which makes Player 2 indifferent between whether to accept or reject.
This offer is (1 − δ2, δ2). In a way, Player 1 convinces Player 2 not to take the
entire surplus (in case the negotiations go to the second round), by offering him
the present discounted value of the entire surplus. Note that if Player 1 offers
anything lower than δ2 to Player 2, he will end up with nothing as Player 2 will
reject the offer and play his equilibrium strategy with the counter offer of (0, δ2).
Also, rationality will make Player 1 not to offer Player 2 anything more than δ2.
The offer (1− δ2, δ2), as it will result in δ2 for Player 2, will be accepted by him,
as by doing so, he will be playing his rational move. The strategies resulting
in the outcome (1 − δ2, δ2) are in subgame perfect equilibrium as no player will
benefit from unilaterally changing his strategy at any round of the game i.e., the
strategy is a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the two round game. We can
also see that if Player 2 is very impatient, δ2 will be nearly zero and in this case,
Player 1 will get nearly all the surplus. On the other hand, if δ2 is nearly one,
Player 2 will get the major share. Also, the agreement takes place immediately.
Such a backward induction process is usually used to determine the outcome of
rational play in dynamic games such as this. Similar logic applies and continues
to any number of rounds.
Rubenstein [127] demonstrated that Nash equilibrium does not restrict the
outcomes i.e. a unique solution to the alternating offers problem cannot be found
using the Nash equilibrium concept. In fact, any agreement (x, 1 − x), in any
period t of the game where 0 ≤ t < ∞, can be supported as a Nash equilibrium
outcome [127]. However, the concept of SPE was applied by [127] showing that
there exists a unique SPE in the alternating offers bargaining model specified by
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the partitioning where Player 1 gets (1 − δ2)/(1 − δ1δ2) (δ1 and δ2 being fixed
discounting factors of the players) and Player 2 gets the remainder of the surplus
immediately (in the first round of the game). The time period between two
stages of the game is usually not taken to be unity. If τ is the period between
two stages, then δi is replaced by δτi everywhere. An important point to make
here is that for small time intervals between rounds i.e., if τ → 0 ⇒ δ → 1,
this unique SPE outcome approximates the generalised Nash bargaining solution.
This important result was convincingly proven in [20]. The limiting case of τ → 0
is significant in that, in real world situations, the optimal thing to do for a
negotiator, once he rejects an offer, is to make a counter offer as soon as possible
without sticking to a strict timetable [19]. This result essentially established a
link between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory and is called the Nash
Program [19]. As an aside, note that using computational methods to establish
a link between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory is an interesting
concept and may be seen as a Nash program too, but this is just our conjecture,
and to our knowledge, not been seen in this light before. Whether it is interesting
or not is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss.
The Rubinstein-Stahl alternating offers game, as this alternating offers proto-
col is called, has had many applications in real world situations e.g. bargaining
problems concerning international trade, industrial organisation, political econ-
omy etc. [135]. More on infinite horizon games and its applications to decen-
tralised trading situations is given in [110]. The prevalence of this protocol is one
motivation for us to consider it in this thesis.
Yet another protocol studied in the non-cooperative bargaining literature is
the monotonic concession protocol [123]. Two players simultaneously announce
their proposals and an agreement is reached if both offers match or the offer
exceeds the other player’s demand. Tossing a coin decides on which one of the
two offers to chose from, in case they are dissimilar. In case of a disagreement,
the players make new offers which need to be higher in utility for the other player
than the utility he (the other player) would get from the previous offer, implying
monotonic concession. The player can either make the same offer in which case
he is said to be standing firm, or could concede. If both players stand firm,
negotiations end and both receive a disagreement payoff. More on this protocol
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can be found in [123].
According to [119], in the multi-issue case, the protocols under which bar-
gaining may take place, can be divided into global or simultaneous, separate and
sequential types. As the name suggests, global bargaining calls for having to
bargain over all the issues simultaneously while separate bargaining allows for
negotiations to take place over issues separately and independently. The third
case involves negotiations taking place over issues in a sequential manner. Se-
quential bargaining can further be divided into independent and simultaneous,
depending on whether or not players can benefit from an agreement over an issue.
In the independent implementation, an agreement over an issue excludes them
from being considered in future bargaining rounds and the agreed upon issues are
no longer discounted. On the contrary, the simultaneous version makes players
wait until all issues have been considered before benefits from them can be en-
joyed. As may be evident, if one negotiates over issues in a sequential manner, the
question of which issues one should consider bargaining over first arises. There
are two main bodies of work dealing with this issue. The order in which different
issues are brought on to the negotiation table (also called agenda) can be set
either exogenously or endogenously by the players. In the former case, since each
issue is bargained over one at a time, Rubinstein’s results of uniqueness of the
equilibrium and that of it being pareto-efficient hold [135]. Fershtman [51, 52]
studies exogenous agenda games in the case where the players attach different
importance to different issues. Usually however, either the importance associated
with issues is equal (for instance, see [14]) or the players have identical preferences
[24] (i.e. a player attaches the same importance to an issue as the other). More
realistic games with players having to endogenously decide on the agenda have
been studied in [78] and [77]. As per [77], offers can be made in any subset of
remaining issues and a unique subgame perfect equilibrium agreement is shown
to have been obtained.
A case in point to make here is that the reason having a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium for a game is important is that such games become easier
to have as validation benchmarks, i.e. it becomes easier to test new approaches
(from outside game theory) to solutions to these games by comparing the results
with game theoretic ones (i.e with equilibrium outcomes). We elaborate on this
35
2.2 Bargaining
point in Chapter 3.
2.2.4 Computational Approaches to Bargaining
Modelling human socio-economic learning behaviour using computational ap-
proaches necessitates getting rid of the notion of having to make simplifying
assumptions of rationality and common knowledge used frequently in game theo-
retic analysis. Techniques from artificial intelligence have been shown to attempt
modelling such behaviours to good effect and rational behaviours have often been
shown to emerge. However, these techniques have many issues, which we will dis-
cuss in Section 2.3, specifically for one popular technique considered throughout
this thesis: co-evolutionary algorithms.
The idea with computational approaches is to make the agents interact with
each other according to some interaction protocol and let them, in time, learn
from these interactions. An agent can learn the bargaining strategy specifying
the actions it should take during the course of play while adapting the strategies
over interactions. In other words, an agent can learn and see how to modify its
strategy based on previously played bargaining games and try to amend previous
mistakes as necessary. The agent may modify its strategy on the fly (whilst in
a game) at the same time as well. The latter situation may arise if the agent is
unsure of the opponents preferences or type and tries to form beliefs letting it
fine tune its behaviour.
Genetic algorithms have been used [107] to learn negotiation1 strategies in
both single and multiple issue bargaining settings. Agent strategies were repre-
sented as binary coded strings which encode the threshold (determining whether
an offer should be accepted or not) and a counter offer (in case of rejection of the
offer by the opponent and if the deadline has still not been reached). A similar
model is studied in [58, 59], and motivates much of the work in this thesis, a de-
tailed discussion of which is considered in Chapter 3. It encodes the strategies as
a string of real numbers. The evolution of negotiation strategies where the offers
and counter offers are generated by combining tactical information encoded in
the strategies was studied in [97]. Two populations (buyer and seller) compete
1Note that negotiation and bargaining are used interchangeably in the thesis.
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with each other and the strategies are co-evolved.
Apart from learning bargaining behaviours, techniques from machine learning
such as bayesian belief models have also been used to figure out the opponent’s
type [87] and thresholds of offer acceptabilities [160]. The problem with using
beliefs to adapt agent strategies is that agents should be able to form beliefs of
opponents beliefs and this belief structure continues in an infinite regress. As
pointed out earlier (Section 2.2.2), [70] suggested limiting the number of player
types with the preferences of each type being common knowledge to get around
this problem of infinite regress, making mathematical analysis possible. However,
when using computational agents, the notion of bounded rationality and limited
reasoning relieves us from having to know the beliefs of opponent’s beliefs and
so on. The use of kernel density estimation to approximate the preferences of
the opponent (in the multi-issue bargaining case) in order to let the agents make
more effective negotiation trade-offs, is investigated in [34].
We are essentially concerned with co-evolutionary algorithms in this thesis
and the manner in which they have been applied or adopted, specifically as mod-
elling socio-economic learning (as one of the things they are meant to be doing in
ACE). We choose bargaining games to explore and understand issues, and pro-
pose solutions to the issues, with the application of these algorithms. There is
a gap in understanding co-evolutionary algorithms when used for socio-economic
simulations. There are problems with these algorithms which are generally over-
looked within ACE, causing those problems to transfer into socio-economic sim-
ulations. We consider co-evolutionary algorithm design research, highlighting
problems with these methods in Section 2.3. This is followed by looking at the
use of co-evolutionary algorithms in socio-economic simulations (Section 2.4) and
significant efforts in the literature trying to bridge the gap (Section 2.6). This
thesis is yet another effort in this direction, as the Chapters to follow will reveal.
2.3 Co-evolutionary Algorithms
Co-evolution is the process of adaptation, that occurs amongst agents interacting
with each other in some manner, in turn revealing a reward structure, towards
increasingly complex or refined behaviours. Co-evolutionary algorithms were in-
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troduced into the field of evolutionary computation as an alternative to tradi-
tional evolutionary optimisation methods, which were based on optimising with
an explicitly defined fitness function. On the contrary the fitness of an individ-
ual in co-evolutionary algorithms is evaluated and depends on other individuals
co-evolving with it. Of much influence was the work in [72]. The problem that
co-evolution tackled there was the problem of optimising sorting networks. Co-
evolutionary algorithm were deemed superior to genetic algorithms (one type of
evolutionary algorithm), the latter based on a hand designed fitness function.
Co-evolution was used in this work, i.e. in [72], as an alternative to evolutionary
methods, for search efficiency reasons. The nature of the problem did not impose
using co-evolutionary algorithms. A static function could have been designed by
hand, i.e. the fitness landscape does have a structure that allows for evaluating
and comparing solution performances, yet co-evolution results in better search.
The interaction between opponents to choose from for fitness evaluation was also
seen important for better performance of co-evolution over standard evolutionary
methods.
The view of co-evolution as an optimising mechanism with advantages over
standard evolutionary methods was generally understood as being caused by the
popular “arms race” hypothesis. Taking the view of host-parasite interactions
[124] for purposes of explaining what this means, the general idea was that, the
success of the host against parasites depends on the host out-competing the para-
site in some manner. This results in new challenges for the parasite to overcome.
As the parasite evolves, upon tackling the challenges, this creates new challenges
for the host to overcome. Thus, the challenges are continuously created and
bounced across from one side to the other. This may lead to an arms race, and
thus creates an environment where increasingly complex or refined behaviours
may result.
As suggested in [106] and further pointed out in [98], “competing populations
may reciprocally drive one another to increasing levels of complexity by produc-
ing an evolutionary arms race”. However, it is also pointed out in [98], that
arms races do not imply an increase in complexity, but instead they imply mu-
tual efficiency or refined behaviours between lineages. Nevertheless, in general,
the advantages that co-evolutionary algorithms have over standard evolutionary
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methods has been seen as coming from co-evolution creating an arms race, co-
evolving individuals having to deal with a variety of opponents, making general
behaviours appear, and co-evolution possibly preventing stagnation within local
optima. These advantages are not all free from their own specific pitfalls however.
Gradual changes in the selection environment that creates a shift in challenges
from mild to increasingly difficult (arms race) can, in fact, lead to one popula-
tion “utterly” [98] defeating the other, which leads to “disengagement” or “loss
of gradient” [154]. This, as pointed out in [98], would be similar to an “extinc-
tion event” in nature. With regard to generalisation giving solutions that are
capable of out-competing a wide variety of opponents, a standard search problem
may not necessitate this, as there is only one problem to solve. Then, it really
depends on what one wants from co-evolution. This may result in diversity in
the population that further aids search, but it may as well lead to phenomenon
known as mediocre stable states [118] or collusion. This can be seen as a form
of dynamic local optima where the population may just cycle around the search
space. The issue of generalisation has recently been considered theoretically so as
to understand how co-evolution can lead to solutions that, on an average, will be
better at coping with a variety of opponents [28]. The goal there [28] is to study
co-evolution and define a progress measure in terms of generalisation, rather than
use co-evolution as an optimisation tool to solve a particular problem.
Arguments above lend a view of co-evolution that puts their use as simply an
alternative to standard evolutionary algorithms into question. Co-evolution has
however also been used to study and simulate the open-ended emergence of be-
haviours [140], reduction of domain knowledge required to learn complex control
[90] etc. At the same time, games have been used as test beds to understand the
co-evolutionary process properly [28, 36]. In general, these arguments also suggest
that co-evolution has problems and that it is an engineered approach to optimi-
sation and indeed an engineered simulation tool, if used as the latter. Further
elaborating on co-evolution being an engineered product for artificial simulations,
a look at the interaction and fitness evaluation detail is taken into consideration in
[98]. As suggested [98], co-evolutionary algorithms developed so far tend to offer
trade-offs (i.e. they are engineered to offer trade-offs) between “fairness”, “gen-
erality” and “computational cost”. Fairness here means considering evaluating
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individuals against opponents which offer the same level of difficulty. Generality
suggests diversity in the competitive environment within which an individual is
evaluated. Computational cost suggests the cost of evaluating against a group
(of a certain size) of opponents.
Note that, already, it is becoming clear that co-evolutionary algorithms are
themselves marred with problems. Imagining their use, and that too off-the-shelf,
for socio-economic simulation, as we will consider in detail in Section 2.4, does
not relieve co-evolution and thus socio-economic simulations from problems. The
need for a methodical approach to understanding co-evolution will only help in
understanding the use of it as a simulation tool in applications of interest. As
such, this understanding has a potential to make their application methodical
too. Note that co-evolutionary algorithms considered in this thesis fall under
the category of competitive co-evolution, the other category being cooperative co-
evolution [156]. The main difference between the two is that the latter involves
the co-evolution of parts of the solution to the problem being tackled, such that
these parts are eventually brought together into forming the solution.
We now consider research into the pitfalls in co-evolutionary algorithms to
highlight some efforts towards discovering and addressing them. This is followed
by elaborating on the idea behind co-evolutionary solution concepts, which we
use as a design tool in this thesis, to understand and address issues with co-
evolutionary simulations.
The problems discovered in co-evolution essentially spin out of the lack of a
method in designing these algorithms. It is not hard to see why these algorithms
were then chosen off-the-shelf for socio-econonmic simulation, and really empha-
sises the lack of knowledge exchange between the two fields: co-evolutionary algo-
rithm design research and socio-economic simulation research (more specifically
agent based computational economics research, a detailed discussion of which is
carried out in Section 2.4). Essentially, the problems in co-evolution can be listed
as follows:
• Intransitivity: This suggests that the nature of the global fitness land-
scape, which is unknown apriori, may be such that, given three individuals
X , Y and Z, if X is superior to Y , and Y is superior to Z, it does not neces-
sarily follow that X will be superior to Z. Essentially, X may have evolved
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(locally or temporarily i.e. without having any idea about Z) against Y , and
Y may have evolved locally against Z, the adaptations that make X defeat
Y may not make X defeat Z. The way superiority is defined is thus called
into question and implies local progress. This phenomenon has been called
by many names in the literature viz. “cycles” [106], “relativism” [154],
“mediocre stable states” [118], “collusion” [118] and “red queen dynamics”
[112].
• Loss of gradient: Out-competing opponents utterly is the suggested idea
here [154]. The gradient is lost if one population “utterly” defeats the
opponent population i.e. any individual in the winning population is able
to “utterly” defeat any individual in the opponent population. The gradient
may still be there in case of real valued scores from interactions, but the
defeated population may be “hopelessly maladaptive” [98].
• Parasitism: Reaping “easy gains” [154] against opponents by exploiting
specific weaknesses can allow primitive individuals to thrive at the expense
of more sophisticated opponents [141], and can lead to “displacement” of
promising opponents [98].
• Forgetting: The loss of certain characteristics or “traits” [53] from the
entire population of individuals such that these traits may have resulted in
a gain in fitness at some later point in time during co-evolution, is termed
forgetting. This is also known as “focusing” [154] if the loss is due to drift
caused by the biases in the variation operators, and the selection pressure
becomes too narrow.
• Fitness deception: The nature of the search problem may result in certain
solutions being more prevalent in the population and depending on the type
of interaction mechanism used to calculate fitness, reduce the value of the
more optimal solution, thus resulting in what is known as fitness deception
[39, 54].
A generic remedy for these pathologies [53] in co-evolution is that of maintaing
diversity at both the genotypic and phenotypic level, as mentioned in [53], and
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there are various ways diversity has been injected. These include, halting co-
evolution in one population [109, 113], spacial populations [72, 111], multiple
isolated (in the sense reproduction across populations is prohibited) populations
[23, 76], and speciation techniques [36, 37, 81, 124].
In general, there is a major problem echoed across co-evolutionary algorithm
design literature that co-evolution does not do what is expected of it. The dis-
crepancy between expected and actual outcomes from co-evolution is not just
because of technical limitations in the algorithm [98], but also due to the fun-
damental nature of the search problem being addressed by co-evolution, which
is complex enough to have lead previous work in co-evolutionary algorithm de-
sign research to have made unassessed assumptions. Essentially, assuming that
progress towards an expected outcome will happen if an intuitive design of the al-
gorithm suggests so, has been shown to be clearly wrong. The notion of progress
is broken down into three types in [98], viz. local, historical and global, in order
to elaborate on these assumptions. It is noted in [98], that there were two implicit
assumptions in early co-evolutionary algorithm design research, namely:
• Local progress implies historical progress [98]: The assumption here
is that an arms race is expected from co-evolution if new individuals are
“superior” to their ancestors. The meaning of superiority is non-trivial
in co-evolution however, as there is no fixed fitness function that can be
used to measure the performance of an individual. This fitness function
needs proper definition and is linked with the other parts of the algorithm.
Cycles seen in co-evolution [106] and work on “tracking the red queen” [33],
as mentioned in [98], are early works that reveal the problem with this
assumption.
• Historical progress implies global progress [98]: This is to do with
the fact that an arms race does not imply optimality. As discussed in [98],
historical progress has often been seen as the kind of progress one needs
in co-evolution. More precisely, an arms race, given a criterion to measure
progress, is considered enough for co-evolution to be seen as matching our
expectations (from what it does) and what it actually does. This is clearly
not the case, as demonstrated in [106], and further shown to be true in [53].
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2.3.1 Solution Concepts in Co-evolution
In the quest for understanding co-evolution and designing algorithms in a more
methodical manner, the notion of co-evolutionary solution concepts was intro-
duced into co-evolutionary algorithm design research in [53]. As noted in [53],
where the main idea is to examine the divergence between expectation and ac-
tuality with regard to co-evolution, all the aforementioned problems associated
with co-evolution are essentially attributed to a single fundamental problem, that
of a lack of rigour in the definition of the co-evolutionary solution concept. All
co-evolutionary algorithms optimise according to some solution concept, which
may be defined explicitly or implicitly. Ficici [53] has given numerous examples of
applications of co-evolution where “failures to obtain the desiderata1 complexity
or optimality indicate a dissonance between the implemented solution concept and
that required by the envisaged goal” [53].
A solution concept is a notion borrowed from game theory. It specifies whether
a strategy played by an agent adheres to a set of standards that make the strat-
egy preferable to be used in a problem over other strategies, and thus, retained
as a solution to the problem. It separates solution strategies from those that
are not preferred or desired as solutions, almost like a filter through which the
whole search space of strategies is passed, retaining only the desired strategy or
strategies. We do not have the luxury of explicitly scrutinising each strategy
in the search space, which leads to sampling strategies (via exploration of the
strategy space), evaluating them, and following a gradient in the search space
towards the desired solution strategies. The solution concept can thus be speci-
fied as using the gradient to separate potentially preferable strategies from those
that are not. Co-evolution, which helps specify the solution concept and thus
helps solve the search problem of finding the desired solutions, makes finding this
gradient harder however, because the evaluation of strategies is relative to the
strategies sampled, and not against a static/absolute function that needs opti-
mising. The pressure towards filtering out the desired strategies is built on by
channeling the strategies along a certain path in the search space. This path in
the search space is however laid out based on an incomplete and changing view
1Something that is desired or wanted.
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of the space, the current (at any point during the course of the search process)
strategies themselves representing the incomplete view of the search space. This
is very important in co-evolution because the incomplete view of the search space
is also reactive, in the sense that it adapts, to the strategies representing the cur-
rent state of the algorithm, i.e it is important to find which strategies to interact
with so that these strategies (used for the interaction, and in turn, as opponents
for evaluation) react or adapt favourably/usefully towards laying out the path. A
secondary search problem (requiring search effort) thus results, that of searching
who the strategies must interact with. The opponent strategies that describe the
incomplete yet useful view of the search space to adapt with or evaluate against,
need attention in their discovery and use.
Thus, co-evolution involves solving a secondary search problems: one that
allows for selection of preferable strategies, and the other that allows for the se-
lection of a sample of strategies against which evaluation of any strategy may
provide a preferable gradient. Designing and following the primary and sec-
ondary search problem gradients entails a thorough investigation of the elements
that make up a co-evolutionary algorithm, and is what we call the implemented
co-evolutionary solution concept1 in this thesis. Note that an algorithm
implements a solution concept [53]. Two algorithms implementing the same so-
lution concept solve the same search problem, whereas algorithms implementing
different solution concepts solve different search problems. If we want to find the
subgame perfect equilibrium of a game through co-evolution, then two algorithms
which indeed do find it, are said to be implementing the same solution concept of
finding the subgame perfect equilibrium. On the contrary, if the algorithms find
different solutions, they are solving different problems [53]. Thus, the elements
that make up the algorithm need careful design in order for the realisation of the
envisaged solution concept from them, while they interact with each other within
the co-evolutionary implementation.
This includes the representation that decides the nature of the search space,
interaction, evaluation and selection schemes that decide on the nature of the
sample and the gradient provided by the sample, and the variation operators
1Note that in the Chapters to follow, whenever we use the term solution concept, we mean
the implemented co-evolutionary solution concept.
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that help traverse the search space. In order to use co-evolution to lead to a
certain kind of behaviour one has to decide on these elements for the co-evolving
entities, giving us the implemented solution concept. So, given an expected view
on what co-evolution should result in, any mismatch in the actual behaviour of
the algorithm signifies a mismatch between the desired solution concept (desired
strategise to be filtered out) and implemented solution concept.
In [98], solution concepts are interpreted as superiority criteria1 and that
the superiority criterion must be well defined in order to necessitate progress.
While a sound superiority criterion is indeed necessary to filter out solutions one
wants from the search space, when one delves deeper down into the implemen-
tation details of the algorithm, this criterion is linked with the elements that co-
evolutionary algorithm is made up of, i.e. the kind of interaction that is necessary
for evaluation using the criterion, the manner in which individuals are selected
given the evaluation criterion, the representation of an individual (defining the
search space within which individuals traverse via variation, interaction, evalua-
tion and selection), and, the manner in which the variation schemes work on the
representation to help traverse the space. These elements of the co-evolutionary
algorithm have to be designed properly in order to make the algorithm address
the primary and secondary search problems mentioned in [53]. In fact [98] states
that in order to obtain a sound definition of the superiority relation between two
individuals in a co-evolutionary algorithm, one needs to define the superiority
criterion as well as the opponents against which the superiority criterion is to be
used. Looking at this closely tells us that the evaluation of an individual based
on the superiority criterion against a set of opponents entails defining the way in
which the set will be defined (secondary search problem [53]), the way in which
the set of opponents will be used (interaction) for evaluation, and the way in
which an individual will carry on via variation, interaction and selection, given
the superiority criterion. These operations happen on an individual represented
in a certain way dictating its behaviour within the space of possible behaviours,
and so, the representation may impinge on the variation, interaction and selection
1A superiority criterion is a preference relationship that allows for preferring one solution
over the other based on the definition of the solution concept (quality one wants in a solution),
given that we do not have the full search space at hand, when pitted against a reference set of
opponents.
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(as representation defines the search space, which gets traversed using variation,
interaction and selection, given the evaluation scheme, and this traversal may
necessitate different variation, interaction and selection schemes to be used with
different representations in order for a proper traversal of the space), and thus
would need proper consideration/definition too, as would the variation, interac-
tion and selection schemes then. The secondary search effort poses the need for
the definition of the elements as well. Thus, we consider the entire set of elements
that define a co-evolutionary algorithm as defining the solution concept that is
implemented.
2.4 Agent Based Computational Economics
Decentralised market economies, as suggested in [145], are complex adaptive sys-
tems, made up of numerous agents with adaptive capacities, which engage in
multiple parallel local interactions. This local interaction amongst agents results
in macro-level regulation (such as shared market protocols and behavioural simi-
larities), which, in turn, feed back onto directing local interactions further. This
results in a two way feedback process, local feeding into global and global feeding
into local. Though this has been known by economists [71, 108, 132], the ma-
chinery to model this two way feedback quantitatively (as said in [145] “in its full
dynamic capacity”) has largely been unavailable.
The machinery available, mostly lead to a top down treatment of the market
structure and agent behaviours, with many restrictive assumptions to make an
analytic treatment possible. New tools have now become available which allow for
modelling complex phenomena associated with decentralised market economies
with more realism, for example, learning by trial and error, imperfect competition,
endogenous emergence of structure of interaction and open-ended co-evolution of
individual behaviours and mechanisms.
A holistic study of economies involves modelling the individual elements that
the economy is composed of, made possible with the availability of new modelling
tools, and let the system unleash in its full computational capacity. According
to [145], this results in the:
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“... computational study of economies modelled as evolving systems
of autonomous interacting agents.”
This is agent based computational economics (ACE). The idea is to see the
evolution as happening in a computational laboratory [43, 145], and study the
process and outcomes that result under controlled experimental conditions [145].
The point of this thesis is to help ACE further this goal, by having more control
on the process often used to simulate the interaction, adaptation and learning
mechanisms of social interaction, viz. co-evolutionary algorithms, as we shall see
in the Chapters to follow.
The two main objectives of ACE are, for it to help describe the process and
outcomes as they emerge, and for it to help design the process and outcomes of
interest, thus having both a descriptive and a normative nature. Moreover, with
the advent of the Internet, ACE has grown from being a simulation methodology
representing existing or potential economic processes, to being directly applicable
in practice (i.e. synthesising real economic processes). The case in point for the
latter being, automating economic markets, whereby computational agents either
work together with or altogether replace humans (e.g. trading agents on eBay,
algorithmic trading in the stock market, market based control [30] etc.).
The essential fields of research within ACE [145], which are directly impacted
by this thesis, can be enumerated as follows:
• Modelling learning: Representing the learning processes of computa-
tional agents is the essential idea here. There have been many computa-
tional approaches used for this representation of agent learning, notably, ge-
netic algorithms [27, 39, 79], evolution strategies [58, 59, 149], reinforcement
learning algorithms [50, 142], learning classifier systems [93] and any adapta-
tions of learning algorithms specifically channeled towards automated mar-
kets [143]. All this work assumes agents as being boundedly rational from
the outset, with [143] calling them ‘myopically optimal’, describing the short
sightedness of the processing of information by such agents, as they learn
and adapt by trial and error. It was suggested in [57] that techniques from
the artificial intelligence should be made use of in modelling boundedly
rational learning.
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The concern with adopting these algorithms for the purpose of modelling
learning, as echoed in [145], is that these algorithms were originally de-
veloped for optimality seeking (as opposed to the challenges posed by a
co-adaptive consideration of these algorithms, i.e. with no objective opti-
mality criterion to optimise against) and not for simulating learning and
adaptation in societies. Although, as pointed out in [39], these algorithms,
in particular genetic/evolutionary algorithms, when used in a co-adaptive
setup (as co-evolutionary algorithms), can provide insights into the work-
ings of learning and adaptation in societies if interpreted as models of a
learning population, i.e. interpreted as a soico-economic simulation. Opti-
misation algorithms can be treated as global optimisers with an exogenous
(to the agents) fitness function that suggests global properties of interest,
e.g. market efficiency, or they can be treated as local optimisers, with an
endogenous fitness function seeking the optimal actions for an agent given
other agents/environment, which is the case of interest here and where, as
[145] notes, the algorithm will need to incorporate some characteristic of
actual human decision making behaviour. The idea for the endogenous case
is for there to be some predictive power in the simulations.
Other studies on agent learning representations includes [130], where mul-
tiple computational trading algorithms were pitted against each other in a
double auction tournament and a simple strategy (as opposed to sophisti-
cated learning algorithms) won, suggesting deliberation at a local level of
the agent is not always good. Other studies within the realm of auctions
are [31, 32, 63].
More pertinently to the ideas promoted in this thesis, that of co-evolutionary
solutions concepts, [152] conducts a study using evolutionary algorithms
whereby the focus is driven onto the ‘level’ of learning designed/engineered
into the algorithms. The two cases studied are called individual and social
learning and are suggested to be modelling the interactions between learning
agents, and the way an agent constitute its strategy to play the game, differ-
ently. In the case of individual learning, a population of strategies belonging
to a firm (which is the agent in this case) only exchanges information within
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itself, for instance, by way of evolutionary operators like cross-over (thus,
this populations of strategies constitutes the overall game playing strategy
of the firm), and in the case of social learning, there is exchange across
firms (thus, the population of strategies represents a population of firms,
each strategy constituting the overall strategy of a firm). From the artificial
intelligence research perspective, the two approaches can essentially be con-
sidered as follows. The first considers the use of a ideas like learning classifier
system [74] for each agent, thus only exchanging strategies within the agent,
whereas the second uses ideas like genetic algorithms where the population
contains strategies used by all agents. These two can also be considered as
the Michigan [74] and Pittsburg [42] approach to socio-economic simulation
respectively, as they are called in evolutionary algorithm design research
channeled towards machine learning and optimisation problems. This has
lead to many objections in terms of the socio-economic interpretation of
evolutionary algorithms, notably [27, 39, 46, 86]. This suggests a need for
the consideration of co-evolutionary solution concepts in ACE, for a more
systematic study and thus a better understanding of the way the elements
that it is composed of, affect simulations. We carry out a study in this thesis
in Chapters 3 and 4, laying down an explicit link between co-evolutionary
algorithms and socio-economic simulations, specifically when it comes to
modelling certain phenomena of interest that may be open to speculation
for their translation to evolutionary algorithms overlaying interpretations
from the socio-economic learning point of view.
Other questions being looked at in modelling or representing socio-economic
learning processes are whether or not the information used by agents evolves
during the course of the market processes and in what way this might hap-
pen. In some sense, this study focusses on the amount of deliberation that
endogenously emerges to be useful for agents and how these deliberations
relate to the evolved outcomes [95]. This is a detailed study in bounded
rationality, but differs from our work in the sense that, it assumes the use
of a genetic algorithm (off-the-shelf, as is common practice). So, it does not
show the necessity of a sound interpretation of socio-economic phenomenon
like bounded rationality (a case we consider throughout this thesis) in ACE
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research when using evolutionary algorithms, and the way a sound inter-
pretation can be made via a methodology, which is the point of this thesis.
• Modelling market processes: This line of research deals with under-
standing market mechanisms by modelling them, e.g. oligopoly [94], and
investigating the behaviour of agents modelled in some arbitrary (and some-
times tuned to real data) manner, e.g. genetic algorithms [94], classifier sys-
tems [10] etc. The difference from modelling learning (as discussed above)
is that this field is concerned with the mechanism per se, and uses learning
algorithms off-the-shelf. On the contrary, modelling learning research still
uses algorithms off-the-shelf but gives an economic interpretations to them.
In both cases, the off-the-shelf treatment of agent learning and adaptation
suggests a need for a methodical approach to agent modelling. Evolutionary
algorithms have indeed found an application here as well [89]. Trading rules
to act within a financial market model are co-evolved and the evolutionary
emergence calibrated to macroeconomic data [89]. The work of [58] spans
the modelling learning and modelling market processes research areas. On
the one hand, it used an evolutionary algorithm for modelling the socio-
economic learning and adaptation process of agents, and on the other, it
studies these agents in various market settings that involve bargaining over
single and multiple issues. In so doing, it studies the conditions under which
mechanism/game level outcomes, for example subgame perfect equilibrium
in the alternating offers bargaining setting (the game considered through-
out this thesis), emerge with evolutionary algorithms doing the learning for
agents. Our work spans the two as well, but the main focus is not to study a
certain kind of emergence, but instead to propose a methodology that helps
co-evolutionary algorithms be used in a more methodical manner, than as
an arbitrary choice. The arbitrary choice can lead to mis-interpretations of
socio-economic phenomena that may be used to interpret the learning pro-
cess of agents. We elaborate on a framework which can help enable making
interpretations in a more methodical manner in Chapters 3 and 4.
• Emergence of behavioural norms: Evolutionary dynamics and bounded
rationality are made explicit if one takes a bottom up perspective on agent
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interaction and adaptation. Bounded rationality is assumed but indeed
an inherent quality of such agents. Over the course of evolution, certain
norms on the way agents behave may grow and decay. This is one direction
ACE has channeled into. One of the most influential [145] studies in this
regard is that of the evolution of mutual cooperation within a society of self-
interested non-related agents [12]. The norm here is reciprocity, that allows
for cooperative outcomes from agent interactions to emerge. Essentially,
there are patterns that develop on the way agents behave as an unintended
consequence [132] of local interactions. Further studies along this vein are
those considered in [7, 13, 29, 38, 48, 49, 75, 159].
• Economic networks: This line of research studies the effect that the
agent interaction network has on various aspects of the modelled economy.
Moreover, endogenous formation of trade networks has also been looked at
[144, 151, 155]. Furthermore, classifier systems have found their applica-
tion in specific market models, e.g. fish market [85], where buyer loyalty
to sellers is questioned. Recent work [47] in the endogenous network for-
mation vein involved studying the emergence (both using an evolutionary
game theoretic approach and using co-evolutionary algorithms) of coop-
erative behaviour in the one shot prisoner’s dilemma game. The type of
interaction, endogenised by using a reputation mechanism that aids dis-
criminator strategies discriminate between cooperative and non-cooperative
opponents, results in cooperative behaviours. Though this is different from
the issues considered in this thesis, the fact that co-evolutionary algorithms
have found their application here as well, only adds to their wide ranging
application, thus needing attention in terms of their proper design.
• Validation across real and computational agents: In order for an
ACE experiment to tell the causes that lead humans acting within societies
to various outcomes, there is a need for the ACE model to be more realis-
tic. Realism of the evolutionary learning process has been questioned often
[1, 5, 27, 39, 46, 86, 145]. One line of research in this regard suggests paral-
lel human-subject and computational experiments [4, 5, 6, 9, 25, 99]. This
allows for learning processes of computational agents to be guided using
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human-subject behaviours. Synergistically, the opposite view of computa-
tional agent behaviour providing hypotheses on the root causes of human
behaviour, is also a direction [145]. The emergence of money (within a
search model of money, as the model is called [145]), is one such study
[44]. Reinforcement learning is used as the agent learning process where
the agent behaviour rules are guided by human-subject experiments. A
further study with computational agent in modified versions of the model
suggests outcomes “roughly similar” [145] to human experiments. This
form of cross-validation is not always possible and raises questions about
the validation of computational agents using human-subject experiments,
as explained in [117]. This is just one way to validate and a methodi-
cal treatment of learning processes within the ACE community is clearly
echoed here, as it is in [1, 5, 39, 96, 153]. We propose a methodology in
this thesis which links co-evolutionary algorithm design research and ACE,
to make the use of co-evolution as a learning process, more methodical in
ACE.
Other areas of research [145], which come under the framework of ACE, but are
not directly impacted by the work considered in this thesis are:
• Automated market agents: Considering reduction of labour costs and
search efficiency, computational agents, specific in their optimisation ca-
pabilities, have found a use in automated marketplaces to deal with other
agents. A study of boundedly rational agents, bounded in the amount of
look ahead and self-interestedness employed, is carried out within a ne-
gotiation framework in [3]. For such automated scenarios, it should be
noted that the line between simulation and reality is blurring. The idea
now is to tackle computational agents behaving in automated markets, as
opposed understanding economic activity within real, human centric, eco-
nomic machinery. The impact of automated agents on real markets where
both humans and agents interact is one direction gaining ground recently,
e.g. algorithmic trading in financial markets [66, 114], and forms a middle
ground between studies tailored towards a fully automated or a real market.
Simulations tuned to automated agent behaviour, e.g. opponent modelling
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[34, 73] is one of the thrust when it comes to designing agents for automated
markets. Co-evolution has indeed been used for this purpose [107], but for
the purpose of the ACE work considered above, co-evolution still needs a
more systematic treatment, as described in the Chapters to follow in this
thesis.
• Modelling organisational structure: At a more micro level than the
study of economic networks lies the study of organisational structure. The
idea here is to consider a group, also known as an organisation in economics
literature [145], and study the effects of the structure of the organisation
on its own resulting behaviour [145]. Both organisational structure and the
structure of the network have also been considered together [41], where a
specific (to the agent based model) adaptation method is used to adapt the
behavioural rules (dictating whether the organisation should innovate or
not). This is done to understand how the rules should adapt to structural
changes both at the network and the organisational level.
There have also been studies to understand the extent to which learning processes
of real world market participants are maladapted to market institutions, giving
optimisation algorithms as they are (i.e. without need for matching human like
learning processes) a possible application domain [84]. The diametrically oppo-
site question of the extent to which market institutions have evolved or can be
designed in order for market participants to be constructed without much regard
for them being rational has also been investigated [31, 32, 63]. A combination of
the two, from the point of view of informing the design of automated markets,
where co-evolution at both the agent behaviour level and the market mechanism
level has also been investigated [115, 116].
Viewing games as strategic interaction problems embedded in natural and
social processes, agents repeatedly and innovatively tackling these problems over
time, evolving the ability to play the games effectively as a result [62, 145], is one
of the drive behind modelling the learning and adaptation processes of agents.
One of the key issues in ACE dealing with modelling socio-economic learning
and validation of simulations, is to effectively gain insight into the dynamics of
the simulation for socio-economic games, more complex versions of which may be
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intractable [1]. Having gained insights and understood the way desired outcomes
can emerge from simulations, can help practitioners with useful insights into
solutions for more complex versions of the games, or even generalise to complex
versions. The idea here is to ensure predictive content in complex setups of
games, given adaptive agents. If the simulation of learning does not lead to
desirable outcomes in simple games, it cannot be expected to simulate learning for
more complex versions of the games. This is one form of validation, as opposed
to validating against human-subject experiments, as carried out with varying
degrees of success in [2, 59, 149]. Interpreting the results of the simulations in
socio-economic terms would be of little value if the simulation does not do what
is required of it, specifically if modelling socio-economic learning. This is the
problem considered in this thesis.
Recent work on the use of co-evolutionary algorithms as an agent learning
simulation tool [158], again takes the algorithm off-the-shelf. It gives and eco-
nomic interpretation to the elements of co-evolution and uses the algorithm to
meet its needs of optimising strategies for various games under various dynamic
exogenous conditions and information asymmetry amongst agents. Our work is
different from this at a fundamental level, in that, we suggest not to use evolu-
tionary algorithms in this simplistic, off-the-shelf, manner.
As far as evolutionary algorithms are concerned, the hunch is that mechanising
innovation and progression (given innovation) as evolution, helps realise a link or
interpretation between socio-economic learning and these algorithms, as alluded
to in [65]. This link is not trivial however, and the goal of this thesis is to
investigate the link through the lenses of a methodical framework for algorithm
adoption (via algorithm analysis and refinements), as we will see in Chapters 3
and 4.
2.5 Bounded Rationality
Simon [138] is attributed to have coined the term bounded rationality. Bounded
rationality is a concept within the Social Sciences that takes into consideration
the cognitive limitations that humans face, in conformance with which they solve
problems or make decisions, that lead to outcomes which are unclear or uncertain.
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The limitations that make one unable to gather, retain, transmit and/or process
information, and the limitations on the amount of time they have to gather, re-
tain, transmit and/or process information, on route to solving a problem/making
a decision, can be seen as limits on rationality, or bounded rationality. Quoting
Williamson [157] citing Simon, “boundedly rational agents experience limits in
formulating and solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing,
retrieving, transmitting) information”. For example, a decision maker may not
have the resources to find the optimal solution to a problem at hand, which leads
to the decision maker making assumptions about the problem in order to arrive
at a solution, thus greatly simplifying the problem/possible choices of solutions
to the problem. In computational terms, this limitation can translate into an
agent being incapable of gathering, retaining, transmitting and/or processing the
information or having limited time to gather, retain, transmit and/or process the
information that ideally can lead an agent to behaving as if it possessed complete
information and unlimited processing capabilities. Fully rational behaviour is
only possible if decisions can be made such that they lead to outcomes that are
clear/certain during the time of processing making such decisions, and that these
outcomes do not change whilst processing.
As such, an agent tries to satisfice [137] rather than optimise its payoff (from
a world within which it is situated), i.e. the agent aims for a satisfactory rather
than an optimal solution, subject to the information it has been able to gather,
retain, transmit and/or process, and the time it has to do so. In other words,
satisficing is the idea that, an agent using a strategy to play a game would at-
tempt meeting some criteria for the payoffs from the strategy to be satisfactory
enough or adequate, rather than optimal. The agents thus look for an outcome
from the game that satisfice their needs, where these needs may, for example, be
described as utility functions in game theoretic and computational approaches
to solving games. Simon [138] further suggests that agents make decisions us-
ing heuristics, for example, experience based decisions or common sense based
decisions, so that they may be able to manage the deliberative costs that may
incur if they were to base their decisions on exhaustive reasoning. Note that
this notion of exhaustive reasoning, when seen in the computational realm of
solving games using agents, may be seen as a computational agent exhaustively
55
2.5 Bounded Rationality
searching for a solution, which indeed is what ACE and indeed computational
approaches to solving games relieves us from doing. In agent based simulations,
where agents have limited computational capabilities, such agents are deemed
boundedly rational from the outset [131, 145].
One of the ways bounded rationality has been modelled in socio-economic
literature is via the notion of a “trembling hand” [133]. The idea here is that a
player would not always use its strategy such that the moves that it makes in
accordance with its strategy are exactly what the strategy specifies. The players
thus make moves with a trembling hand. The way this is modelled is by there
being a probability associated with the players, according to which they make
moves erroneously. This is one notion of bounded rationality that we explore in
the thesis in Chapter 4, wherein we specify it in concrete terms. There have been
other specification of bounded rationality in socio-economic literature [60, 129],
and these could also be investigated in the context of ACE, as we utilise the
trembling hand specification, in accordance with the methodology presented in
the thesis, but it is not necessary for us to do so for the purposes of the thesis.
However, we encourage the interested reader to investigate different specifications
of the term as we investigate the notion of trembling hand in the thesis.
As far as ACE is concerned, the trembling hand notion of bounded rationality
has indeed been used within simulations recently, for example the work in [79,
122]. The work in [79] considers representing agent strategies as finite state
machines, and uses genetic algorithms to understand the kind of machines that
may result over the course of evolution, having evolved with the specific bounds
on the way they function. The essential idea is that an agents play the iterated
version of the prisoner’s dilemma [55] game and make moves, with a chance
of these moves being opposite of what the agent intended, or the opponent’s
moves are reported to be the opposite of what the opponent actually chose, the
moves being to either cooperate or defect in a given round of the iterated game.
The machines that result over the course of evolution are shown to behave less
cooperatively and thus bounded rationality is shown to hamper the evolution of
cooperation. This notion is also used in [122] to define bounded rationality, where
it is shown how bounded rationality reduces the number of equilibrium outcomes
in infinitely repeated normal form games. Both cases however, are not concerned
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with the main theme explored in this thesis, that of adopting co-evolutionary
algorithms for socio-economic simulations methodically. Most of ACE indeed
assumes for bounded rationality to be present in the simulations implicitly [131].
2.5.1 Implicit Assumption of Bounded Rationality in ACE
Although ACE relieves us from using the game theoretic assumption of full ratio-
nality within players or agents, it however provides too much freedom in terms of
what bounded rationality may mean within simulations, i.e. it does not make any
explicit assumptions about the rationality of agents. Bounded rationality is seen
as implicit in the design choices made about the algorithm, which is then used to
simulate socio-economic learning [131]. Quoting Safarzynska and van den Bergh
[131], “Bounded rationality is implicit in many evolutionary economics models
or results from specific choices made with regard to the other model components
(e.g., selection models)”. They also state that “a variety of assumptions regarding
boundedly rational behaviour can be encountered in evolutionary-economic models.
In many cases, they are introduced ad hoc without clear empirical, experimental
or theoretical support”. They suggest that theories in behavioural economics re-
search (for example, theories in [16, 61, 67, 82]) can help with laying a foundation
for specifying bounded rationality in these models.
The fact that simulations are assumed to incorporate bounded rationality,
makes it very hard to understand what role it plays within these simulations and
indeed, can give rise to bounded rationality being mis-interpreted as a term, a
case we consider throughout the thesis, in order to elaborate on a methodical
adoption of co-evolutionary algorithms for socio-economic learning simulations.
Coupled with the off-the-shelf adoption of co-evolutionary algorithms for socio-
economic simulations, the abuse of the term is not entirely impossible, as we do
show in Chapter 3. Although we do not profess that the assumption of bounded
rationality within socio-economic simulations, as done in ACE, to be wrong, we
do want ACE research to pay head to scrutinising the assumption in this thesis,
before any conclusions are drawn from the simulations that may in fact rely on the
role of bounded rationality within these simulations. Simply put, we emphasise
that if we do not know what bounded rationality means within simulations, we
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cannot reason about the simulations in terms of bounded rationality.
2.6 Disciplining Efforts for Co-evolution in ACE
Brenner [22] says that, “learning models are indeed usually chosen without much
justification in the literature” dealing with modelling socio-economic learning
within ACE, and that “the use of learning models is often criticised due to the
lack of a common model and the ad-hoc choice of specific models” [22], comment-
ing on the lack of a methodology for making this choice. Talking about the choice
of an algorithm, made by practitioners of ACE, from the choice of algorithms one
has within artificial intelligence (not limited to co-evolutionary algorithms alone
that is) for socio-economic simulations, Brenner [22] further says:
“...there is a strand of artificial intelligence and machine learning.
In general, a tendency has been observed in recent years to borrow
methods from other disciplines. These models have become increas-
ingly complex in recent years, mixing such features as evolutionary
algorithms, classifier systems, fuzzy logic and neural networks. It is
not always clear what the researchers in this field aim to do. Some
seem simply to believe that their learning models describe real learn-
ing without looking at any evidence for this. Others seem to aim at
creating learning models that perform well or can solve problems that
in nature only humans can solve. Finally, there is those who claim a
correspondence to reality.”
The above concern is indeed also present when simply considering making a
choice of or using a particular co-evolutionary algorithm for socio-economic learn-
ing simulations. The algorithms are adopted or used in an unconsidered [145] (not
rigourous) fashion. Despite the widespread use of learning and adaptation algo-
rithms in ACE, very few researchers have looked at the off-the-shelf nature of this
usage. The need for disciplining learning and adaptation algorithms channeled
towards modelling socio-economic learning is clearly echoed in [145]. This thesis
essentially deals with this very issue, but specifically for the use of co-evolutionary
algorithms in ACE research for modelling socio-economic learning, and shows one
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way this usage can be made more methodical. Following is a look at the previous
efforts that have been made in this direction.
Often, with the use of evolutionary algorithms for socio-economic learning, the
parameters of these algorithms are directly derived from the socio-economic model
parameters [2]. According to [2], this direct mapping has been shown to be the
cause for particular kinds of evolutionary algorithms (the ones often used for sim-
ulations, and taken for granted for their applicability), not doing what they were
intended to do, e.g. learn to achieve a certain kind of learnt/adapted/emerged
outcome. It has thus been stressed that algorithmic and model parameters be
treated separately [2]. The way this separation is proposed to be looked at is by
comparing the two widely used kinds of co-evolutionary algorithms (individual
and social learning approaches) for socio-economic simulation. This comparison
is done with respect to their convergence properties and robustness to evolution-
ary algorithm parameter value variations [2].
Evolutionary algorithms, having originally been designed for optimisation
problems, raise questions on the tuning of their parameters when used for socio-
economic simulation. A goal in the above mentioned previous work [2] is to
reestablish guidelines for tuning evolutionary algorithms for socio-economic sim-
ulation. The reason is for the simulations to be robust [2], rather than sensitive
to changes in problem instances.
Note that the two approaches of individual and social learning are taken as a
given, and these are then compared for their learning capabilities in the Cournot
oligopoly game [35]. In the individual learning approach [39, 152], one or a set
of strategies (e.g. a population of evolving strategies) represents one agent alone,
which does not exchange its traits by way of evolutionary operators like cross-
over, with other agents, but instead updates its own set of strategies using such
operators, though the agents indeed interact. In social learning [11, 28, 121],
the evolutionary algorithm population as a whole represents strategies shared
amongst agents, i.e. strategies that they may choose from for their operation in
the socio-economic situation considered. Note that these two approaches differ in
what a population of evolving strategies means in socio-economic terms, leading
to changes in the way the individual agents interact, are evaluated etc. This
changes the co-evolutionary solution concept being implemented, as discussed in
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Section 2.3. It is shown that the first approach leads to premature convergence
and lower profits for agents in the Cournot game. This demonstrates the need
for the notion behind co-evolutionary solution concepts to be considered in ACE,
apart from the parameter settings of the particular concept in use, the latter
being the main cause for concern in [2].
Our take in this thesis is that, co-evolutionary solution concepts can also
be parametrised from the point of view of socio-economic phenomenon of in-
terest which may have lead to anomalies in the outcomes expected from the
co-evolutionary process, and may have been mis-interpreted if not looked at care-
fully. It is clearly mentioned in [2], that a fundamental methodology for designing
co-evolutionary simulations needs attention and is one alternative to understand-
ing and improving the quality of simulations for socio-economic problems. We
indeed take this view in this thesis. Whereas [2] considers evolutionary algorithm
parameters that do not have a direct economic interpretation, and studies two
co-evolutionary solution concepts for their robustness in outcomes (results being
similar or not), when the parameter values are varied, we focus on a method-
ology for the careful design of co-evolutionary solution concepts (Chapter 3),
parametrising them from the socio-economic point of view (Chapter 4). This
enables understanding the relationship between the socio-economic phenomenon
of interest and the simulation methodically, which may further guide moulding
the algorithms for soico-economic simulation, if needed.
Of major influence in terms of disciplining the use of evolutionary algorithms
for ACE is [39], which revolves around understanding the ways in which, as [145]
puts it:
“... particular aspects of the implementation strongly influences the
set of potential long run outcomes.”
The caution one should use in using genetic algorithms for socio-economic
simulation is much appreciated in [39]. The question of whether these algorithms
are just a technique (and as such other algorithms may be equally worth con-
sidering for socio-ecnomic learning), or whether they can indeed model learning
behaviour within societies is raised [39].
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There is some work that suggests evolutionary algorithms doing better at
simulating socio-economic learning than other techniques. Evidently, simulations
using evolutionary algorithms yield better approximations to empirical results
than least square learning for instance [5, 39]. There is evidence that some ex-
periments with evolutionary algorithms for building trading strategies in auctions
resembles observed human strategies [4]. Moreover, it is stressed in [39], that
the fact that evolutionary algorithms (more specifically, genetic algorithms) are
used to simulate socio-economic learning is that there is no rigourous empirical
foundation of how humans form expectations over outcomes from socio-economic
situations and their own behaviours. Quoting Simon [139]:
“Armchair speculation about expectations, rational or other, is not a
satisfactory substitute for factual knowledge as to how human beings
go about anticipating the future, what factors they take into account,
and how these factors, rather than others, come within their range of
attention.”
Since there is no rigourous study in economics and psychology that allows us
to specifically model socio-economic learning, the best one can do is to analyse
models which “describe some plausible features of actual learning behaviour” [39]
and match these models with game theoretic and experimental economics stud-
ies. Doing this is suggested to allow for judging their suitability as socio-economic
simulators. At the least, in so doing, one may gain insights into the dynamics of
actual adaptive behaviour, even though the process of picking a learning model
may be ad-hoc [39]. Classifier systems (modelling individual learning) have suc-
cessfully been used to find equilibrium in a model of money [93], not only for the
model for which the equilibrium was known (analytically), but also finding the
equilibrium in a model where it was not. This suggests that techniques from com-
putational intelligence may not only be used to simulate socio-economic learning
but also to compute equilibria in complex games where analytic computation be-
comes cumbersome [93]. Using the social learning approach, the equilibrium was
again found in the simpler model [91].
The interpretation of evolutionary operators from the socio-economic point
of view is called into question [39] and deemed unsatisfactory [39]. Parameter
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values of these algorithms is another questionable issue, where a direct mapping
between the values and socio-economic values (if interpreted that way), is not
known. Different parameter settings result in different results from evolution,
so this is important [39]. This issue has been addressed in [2] to some extent,
as we explained earlier on in this Section. It has also been addressed from the
angle of calibrating parameters using experimental data [44]. Different strategy
encodings or representations lead to different outcomes too [153]. So, a link
between representations and the economic interpretation of representations is
another issue needing attention [39].
The main concern expressed in [39] is that there is no mathematical theory
which may explain the results of simulations using genetic algorithms. This makes
it impossible to predict the behaviour of genetic algorithms without actual simu-
lations. Doing this can guide the design of genetic algorithms for socio-economic
simulation when particular kinds of outcomes (e.g. equilibrium or deviations
thereof as stable states) are desired. Analysis of genetic algorithms is carried out
from the point of view of Markov chains [105], extended to include characteristics
that differentiate co-evolution from evolution for optimisation, i.e. the fitness of
an agent changes as the opponents change, and the notion of optimality changes
to equilibrium finding. This leads to theoretical results that suggest what the
genetic algorithm might evolve. For some games this kind of analysis is possible
and for other it is not [39]. In the former case, the genetic algorithm simulation
shows a match with theoretical outcomes. In the latter case, the genetic algo-
rithm is able to learn cyclic equilibria. This is interesting from the point of view
of understanding what a particular kind of evolutionary algorithm (though taken
off-the-shelf), may result in when used as a simulation. What we suggest in this
thesis however, is a way of making the choice of an evolutionary algorithm easier
(methodical) from an empirical point of view. Our work in this thesis comple-
ments the work in [39] such that, instead of treating an off-the-shelf evolutionary
algorithm theoretically, one can envisage using our methodology to help narrow
down on an algorithm first, and then conduct a theoretical analysis for further
confidence.
Unaware of the existence of the work in co-evolutionary algorithm design,
more specifically co-evolutionary solution concepts, a study is undertaken in [8],
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wherein the differences between individual and social learning are examined from
the point of view of convergence to the equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly game
[35]. The main question, essentially for the individual learning case, concerns the
changes in the genetic algorithm learning model [5] needed so that it can be engi-
neered towards selecting a particular type of equilibrium, which was otherwise not
possible using genetic algorithms, but was with classifier systems [152] represent-
ing individual learning. The authors conclude that the manner in which fitness
was being calculated and assigned to individuals in the population representing
the agent, and the value of a certain parameter, resulted in the genetic algorithm
not converging to the equilibrium. They show this by systematically chang-
ing the genetic algorithm setup, guided by the classifier system setup. Though
unaware of their existence, this work essentially echos the need for viewing co-
evolutionary algorithms through the lenses of co-evolutionary solution concepts.
This is evidence that ACE research has grown but somewhat independently from
co-evolutionary algorithm design research. The aim of our work is to bridge this
gap. In some sense, they modify the co-evolutionary solution concept, working on
the fitness evaluation systematically, giving them the desired behaviour from the
algorithm using the conflicting results obtained using another solution concept.
Our work (in Chapter 3) looks at the elements of the co-evolutionary solution
concept and obtains desired behaviour without the need for a separate solution
concept to guide the changes needed. This suggests that co-evolutionary solution
concepts, if explicitly examined, are a powerful way to engineer the algorithm,
and we stress this point throughout the thesis.
2.7 What is Missing?
An important point to be kept in mind is that co-evolution is a search process,
which gets interpreted as simulating socio-economic learning in ACE. Problems
in co-evolutionary algorithm design research, are hence not too far away from
problems in using co-evolution as a socio-economic simulator. ACE, as a field
of research has often used socio-economic terms to understand and explain the
implementation details of co-evolution, with little rigour. Thus, a socio-economic
interpretation to the process and the results that come about from it, is a subject
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of much criticism [39]. As a general case for instance, selection, crossover and
mutation are interpreted as ‘imitation of the successful’ [39], information exchange
[1], and innovation or making mistakes [1], respectively. Moreover, bounded
rationality is generally assumed to be implicit in these algorithms [131], without
scrutiny, i.e. without considering understanding the real role it plays within
them. These are forced (i.e. not thoroughly investigated) qualitative meanings
associated with the co-evolutionary algorithm and suggest a passive treatment of
the problem of modelling socio-economic learning. The simulations thus get mis-
interpreted in socio-economic terms, or indeed, the socio-economic terms used
for explaining the co-evolutionary simulations get mis-interpreted within these
simulations. This thesis considers this practice inappropriate and explicates on a
methodical framework for analysis and systematic refinements to co-evolutionary
algorithms, for them to simulate socio-economic learning, specifically so that mis-
interpretations of socio-economic terms interpreting these simulations be avoided.
In order to match simulation and socio-economic phenomena, i.e. to avoid mis-
interpretations, refinements to the algorithms may indeed be necessary. There
is a dissonance between interpreting co-evolution as a socio-economic simulator
and co-evolution inherently being an adaptive search process. A conformance be-
tween simulation and search is thus in order, otherwise simulating socio-economic
interaction in order that the agents adapt towards reaching a certain type of be-
haviour (rummaging through the search space of behaviours) would have little
meaning, i.e. simulations will not do what they are meant to.
Co-evolutionary solution concepts are thus explicitly dealt with for making
the refinements necessary, in order to show how to make simulations achieve
what they are meant to. This allows for the avoidance of mis-interpreting socio-
economic phenomena that, erstwhile, may have been mis-interpreted within sim-
ulations, by allowing us to challenge and scrutinise the meaning of the socio-
economic phenomena within simulations through the lenses of co-evolutionary
solution concepts. This results in a top-down (from the point of view of there
being a top-down guiding notion of desired outcomes from the simulation) mis-
interpretation avoidance methodology, which is the first integral part of a method-
ical framework that we lay out and apply (for the case of bounded rationality as
the phenomenon of interest) in this thesis in Chapter 3. Co-evolutionary solution
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concepts are thus promoted to be made use of within ACE research.
Having challenged and scrutinised the phenomena, these phenomena may still
not have obvious links with the co-evolutionary algorithms considered for simula-
tions, and thus may still get mis-interpreted within simulations. This is because
we may only have uncovered how the phenomena do not affect the simulations on
the application of the first integral part of the methodical framework. A method-
ology for using the idea behind co-evolutionary solution concepts together with an
explicit expression of such socio-economic phenomena of interest (which we call
reconciliation variables), is thus proposed and applied (for the case of bounded
rationality as the phenomenon of interest) in this thesis as well. This becomes
the second integral part of the methodical framework we lay out and apply in
the thesis in Chapter 4. This is done by associating the phenomena with the
solution concept, enabling their parametrisation and quantification. Thus, a sys-
tematic bottom-up (from the point of view of the socio-economic phenomena)
co-evolutionary solution concept refinement methodology results, which leads
to a better understanding of the phenomena and its relationship with the co-
evolutionary algorithm, thus allowing for the avoidance of mis-interpreting the
phenomena altogether from within the simulations.
In essence, a marriage between co-evolutionary algorithm design research and
ACE, when adopting or using co-evolutionary algorithms for simulating socio-
economic learning, is thus conducted in this thesis, with the idea that mis-
interpretations of the algorithms in socio-economic terms (and vice versa, i.e.
mis-interpretations of socio-economic phenomena within simulations) be explic-
itly and methodically avoided. As such, the methodology (a methodical frame-
work for analysing and refining co-evolutionary algorithms) we present in the
thesis should help increase the value of the adoption or usage of co-evolutionary
algorithms, when used as simulations of socio-economic learning by ACE practi-
tioners.
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Chapter 3
Engineering Co-evolution
3.1 Introduction
Co-evolution is the process of adaptation, that occurs amongst agents interacting
with each other in some manner, in turn revealing a reward structure, towards
increasingly complex or refined behaviours. It has been used for both the evolu-
tion of game playing strategies [80] in order to achieve a certain type of behaviour
(amongst other applications viz. sampling test cases for fitness evaluation to im-
prove search efficiency [72], open-ended emergence of behaviours [140], reduction
of domain knowledge required to learn complex control [90] etc.) and at the
same time using games as a test bed to understand the co-evolutionary process
properly [28, 36].
However, the reported successes of co-evolutionary applications are counter
balanced by many failures. These failures are often attributed to co-evolutionary
properties such as cyclic dynamic [106], mediocre stable-state [118], collusion
[118], forgetting [53], focussing [154] etc. It has been shown that often these
pathologies imply a lack of rigour in the definition of the solution concept used
for the co-evolutionary process [53]. All co-evolutionary algorithms optimise ac-
cording to some solution concept, which may be defined explicitly or implicitly.
Ficici [53] has given numerous examples of applications of co-evolution where
“failures to obtain the desiderata complexity or optimality indicate a dissonance
between the implemented solution concept and that required by the envisaged goal”
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[53].
Game theory provides a powerful framework to understand interactions be-
tween entities. These entities could be players with complete knowledge of their
environment, players with incomplete knowledge of the environment, and more
pertinently, computational agents interacting with each other under various as-
sumptions about their deliberative abilities. Theoretical results from game theory
e.g. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) [133] as it is called in a sequential game
like bargaining, give us a useful idealised result in terms of what outcomes one
may expect with players interacting under theoretical assumptions of full ratio-
nality and complete knowledge. Although these theoretical assumption are far
too strict and do not in any way model the reality of the particular interaction or
game under question, they are indeed required for a closed form solution to the
game. The value of these theoretical outcomes is arguable, at least in economics
and psychology research. However, for the purpose of understanding and disci-
plining bottom-up approaches like co-evolution, they are indeed a boon. These
solutions give us what is known as a ‘solution concept’ or a ‘goal’ to aim for,
without which evaluating the outcomes from a co-evolutionary process becomes
extremely hard, or even impossible, for the very fact that co-evolution can have
an open ended dynamic. To put a handle on the process, one needs a definition
of the quality of the solutions one expects from the process. Game theoretic
solutions give us these quality attributes which we may use in order to engineer
(build, validate, and refine) co-evolution towards achieving them in the solutions
that emerge out of the process. Note that, whether or not game theoretic out-
comes must be used as a goal for co-evolution is an entirely different matter. The
goals could well be defined as deviations from game theoretic outcomes, as we
will consider in Chapter 4. One could as well use experimental data from human
experiments for example, if this data were indeed available, to construct the goal.
The idea is to have a pre-defined goal to aim for which is specific enough for
validating the simulation outcomes. We are interested in engineering the process
of co-evolution to achieve our pre-defined goals.
Apart from game theory helping validate co-evolution, there is a second ad-
vantage and indeed, our main purpose, in carrying out this activity. Agent
based computational economics (ACE), as a research field, has seen a use for
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co-evolution as a mechanism to model socio-economic learning and adaptation in
order to see what emerges (as a culture dish approach to economics), understand
how the emergence came about, and give socio-economic interpretations to the
co-evolutionary process and the results that emerge. Socio-economic learning has
further been used in this manner to simulate equilibrium selection. One of the
reasons this is interesting is that this gives support to the designed co-evolutionary
algorithm to be applicable for equilibrium selection in game settings where the
theoretical equilibrium is intractable. Another reason is that this can lead to
‘what-if’ scenarios that may inform a practitioner about details that they may
miss when trying to find a closed form solution for an economic game.However, an
important point to be kept in mind is that co-evolution is a search process, which
has been interpreted as simulating socio-economic learning within ACE. Prob-
lems discovered in co-evolutionary algorithm design research, are hence not too
far away from problems in using co-evolution as a socio-economic learning simu-
lator. ACE, specifically when simulating socio-economic learning, due to the field
growing largely independently of co-evolutionary algorithm design research, has
often used ideas and notions from economics to understand the implementation
details of co-evolution, with little rigour. Thus, an economic interpretation to the
process and the results that come about from it, is a subject of much criticism [39,
chap 2.], as these may in fact be mis-interpretations. As such, the socio-economic
terms or phenomena used to interpret the process and results get mis-interpreted
within simulations. There is a dissonance between interpreting co-evolution as a
socio-economic learning simulator and co-evolution inherently being an adaptive
search process. A conformance between simulation and search is thus in order,
otherwise simulating socio-economic interaction and learning in order for agents
to adapt to reach a certain type of behaviour (rummaging through the search
space of behaviours) would have little meaning i.e. simulations will not do what
they are meant to.
This Chapter first (Section 3.2) lays out the first integral part of our method-
ical framework, for the case of avoiding mis-interpretations of socio-economic
phenomena of interest within simulations from the top-up, using the notion be-
hind co-evolutionary solution concepts. The Chapter then takes us through a
discussion on how co-evolution has been used within ACE (Section 3.3), how
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it has often been mis-interpreted, leading to misleading conclusions about what
it can achieve as a mechanism for socio-economic learning (Section 3.4). As a
case study, we focus on applying our methodology, thus analysing and refining
the co-evolutionary solution concept, by considering the phenomenon of bounded
rationality. Bounded rationality has been mis-interpreted as being the reason
for co-evolution to fail to achieve the desired results previously [59, 149] (Sec-
tion 3.5). The notion of bounded rationality hence gives us a point of focus to
explore and understand, together with understanding whether or not it hinders
co-evolution from being a useful socio-economic learning mechanism such that co-
evolution achieves the desired results. Using the notion behind co-evolutionary
solution concepts and applying our methodology (Section 3.6), we show how and
that indeed we can, achieve the desired results, which in our case is equilib-
rium selection, with boundedly rational agents. We thus reveal the misuse of
co-evolutionary algorithms by way of mis-interpreting bounded rationality, which
lead to mis-interpretations of the process and results thereof, and show how to
avoid doing so using our methodology. Section 3.7 comments on how our method-
ology generalises to more complex versions of the games considered, and Section
3.8 comments on the issue we continue investigating in the next Chapter.
3.2 Framework Part 1: Avoiding Mis- interpre-
tations From the Top-down
3.2.1 Description of the Framework
Given that one has a co-evolutionary algorithm for simulating socio-economic
learning and adaptation at hand, we want to analyse and refine the algorithm
so that the simulation may not get mis-interpreted in socio-economic terms.
Recall from our objectives (see Chapter 1) that we want to handle such mis-
interpretation of simulations by focussing on the socio-economic phenomena of
interest that is being interpreted with little scrutiny within simulations, and thus
being mis-interpreted. In essence, we want to show how to analyse and refine
co-evolutionary simulations such that socio-economic phenomena of interest may
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not get mis-interpreted within them. Here, we lay out the first part of the frame-
work that we want the ACE community to follow in order to achieve this. Note
that the first part of the framework essentially allows for the avoidance of mis-
interpretations of socio-economic phenomena of interest within simulations from
the top-down, using the notion behind co-evolutionary solution concepts. The
following guidelines lay out the first part of the framework:
1. Ask the question, what the solution concept/goal/desired outcome is, that
we want the co-evolutionary algorithm to have agents converge towards?
This could be, for example, convergence to the equilibrium, or some other
desired outcome of choice.
2. Reduce the population size in the algorithm to get a handle on the co-
evolutionary dynamic, if necessary and possible. The necessity becomes
evident if the dynamic cannot be explicitly understood with a population.
This allows for following the co-evolutionary dynamic and indeed under-
standing it in explicit algorithmic terms.
3. With the goal in mind, work on the elements that specify the algorithm, to
understand how the elements effect the goal and co-evolutionary dynamic.
This analysis of the elements, helps refine them in order to achieve the
goal under question. Note that working on the evaluation, interaction and
selection schemes may need greater attention than the variation scheme
and representation used in the algorithm, because the selection pressure
largely depends on these three. Changing the representation however, can
necessitate a change in the other elements, for the desired goal to be realised.
The socio-economic phenomenon of interest that we consider scrutinising in this
thesis is bounded rationality. As a case study within this Chapter, we utilise the
above mentioned framework to show how mis-interpretations of bounded ratio-
nality can be avoided from the top-down from within previous work [59]. Chapter
4 lays out and applies the second part of the framework.
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3.3 Co-evolution in ACE (a modelling and pre-
dictive tool)
3.3.1 Modelling Socio-economic Learning and Adaptation
Agent based computational economics (ACE), as a research field, has been using
co-evolution as a way to model social interaction and learning, in order to under-
stand the process by which certain socio-economic outcomes emerge, intending to
ensure predictive content through mimicry. Agents interact locally, which gives
rise to macro phenomenon (macroeconomic in this case), which feed back into
affecting local interactions further. This two way feedback [145] has rendered co-
evolution as a potentially viable methodology (co-evolution has a similar thematic
structure when it comes to this two way feedback) to model it, with the hope
that both descriptive and normative concerns expressed by practitioners will be
attended to. Descriptive being the need for a constructive explanation of global
emergent behaviour, and normative being the understanding of peculiarities of
entities that form part of the model [145], e.g. behavioural norms that the agents
may evolve towards. Modelling the learning process of computational agents has
been one of the main areas of research as far as ACE is concerned. A broad
range of algorithms have been used to represent this learning process and as such
become candidates for modelling socio-economic learning. The list includes evolu-
tionary algorithms [27, 39], reinforcement learning algorithms [50, 142], classifier
systems [93] etc. Given that a lot of these algorithms were originally employed
for optimality seeking (as opposed to the challenges posed by a co-evolutionary
or co-adaptive consideration of these algorithms), it is known that caution must
be used if they are to be applied for socio-economic modelling [145]. Viewing
games as strategic interaction problems embedded in natural and socio-economic
processes, agents repeatedly and innovatively tackling these problems over time,
evolving the ability to play the games effectively (though effective play is not
the same as optimising a static function) as a result [62, 145], is the drive behind
using the above methods. As far as evolutionary algorithms are concerned, mech-
anising innovation and progression (given innovation) as evolution, helps realise a
link between socio-economic learning and these algorithms, as alluded to in [65].
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The motivation for using these algorithms thus has roots in the intuitive notion
of optimisation as progression of the agents towards refined behaviours (arms
race for example, much the same as the intuition behind early co-evolutionary
algorithm design research), which is not correct when one adds a co-adaptive
component into the picture, as we know from co-evolutionary algorithm design
research. The use of such algorithms with a co-adaptive component, which is what
is needed for socio-economic simulations, has however remained ad-hoc. It is now
common within the field of ACE to consider one of the two class of algorithms
(also known as levels of learning) for the purpose of socio-economic learning sim-
ulations, these classes being individual learning and social learning. These two
classes stem from the initial work carried out in the field of evolutionary computa-
tion, more specifically evolutionary learning, whereby two approaches (or schools
of thought) known as the Michigan [74] and Pittsburg [42] approach to evolution-
ary learning were made prominent. These approaches differ in the way a solution
to the problem is constituted from an evolving population of solutions. In the
Michigan approach, the population as a whole constitutes a solution (individual
being partial solutions), whereas in the Pittsburg approach, each individual in the
evolving population constitutes a solution to the problem. Considering one agent
(or the strategy used by the agent to play a game) as being this solution discussed
above, these two approaches directly map to the individual learning and social
learning classes commonly considered to make a choice of an algorithm within
ACE. Choosing an algorithm residing in one of these two classes, even because
of a class being more popular amongst practitioners [152], rather than due to a
rigorous study backing the usage, is not uncommon.
There are various reasons why modelling socio-economic learning using evo-
lutionary algorithms may be considered interesting. One deals with effectively
gaining insight into the dynamics of the simulation for games, more complex ver-
sions of which may be intractable, thus helping practitioners with useful insights
into solutions for these complex versions. Another deals with using these algo-
rithms as models of human learning, where efforts to calibrate the algorithms
to empirical decision making data are carried out as well [94]. There have also
been studies to understand the extent to which learning processes of real world
market participants are maladapted to market institutions, giving optimisation
72
3.3 Co-evolution in ACE (a modelling and predictive tool)
algorithms a possible application domain [84].
Making a methodical choice of the algorithm that may represent socio-economic
learning, and thus be a good candidate for carrying out such simulations, is a line
of research still in its infancy. Researchers have expressed co-evolutionary algo-
rithms to exhibit promise for modelling socio-economic learning, and at the same
time concerns about their ad-hoc usage [39, 145]. Indeed, very pertinently to the
focus of this thesis, influences on the outcomes of simulations given simulations
differing in the level of learning mentioned above (bearing a resemblance to the
idea of a co-evolutionary solution concept, further discussion of which is carried
out in Section 3.6) has been touched upon [152], amongst other recent efforts,
which we discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.6).
3.3.2 How Viable are EAs as a Tool for Socio-economic
Simulations?
In general, interpreting the process of evolutionary algorithms and the parameters
and intricacies of these methods, as learning with socio-economically sound enti-
ties within the context of a socio-economic game, specifically when considering the
co-adaptive component within these algorithms (i.e. considering co-evolutionary
algorithms), poses problems. The choice of the evolutionary algorithm used for
simulating a socio-economic situation in question has in general been ad-hoc. A
very simple way to look at this problem is that since evolutionary algorithms do
not model natural selection in its original and complex form, if we consider socio-
economic phenomena as an offshoot of the natural evolutionary process (indeed,
co-evolutionary process), it is not hard to see that at least an ad-hoc choice of an
algorithm will not do justice to the idea of simulating the phenomena. In fact,
given the issues that have been discovered that hinder co-evolutionary algorithms
from doing what is expected of them, some of which we discussed in Chapter 2
(Section 2.3), an ad-hoc choice of these algorithms for the purpose of explaining
or indeed growing socio-economic processes, does not sound reasonable. This
can lead to the co-evolutionary process and the outcomes there of, being mis-
interpreted in socio-economic terms. In order for this mis-interpretation to not
happen (i.e. to match simulation and socio-economic phenomena), refinements
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to the algorithms may indeed be necessary. To answer whether co-evolutionary
algorithms are indeed a viable tool for socio-economic simulations, we would have
to consider systematic refinements to off-the-shelf algorithms, and see if we can
get rid of such mis-interpretations. The method of design of these algorithms for
the purposes of simulations, thus needs a fundamental change.
3.4 (Mis)Interpretation of Co-evolutionary Sim-
ulations
3.4.1 (Mis)Interpretation of the Process and Outcomes
Based on some empirical evidence that evolutionary algorithms may lead to de-
sired or close to desired phenomena, it is suggested in [39] that some of the
features of these algorithms represent the effects appearing in a learning popu-
lation well. Along the same lines, for some simple bargaining games, it is noted
in [59, 149], that evolutionary algorithms do indeed come close to modelling the
desired phenomena, but they fail to do so for more complex games. An evolu-
tionary algorithm is interpreted in terms of socio-economic phenomena such that,
the elements that define the algorithm are given a socio-economic meaning. As a
general case for instance, selection, crossover and mutation are interpreted as ‘im-
itation of the successful’ [39], information exchange [1], and innovation or making
mistakes [1], respectively. Moreover, bounded rationality is generally assumed to
be implicit in these algorithms [131], without scrutiny. These are forced (i.e. not
thoroughly investigated) qualitative meanings associated with the evolutionary
algorithm and suggest a passive treatment of modelling socio-economic learning,
and indeed an off-the-shelf treatment of the evolutionary algorithm considered.
One can only say that if the process is interpreted in such a manner, the out-
comes may not always match up to what is desired of the evolutionary algorithm.
It is in fact shown in [39] that particular aspects of the implementation of the
co-evolutionary algorithm can strongly influence the outcomes from the process.
As a concrete example of this non-rigourous treatment of the subject, a case
to point out is that agents, in such models, are assumed to have little apriori
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knowledge about the game and the opponents, and it is by trial and error that
they gradually adapt towards desired/optimal solutions. This deems them to be
boundedly rational from the outset [59], as also suggested in [1]. This is gen-
eral practice within ACE [131]. Still, interpreting outcomes when they deviate
from the desired outcomes (not matching rational equilibrium outcomes for ex-
ample), as being caused by bounded rationality (for example, as presented in
[59]), suggests assuming the methods would never work for what is required of
them. Actively understanding the cause for deviations may however give further
insight into whether this is indeed the case, and if not, what bounded rationality
may mean in the context of the simulations considered. An investigation of this
kind may benefit ACE concretely, as opposed to the field being mislead by way
of unscrutinised assumptions. For example, for the case of bounded rationality,
if the assumption is proven to be correct, we will learn what bounded rationality
means within simulations at the algorithmic level, i.e. the algorithmic details
that cause the deviations. But, and very importantly, if the assumption indeed
turn out to be incorrect, we will learn what bounded rationality does not mean
within simulations, thus avoiding mis-interpreting it within simulations. In both
cases, we can then further consider how it may explicitly and tangibly be varied
within simulations (something we consider in the next Chapter), because having
a concrete handle on it necessarily requires for it to not be mis-interpreted within
simulations.
3.4.2 Forcing Interpretations vs. Engineering Co-evolution
If the match between what is required of the outcomes and what actually emerges,
is not close (to some degree), it is unclear as to why computational methods should
be used at all, other than providing ‘what-if’ scenarios. In our opinion though,
what-if scenarios are simply too hard to evaluate for their usefulness other than
them being just a possible result out of the myriads of results, many of which
may in fact be more useful than the one that emerges. It has been noticed that
interpreting simulation results, where there is indeed a mismatch, has largely
been ‘hand-wavy’ and so, not easy to believe for its soundness.
The fact that co-evolution has been used for agent based simulations, one
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would expect there to be efforts to understanding the validity of this approach
in the literature. Although there have been a few studies [2, 8, 39], evolutionary
algorithms are generally adopted off-the-shelf to simulate socio-economic learning.
Without a methodical adoption of algorithms for simulation, any socio-economic
interpretation of the process and results thereof, lack the rigour necessary to
confidently say that the interpretations are indeed sound. In fact, if one does not
understand the algorithms, one cannot understand what they simulate. Given
that co-evolution is a co-adaptive search process, it is not necessarily clear what
connects search and simulation. If agent based simulations are to be seen as
search processes or processes of adaptation, then one needs to reconcile search
and desired goals from simulations.
The fact of there being mis-matches in socio-economic simulations using co-
evolution are remarkably similar to the fact that mis-matches are often seen to
occur in co-evolutionary algorithms, where they have been shown to occur due
to the lack of rigour in the definition of the co-evolutionary solution concept
[53]. Our aim is to discipline ACE research such that, ideas from co-evolutionary
algorithm design research, more precisely, the notion of solution concepts in co-
evolution, are not overlooked in this field growing largely independently of co-
evolution.
Game theory gives us useful idealised results in terms of what outcomes one
may expect with players interacting under theoretical assumptions. Although
these theoretical assumption are far too strict and do not in any way model
the reality of the particular interaction or game under question, they are indeed
required for a closed form solution to the game. Although the value of these
theoretical outcomes is arguable, at least in economics and psychology research,
for the purpose of understanding co-evolution and as a consequence, agent based
simulations, they are indeed a boon. These solutions give us a goal to aim for,
without which, evaluating the outcomes from a co-evolutionary process becomes
extremely hard, or even impossible, for the very fact that co-evolution is an open
ended or even a cyclical (e.g. red queen effect [33]) process. To put a handle on
the process, one needs a definition of the quality of the solutions one expects from
the process. Game theoretic solutions give us these quality attributes which we
may use in order to engineer (analyse and refine) co-evolution towards achieving
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them in the solutions that emerge out of the process.
We essentially want to make sure if we can ‘engineer’ co-evolution in a method-
ical manner, specifically utilising the framework described in Section 3.2, towards
modelling socio-economic situations such that, pre-defined or desired outcomes
from the socio-economic situation considered, are indeed achieved or achievable,
or at least that the mis-interpretations of the simulations in socio-economic terms
(or mis-interpretations of socio-economic terms within simulations) be avoided.
Following this, we can then also delve deeper into understanding and analysing
how the co-evolutionary process fairs in achieving outcomes (for example, devia-
tions from rational equilibrium outcomes, which may relate to real world outcomes
with humans) that may have been explained to have come about as a result of the
mis-interpretations, enabling the formation of closer matches between simulation
and reality, if need be.
3.5 The Crux of the Problem: Forcing a Socio-
economic Interpretation
3.5.1 Preliminaries
In this section we describe the game considered in the thesis, and the co-evolutionary
algorithm and settings previously used in [59].
3.5.1.1 Alternating Offers Multiple Issue Bargaining Game
We consider the multiple issue, finite horizon (finite number of rounds) version
of Rubinstein’s [127] alternating offers bargaining game. There are two agents,
‘Player 1’ and ‘Player 2’, and Player 1 always starts the game. Each agent (as an
offerer) in turn proposes an offer (a division of the surplus on m issues, expressed
as a vector 'o) to the other agent (i.e. the responder). The responder decides
whether or not to accept this offer. This decision is made by matching the utility
of this offer against a threshold. Each round of the game consists of an offer
proposed by the offerer and the decision on the acceptance or rejection of it by
the responder. There are a maximum of n rounds. At the end of each round,
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the game terminates with a probability 1 − p. The probability p (probability
that the game proceeds to the next round) reflects the uncertain nature of real
world bargaining interactions, from the point of view of the agents not necessarily
knowing the actual deadline of the game. The game ends in a disagreement if
there is a breakdown (which, as said, occurs with probability 1 − p) or if the
responder rejects the offer in the last round. In either case both agents receiving
nothing (i.e. the utility is zero). The game ends in an agreement if the responder
accepts the offer in any of the rounds before the game terminates. In this case,
the agents receive a positive payoff decided by their respective utility functions.
Refer to Fig. 3.1 for a diagrammatic description of the game. As in [59], we
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 
 
 
 
 











Figure 3.1: Alternating offers multiple issue bargaining game.
assume, without loss of generality, that the total bargaining surplus available for
each issue is unity. For either agent, the utility of an offer 'o is the dot product
'wj .'o =
∑m
i=1w
i
jo
i, where 'wj is a vector containing agent j’s weights for each issue.
A particular instance of the game is defined by specifying values for the num-
ber of issues, m, the probability of going on to the next round, p, the maximum
number of rounds, n, and the the weight vector 'wj for agent j. We consider
78
3.5 The Crux of the Problem: Forcing a Socio-economic
Interpretation
fixing the number of issues (m) to 2 to begin with, since the majority of the
results reported in [59] consider this value of m. We also consider fixing 'w1 to
(0.7, 0.3) and ( 'w2) to (0.3, 0.7), again because the results reported in [59] consider
these. Note that the weight vectors ( 'wj) are independent of the offers made by
an agent or the offers received from the other agent. An agent only gets to use
its respective weights when calculating the utility of an offer, for both the offer
made by itself and the offer received from the other agent. Other instances of the
game are specified as and when necessary in order to explore the answers to the
main questions raised in the thesis. Thus, a specific value for p and n instantiates
the game (see Table 3.1). For each combination of p and n, there is a unique
SPE solution that can be calculated using backward induction (as discussed in
Chapter 2). It is this equilibrium point that characterises the optimal strategies
the co-evolutionary algorithm should evolve.
As an example, we consider the game with no breakdown i.e. p = 1. In this
case, the game theoretic solution (SPE) is the obvious one, that if the game is
of ‘odd’ length (n is odd), the first agent gets everything on all issues (payoff of
1) and the second gets nothing (payoff of 0). On the other hand, if the game
is of ‘even’ length (n is even), the first agent gets nothing and the second gets
everything on all issues. In other terms, if the number of rounds is fixed, then
the agent that turns out to be the responder in the last round should accept any
offer since the alternative is disagreeing, hence receiving no utility at all.
3.5.1.2 The Co-evolutionary Algorithm
We apply the same co-evolutionary self adaptive (µ+λ)-Evolution Strategy (ES)
used in [59]. Two populations (of size µ) are considered, one for each type of agent
(Player 1 or Player 2). Each individual in a population plays a game with every
individual in the other population, and the fitness is evaluated as the average
utility that the individual gets from all the games. At each generation, λ indi-
viduals are selected from each population uniformly at random (independently)
and then mutated to form the two offspring populations (of size λ), one for each
agent type. The individuals in the offspring populations are evaluated by playing
against every individual in the opponent parental population. The fitness of each
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Table 3.1: Parameter settings for the game and co-evolutionary (µ+ λ)-ES.
Game Weights of agent 1 ( 'w1) (0.7, 0.3)
Parameters Weights of agent 2 ( 'w2) (0.3, 0.7)
Number of issues (m) 2
Continuation probability (p) specified as needed
Maximum number of rounds (n) specified as needed
EA Parental population size (µ) 25
Parameters Offspring population size (λ) 25
Selection scheme (µ+ λ)-ES
Mutation model self-adaptive
Initial standard deviations (σi) 0.1
Minimum standard deviation 0.025
individual is the average utility obtained by playing against these opponents. The
µ fittest individuals are selected from the respective pools of µ+ λ individuals of
both types for the next generation1. Fig. 3.2 shows a schematic diagram of this
process. Table 3.1 shows the parameter settings for the algorithm used in [59]
and that we will replicate.
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Figure 3.2: Co-evolutionary (µ+ λ)-ES.
The strategy representation used is the same as in [59], and shown in Fig.
3.3. The agent strategy specifies the offers 'oj(r) and thresholds tj(r) for each
round r in the game for agents j ∈ {1, 2}. As such, the strategy is specified by
a string of real numbers in the interval [0.0, 1.0]. At the start of each run, these
offers and thresholds are initialised by sampling random numbers in the interval
1This scheme resembles the individual learning notion of simulating socio-economic learning
within ACE.
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[0.0, 1.0] from a uniform distribution. Moreover, the mutation of an individual
happens as follows. Each real value, say xi (which is a value either representing
the offer on one of the issues or a threshold), in this string that specifies the
strategy, is mutated by adding a zero mean Gaussian variable having a standard
deviation of σi to xi, giving x′i, i.e. x
′
i = xi+σiNi(0, 1)
1. The standard deviations
(σis) decide on the step size of the mutation, and are associated with each xi in
the representation. These σis are self-adaptive in the sense that, the mutation
operator in this algorithm first updates σi according to σi = σiexp[τ ′N(0, 1) +
τNi(0, 1)]2, and then uses this updated σi to mutate the corresponding xi, giving
x′i.
    
    


Figure 3.3: Strategy representation.
3.5.2 Bounded Rationality Leading to Divergence
We consider the problem of co-evolving optimal agents for the alternating offers
bargaining game [127]. Previous work [149] using co-evolution for finding the
theoretical equilibrium (SPE) for the game suggested that it was not possible to
achieve optimal agents at the end of the co-evolutionary process, hence, that the
algorithm did not converge.
Fig. 3.4 shows the mismatches between evolutionary and SPE results for
bargaining games with p = 1 and p = 0.95, as reported in [59]. Lines join SPE
solutions to guide the eye. It can be seen that the mean fitness of the populations
over 25 runs is somewhat close to the SPE values but does not converge to them.
1Ni(0, 1) is generated afresh for each xi.
2τ ′ and τ are specified as (
√
2l)−1 and (
√
2
√
l)−1 respectively [17]. The zero mean Gaussian
variable Ni(0, 1) associated with τ is generated afresh for each σi, whereas N(0, 1), which is
associated with τ ′ is only generated once and applied to #σ (i.e. applied to all σis associated
with xis of an agent).
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This holds for any p or any n. The reasons are attributed to the agents being
“myopic” [59], in that the agents had no memory to remember past interactions,
no explicit rationality principles to use, and for more realistic game settings with a
stochastic element defining when the game ends, they were supposedly unable to
reason backwards from the deadline. While these issues may be interesting, they
do not directly answer why co-evolution, in this case, does not lead to optimality
and convergence. Since a given setting of the bargaining game has only one
SPE, it is worth investigating whether a co-evolutionary algorithm can evolve
the agents’ strategies towards optimality. In Section 3.6, we further analyse the
co-evolutionary algorithm used in [59, 149] to understand why optimal agents
cannot be co-evolved and whether there are better co-evolutionary approaches
that can be used in this case. The goal here is to identify general issues that
may influence co-evolution, not just for a particular game considered. Since this
myopia is reported for all values of p and n, it seems safe to look into the most
simple setting of the game, that of p = 1, in our following analysis.
(a) p = 1 [59]. (b) p = 0.95 [59].
Figure 3.4: Comparison of evolutionary results with SPE results for p = 1 and
p = 0.95 [59].
We re-implement the methodology from [59]. When running the algorithm
we see that, independently from the values of p and n, the populations indeed
evolve towards the pareto-efficient frontier (Fig. 3.5). And, as reported in [59],
the agents keep exploring the search space as a “moving cloud” of agreements
along the frontier, instead of evolving towards the equilibrium. Moreover, we see
that, the populations scatter in the long term, only to regroup, move along the
frontier and scatter again. Fig. 3.5 depicts the described “breakdowns”. This
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should not happen if our solution concept is that of finding the equilibrium for
the game, especially with elitist selection.
(a) After 3200 generations. (b) After 3700 generations.
Figure 3.5: Outcomes of games played (agreements reached) by both parental
populations for p = 0.7 and n = 10 from a typical run. SPE = (0.769, 0.538).
The dotted line is the pareto-efficient frontier.
In Fig. 3.6 we plot the mean fitness of the populations in a typical run for
p = 0.7, n = 10 (Fig. 3.6(a)) and n = 1 (Fig. 3.6(b)) respectively, p = 1 by
default in the latter. In the first case we can see that the mean fitness of both
populations just goes up and down. The figure suggests that the strategies are
not evolving towards any direction. The wrong co-evolutionary solution concept
might have thus been applied. From Fig. 3.6(b) we can understand a bit more.
Since for the simple game with n = 1, the optimal solution is 1.0 for Player 1 and
0.0 for Player 2 (as discussed in Section 3.5.1.1), the fitness trajectories in Fig.
3.6(b) are clearer. We see that the mean fitnesses do head towards the optimal
values and then collapse repeatedly. Although the causes for this divergence still
remain unclear, we see that the co-evolutionary methodology does not converge
even for this simpler game. In Section 3.6, we continue studying the game where
p = 1 and simplify the experimental setup in order to gain insight into the co-
evolutionary dynamics, specifically convergence.
In particular, we remove the influence of a population by considering only 1
individual per agent type in the co-evolutionary setup (i.e. we get the (1+1)-ES1).
1Note that in a (1+1)-ES, the offspring replaces the parent only if its fitness is greater than
or equal to that of the parent (i.e. if the parent and offspring have the same fitness, selection
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(a) p = 0.7, n = 10. (b) n = 1.
Figure 3.6: Mean fitness of the populations in a typical run.
The idea is to study the causes of the breakdowns by looking at the individual
strategies. All other parameters remain the same as in the original population
based algorithm.
3.6 Possible Solution: Engineering Co-evolution
3.6.1 Co-evolutionary Solution Concepts
A solution concept is a notion borrowed from game theory and specifies whether
a strategy played by an agent adheres to a set of standards that make the strat-
egy preferable to be used over other strategies, and thus, retained. It separates
solution strategies from those that are not, almost like a filter through which the
whole search space of strategies is passed, retaining only the desired strategy.
However, designing this filter is no mean task. We do not have the luxury of
explicitly scrutinising each strategy in the search space, which leads to sampling
strategies, evaluating them, and following a gradient. The solution concept can
thus be specified as using the gradient to separate potentially preferable strate-
gies from those that are not. Co-evolution however, makes finding this gradient
harder, because the evaluation of strategies is relative to the strategies sampled,
and not a static/absolute function to optimise on.
The pressure towards filtering out the desired strategy, is built on by channel-
is not performed uniformly at random).
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ing the solution strategies along a certain path in the incomplete and changing
view of the search space. The idea is for the incomplete and changing view of the
search space to be timely for it to be useful to guide the solutions towards the
desired solutions. This is very important in co-evolution because the incomplete
view of the search space is reactive to the solutions representing the current state
of the algorithm. A secondary search problem thus results, that of finding who
to interact with, given that the solutions themselves present the incomplete view
of the search space. The opponents that describe the incomplete yet useful view
of the search space to adapt with, need attention in their discovery and use.
Thus, co-evolution involves solving a secondary search problems: one that
allows for selection of preferable strategies, and the other that allows for the
selection of a sample of strategies against which evaluation of any strategy may
provide a preferable gradient. Designing and following the primary and secondary
search problem gradients entails a thorough investigation of the elements that
make up a co-evolutionary algorithm, and is what we call the implemented co-
evolutionary solution concept in this thesis.
This includes the representation that decides the nature of the search space,
interaction, evaluation and selection schemes that decide on the nature of the
sample, the gradient provided by the sample, and the manner in which the gra-
dient is followed, and the variation operators that help traverse the search space.
In order to use co-evolution to lead to a certain kind of behaviour one has to
decide on these elements for the co-evolving entities, giving us the implemented
solution concept. The discussion in Section 3.5.1.2 describes the implemented co-
evolutionary solution concept used in previous work [59]. So, given an expected
view on what co-evolution should result in, any mismatch in the actual behaviour
of the algorithm (for example, expecting convergence to the equilibrium outcomes
but the algorithm resulting in outcomes diverging from the equilibrium in previ-
ous work [59]) signifies a mismatch between the desired solution concept (desired
strategise to be filtered out) and implemented solution concept.
Note that, if the idea is to simulate ‘real’ economic behaviour, one has to tune
the aforementioned elements first in a methodical manner, such that they do
indeed do so, before interpreting the results obtained from the algorithm. Other-
wise, the conclusions drawn from the incomplete treatment of these elements are
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at best premature. This is a problem still overlooked in ACE literature and one of
the aims of this thesis is to emphasise the importance of co-evolutionary solution
concepts within the field via the application of our methodical framework, the
first integral part of which is described in Section 3.2.
3.6.1.1 Relationship Between Divergence in Co-evolution and Diver-
gence Leading to Misinterpretations in ACE
Co-evolution has its share of problems in there being a mismatch between the
desired and implemented solution concepts [53]. Using co-evolution directly off-
the-shelf in ACE does not solve these problems of course. It makes sense to
assume that these problems will remain to be understood in depth, instead of
assuming for them to be an ‘economic feature’ (as opposed to an ‘algorithmic
incompetence’) and interpreting or explaining the problems as socio-economic
terms. ACE often sees such problems as a “source for additional insights about
the fine-structure of the emergence” [40] within socio-economic simulations caused
by socio-economic phenomena interpreting various aspects of these simulations.
For example, the problem of divergence from the equilibrium solutions, may be
seen as due to certain aspects of the algorithm which could be given a socio-
economic meaning, and this socio-economic meaning can in turn be then seen as
the source of additional insights about the nature of emergence within simula-
tions. When making socio-economic assumptions about the algorithm however,
if the insights are not sourced (i.e. scrutinised), but instead the fine structure of
emergence simply taken for granted (in other words, explaining divergence being
caused due to some assumed socio-economic phenomenon like bounded rational-
ity, instead of finding the algorithmic source of the divergence), we cannot be sure
whether or not it is indeed algorithmic incompetence that mars the simulations.
As such, socio-economic phenomena may get mis-interpreted as leading to these
fine structures of emergence, the case in point being bounded rationality get-
ting mis-interpreted as causing divergence within simulations. We are thus of the
opinion, that working on the co-evolutionary solution concept should not be over-
looked, or else the use of socio-economic phenomena of interest for explanations
within the simulations may not be fully justified.
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3.6.1.2 What Should Explain Divergence?
As explained previously in Section 3.5, the divergence between expected and ob-
served outcomes from the co-evolutionary simulations were attributed to ‘bounded
rationality’. Not working on the co-evolutionary solution concept to see if this
divergence can be overcome, and explaining the lack of rigour in understanding
the process by holding bounded rationality of the agents responsible for it alone,
does not do justice to either field, i.e. co-evolutionary algorithm design on the one
hand, and ACE on the other. If we could come up with an algorithm (a refine-
ment of the co-evolutionary solution concept implemented previously, described
in Section 3.5) which result in agents converging to the equilibrium solutions for
the games considered, the real meaning of bounded rationality may come to sur-
face. We will essentially come to know what bounded rationality does not mean
in computational or algorithmic terms, and indeed come to know what it was be-
ing assumed to represent (algorithmically). If, on the other hand, we are unable
to engineer an algorithm that does this, we would still delve deeper into under-
standing the co-evolutionary process and its relationship with observed outcomes
in computational or algorithmic terms (as opposed to unassessed socio-economic
terms), which we may then consider seeing as bounded rationality (i.e. if there
seems to remain no reason for such a consideration to get challenged), though in
explicit algorithmic terms (as opposed to current practice in ACE of simply as-
suming bounded rationality to be present in the algorithms from the outset). One
could then even envisage quantifying the socio-economic phenomenon of bounded
rationality as an explicit computational or algorithmic entity to understand how
it really affects co-evolution towards specific outcomes, something we do consider
in Chapter 4.
3.6.2 Convergence to Equilibrium
We introduced this problem of forcing an economic interpretation on co-evolutionary
simulations by taking the case described in [59], where bounded rationality is seen
as the cause for all the observed deviations from optimality (deviations from the
equilibrium). We want to understand if it is really bounded rationality or some-
thing else, that causes the deviations. In other words, we want to understand
87
3.6 Possible Solution: Engineering Co-evolution
why the co-evolutionary algorithm does not converge to optimality, which in our
case is the equilibrium. We see bounded rationality as a premature explanation
of the deviations, since a thorough investigation on what it really means in terms
of how it relates to the co-evolutionary search process was not carried out. The
question that immediately follows is whether or not the implemented solution
concept can be engineered so that we achieve convergence to the equilibrium
with boundedly rational agents? The following analyses and refinements of the
algorithm, applying our methodical framework from Section 3.2, sheds light on
this issue.
3.6.3 Working on the Co-evolutionary Solution Concept
for Simple Games (p=1)
3.6.3.1 Variation
Fig. 3.7(a) shows 500 generations of a typical run. We see that (as also noted for
the single issue case in [149], albeit, with a population), the individuals actually
reach the SPE of (1.0, 0.0) for odd n and (0.0, 1.0) for even n. This however should
not happen. It is theoretically impossible to reach the optimum 'x∗ of a continuos
optimisation problem in finite time, but only a point 'x such that |'x − 'x∗| ≤ "
for any constant " > 0 [17]. The ES should converge towards the optimum by
gradually decreasing the step size 'σ and only reach the exact optimal point at
infinity. Hence, there seems to be a problem with the algorithm implementation.
It turns out that the mutation operator sets any mutated value larger than
unity (or smaller than zero) to unity (respectively zero) [59], instead of considering
solutions outside the search space as infeasible. Although this pushes the agents’
strategies to optimality (i.e. for p = 1), it turns out to be destructive. Once the
agents reach the SPE values exactly, the responder becomes indifferent between
getting nothing and disagreeing with the opponent. There is no selection pressure
for the responder to keep a threshold of 0.0 (while there would have been for 0+ "
for any positive "). Hence the responder ends up accepting a random threshold
in the following generation with a high probability (in fact, 1) resulting in a
disagreement (i.e. the fitness goes down to 0). The new threshold would not be
too bad if the mutation step size were decreasing in time as it should. However,
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the step size 'σ ends up evolving in the opposite way. The higher the 'σ, the
higher is the probability that an infeasible solution is created which in turn is
transformed into the optimal one. In Fig. 3.7(b) we plot the 'σ values for Player 1
in a typical run. The same phenomenon happens for Player 2. Where the values
of σi’s are not visible, they are higher than the plotted extreme.
(a) A typical run. (b) σi for Player 1.
Figure 3.7: A typical run of the (1+1)-ES using the mutation procedure in [59]
for n = 1.
Forcing infeasible players to be equilibrium players or clipped to the bounds of
the search space does not do justice to the co-evolutionary search, i.e. mis-guides
the search. The algorithm cannot follow its perceived gradient towards optimal
solutions, as it is made to jump out of bounds and achieve infeasibility disguised
as optimality. The self adaptive step sizes are testimony to this behaviour of the
algorithm as they get extremely large, forcing the solutions towards infeasibility.
Moreover, being forced to optimality exactly, further misguides the algorithm
once optimality is achieved. If we are to engineer a solution concept with having
the ability to construct the necessary gradients towards optimality, once we reach
optimality, the algorithm should stay put instead of diverging. The fact that a
disagreement and getting nothing result in the same fitness for the responder
i.e. there is no gradient that the algorithm constructs over the threshold of the
responder once optimality has been achieved, divergence is bound to happen. As
said before, the ES should converge towards the optimum by gradually reducing
the step size and only reach the exact optimal at infinity, which would happen if
instead of accepting infeasible solutions, the gradients are properly constructed
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and used by the algorithm so that infeasible solutions are indeed considered infea-
sible. We emphasise that this problem with the algorithm clearly suggests that
bounded rationality should not be considered as an explanation of divergence
from optimality yet.
We modify the algorithm such that infeasible solutions (i.e. solutions outside
the search space) have worse fitness than any feasible search space point (i.e.
-1.0), hence are never accepted.
(a) A typical run. (b) Worst (most divergent) of 25 runs.
Figure 3.8: Runs for the (1+1)-ES using (a) the mutation procedure in [59]
(separate plots for agent types to make the severity of fluctuations unambiguous)
and (b) the corrected version, for n = 1.
In Fig. 3.8, the worst run of the corrected (1+1)-ES is compared with a
typical run of the original version. It clearly shows the difference this simple
correction to the original approach makes. Now the strategies evolve towards
optimality for long periods of time. However, breakdowns still occur (although
far less frequently) and become more severe as the number of rounds n increases.
3.6.3.2 Interaction
We call a pair of strategies as incompatible if they disagree when playing with
each other. A closer look at the evolved strategies reveals that the simultaneous
selection of incompatible offspring as the new parents leads to a disagreement,
and hence, a collapse. To illustrate this, we call P1 and P2, the two parents
(one for each agent type) at any given time during the co-evolutionary process,
and the offspring, C1 and C2 respectively. If (P1, P2) are compatible, (P1, C2)
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are compatible, and (C1, P2) are compatible, it does not necessarily follow that
(C1, C2) will be compatible. Figure 3.10 illustrates this. We argue that this was
going un-noticed in the original work [59] and being attributed to the myopic or
boundedly rational properties of the agents. Note that an agent in equilibrium
can be myopic in the sense that it may only know how to play against another
agent in equilibrium, which is when the issue of myopia should be scrutinised.
This is not the case here. Having not played a game before, if the offspring are
incompatible and selected to be in the next generation, then they will inevitably
disagree. This problem (i.e. selection of incompatible opponents) does not depend
on myopic properties of agent strategies, but on an unusual implementation of
the co-evolutionary solution concept.
If we imagine the parents to be close to the equilibrium, it can so happen that
the offspring of both adapt towards fitting the parental opponents in such a way
that the offspring of Player 2 increases its threshold but receives the same fitness
when evaluated against the parental opponent. At the same time, the offspring
of Player 1 fits on to the threshold of Player 2 (parent), leading to an increase in
fitness. Both the offspring will be selected for in this case and they will disagree.
If offspring interact before selection, the gradient towards optimality may not be
compromised. If the offspring of Player 2 interacted with the offspring of Player 1
for further evaluation for its worth as providing a useful secondary search problem
gradient (can also be looked at from the other player’s point of view i.e. if offspring
of Player 1 interacted with offspring of Player 2 for further evaluation for its worth
as providing a useful secondary search problem gradient) the breakdown could
be avoided. Playing with opponents which show a gradient towards convergence
can help tackle the primary search problem of finding the optimal. Knowing
that these opponents are indeed useful, their usefulness coming from the gradient
provided by the players in turn, can help tackle the secondary search problem.
The co-evolutionary solution concept can, in this manner, be refined. Note that
the nature of the problem is such that the primary and secondary search problems,
on seeing from the point of view of the other side or player, change roles. The
primary search problem for Player 1 is the secondary search problem for Player
2 and vice versa.
In the following, we modify the co-evolutionary solution concept, i.e. the inter-
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action element, by allowing the offspring to play games against each other before
selection. If this game results in a disagreement, the offspring are not accepted
(they get a negative fitness of −1.0), otherwise, the co-evolutionary process car-
ries on as in the previous co-evolutionary solution concept. This, by definition,
eliminates the problem of selection of incompatible opponents altogether. Fig.
3.9(a) shows the mean fitness across 100 runs of the modified (1+1)-ES. No di-
vergence was seen in any of the runs (we also allowed the algorithm to run for a
million generations, without seeing one breakdown). Since there is no reason for
breakdown occurring if we add populations, the algorithm will now work also for
µ > 1 and λ > 1.
As we can see, the co-evolutionary solution concept has clearly not been thor-
oughly scrutinised in previous work, but instead a premature explanation of the
divergence as caused by bounded rationality is given instead. It is clear that
bounded rationality is not necessary to explain the divergence at this point, as
there is a simpler explanation in the form of a modified solution concept, which
promises to lead to convergence to optimality.
However, the modifications we have applied do not imply convergence for
n > 1. In fact, already for n = 2, we observe some fitness breakdowns again.
Figure 3.9(b) shows a run of one million generations for n = 2.
(a) n = 1. (b) n = 2.
Figure 3.9: Modified (1+1)-ES for (a) n = 1 (mean across 100 runs) and (b)
n = 2 (a typical diverging run).
Zooming into Fig. 3.9(b), to the generations where there is a sudden change
from the convergent trajectory (generations starting from 374400 for instance),
and investigating the agent strategies in these generations, reveals the cause for
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Figure 3.10: Selecting incompatible opponents.
these breakdowns. Fig. 3.11 takes the two agent (P1 and P2) strategies apart
and shows what each agent receives and wants in terms of utilities in both rounds
(since n = 2). It can be seen that the evaluation of a strategy is local with respect
to the rounds. Since the fitness of an individual is computed whenever there is
an agreement, which can happen in any round, the strategies only consider the
agreement round to evaluate themselves (i.e. it is the offers and thresholds of
the agreement round that determine the strategies’ payoffs). In Fig. 3.11, the
agreements happen in round 2 to begin with (when the outcomes are near SPE).
There is no real selection pressure for modifying round 1 offers and thresholds, so
the strategy chunks corresponding to this round vary randomly and at some point
are such that P1 offers more than what P2 needs. Consequently, the agreement
happens in round 1. Now, P1 can take advantage of the fact that it is in the
driver’s seat (as the utility of both agents is decided by the offer it makes, when
this offer is accepted, which it is), while P2 has lost its selection pressure towards
higher fitness (mismatch between its threshold and P1’s offer leading to P2 getting
what it is given). Meanwhile, the selection pressures for offers and thresholds in
round 2 vary randomly since the players agree in round 1 and never reach round
2. By modifying the fitness evaluation procedure such that it credits the whole
strategy instead of just the part corresponding to the agreement round, we may
solve the problem. Alternatively, had the representation not been treating each
round as being separate from each other, we may solve the problem too.
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Figure 3.11: Snapshot of the modified (1+1)-ES for n = 2. Strategy evaluation
is “local” with respect to the rounds.
3.6.3.3 Evaluation
In order to make evaluation of strategies less local, we introduce a ‘sortedness’
property that any newly generated strategy should adhere to. This property sug-
gests that for a game where n > 1, given the original strategy representation, we
consider a strategy feasible (of positive fitness, that results from the outcome of
the game) if and only if, the values that define the entire strategy monotonically
decrease with the number of rounds. In other words, the concessions that a strat-
egy represents monotonically increase with time. The reason why this property
should cater for the evaluation being less local than the previous methodology
is that it is now clear that if there is an agreement at any round in the game,
the agreement is lead to this round through previous rounds where the concession
was not as much as in the current round. This is in contrast to the previous setup
where concessions could be random across rounds, thus, not adhering to a global
structure where a round does not inform (implicitly by way of evaluation) the
previous or the next round. The strategy is thus not allowed to vary randomly
in rounds where the agreement did not happen, as was the case previously, which
lead to the switching of the agreement round, which further lead to divergence
from equilibrium. Thus, there is now some handle on the local loss of selection
pressure by way of relating the rounds through this monotonicity principle.
The way the evaluation works now is as follows: At each evaluation step (when
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two individuals play a game with each other), we introduce two rules that they
need to adhere to, failing which, they are made infeasible. These rules are:
Rule 1: A player’s threshold in the next round should be lower than or equal to
its current offer’s utility.
Rule 2: A player’s offer’s utility should be lower than or equal to its threshold
in the previous round.
Together, the above two rules guarantee that an individual is sorted until the
round it agrees on with an opponent or until the last round if there is a disagree-
ment (including there being an agreement in the last round). If however, the
opponent fails to adhere to these rules, then the individual cannot be evaluated
and receives zero payoff. Moreover, we do not want both offspring to be selected
for at the same time to be in the next generation and find out that they are not
sorted until their agreement round (in case they agree - which is the only way
they can indeed be in the next generation, given our modification for selection
of incompatible opponents in Section 3.6.3.2). The offspring which violate these
rules are hence penalised.
The reward structure of the algorithm now is such that, if there is an agree-
ment and the player being evaluated does not violate the rules, it gets a positive
payoff (payoff from the game), provided the opponent it is being evaluated against
does not violate the rules. If the opponent violates rules but player does not, the
player gets zero payoff (since being evaluated positively against an infeasible so-
lution would not be right). The player receives a negative payoff of −0.5 if it
violates the rules. If the player is an offspring and it is incompatible with the
opponent offspring, both receive a negative payoff of −1.0. A player which is out
of bounds (refer to Section 3.6.3.1) receives a negative payoff of −2.0. This payoff
structure is there to demarcate the problems so they do not interfere with each
other. For instance, we do not want an out of bounds player to replace a player
that violates the rules but which is still within bounds. Having the same negative
payoff can make this happen.
Note that the problems discussed so far for equilibrium selection in games
with multiple issues, translate directly to equilibrium selection for games with a
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single issue. Infeasible solutions are in fact more likely to appear in the single
issue case as the strategy is composed of a smaller set of real numbers (hence the
problem identified in Section 3.6.3.1 is indeed present). Incompatible opponents
are more likely to appear than in the multiple issues case, as the incompatibility
arises when individuals disagree, which, for a game with n rounds, happens when
there is no agreement, even at round n, and multiple issues games introduce
a wider range of possibilities of agreements if the game indeed contains win-
win agreements as possibilities (hence the problem identified in Section 3.6.3.2
is indeed present). So, in order to simplify our analyses, we consider bargaining
games with a single issue from now on (and in the thesis from this point on). Note
that the essential problem with the co-evolutionary solution concept alluded to in
Section 3.5, which considers the multiple issue bargaining game, is unchanged for
a game with a single issue. The latter has also been dealt with in a similar fashion
to equilibrium selection in multi-issue bargaining perviously [148, 149], hence our
analyses applies to equilibrium selection in single issue bargaining games equally.
Be it a single issue or a multiple issue case, the equilibrium solutions for either,
for the case of p = 1 and n ≥ 1 are the same, i.e. last offerer gets everything
whereas the last responder gets nothing.
Figure 3.12: Mean fitness across 50 runs of the algorithm with the ‘sortedness’
rules in place, for n = 2.
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(a) Converging run 1. (b) Converging run 2.
Figure 3.13: Converging runs for n = 2 with the ‘sortedness’ rules in place.
(a) Diverging run 1. (b) Diverging run 2.
Figure 3.14: Diverging runs for n = 2 with the ‘sortedness’ rules in place.
Figure 3.12 shows the mean fitness across 50 runs of the algorithm with the
‘sortedness’ property in place, for n = 2. One can see the tiny blips along the
course of evolution as the algorithm attempts to converge to equilibrium. Though
there are runs which do indeed converge to equilibrium, as can be seen in Figure
3.13, divergence is still a problem. If we single out the runs that cause these
blips, we can say more. Figure 3.14 shows the singled out runs and it is clear
from them that the algorithm does not converge. The reason for divergence is that
there is still a possibility of a switch from an agreement happening in one round
to another. If ever the agreement happens in an ‘odd’ round, the outcomes favour
Player 1, otherwise they favour Player 2. This happens due to the fact that the
offerer in any round decides the payoff for each player from the game, provided the
agreement happens in that round. On the other hand, the responder finds itself
on a fitness plateau as no matter what its threshold, the payoff is always going to
be the same and as governed by an agreement happening for some value of the
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offerer’s offer, which must necessarily be greater than the responder’s threshold.
The following example illustrates when a switch is possible, and hence when
divergence occurs.
Table 3.2: Player strategies per round for n = 2.
Round 1 Round 2
Player 1 o1(1) t1(2)
Player 2 t2(1) o2(2)
As a simple example, let us consider a linear relationship between utility
functions of the two players such that u2 = 1 − u1. An easy way to think about
this relationship is if we consider a single issue with our type of utility function
(weighted sum), where the preference weights for the single issue for both players
are 1.0 i.e. ui(oi) = oi, so u1 = 1 − o2, as u1 = 1 − u2. Table 3.3 details the
possible utilities for players in each round for a single issue bargaining game, with
n = 2.
Table 3.3: Player utilities per round for n = 2, for a single issue bargaining game.
Round 1 Round 2
Player 1 0 or o1(1) 0 or 1− o2(2)
Player 2 0 or 1− o1(1) 0 or o2(2)
Since t2(1) ≥ o2(2) from the sortedness property, we know that 1 − t2(1) ≤
1 − o2(2). This suggests that there are 3 possible relationships between o1(1)
and t2(1) that govern the possibility of a switch to round 1 (or agreement in
round 1) happening: o1(1) < 1 − t2(1) (Player 1 wants less than what would
satisfy Player 2), o1(1) = 1 − t2(1) (Player 1 wants what satisfies Player 2), and
o1(1) > 1 − t2(1) (Player 1 wants more than what satisfies Player 2). A switch
is possible in the first two, if o1(1) ≤ 1 − o2(2) is true, but not in the last. The
probability of o1(1) = 1− t2(1) to happen however, is close to zero for real valued
search. On the other hand, it is worth keeping in mind, as will be obvious shortly,
that if o1(1) ≥ 1 − o2(2), the only possibilities remaining are o1(1) = 1 − t2(1)
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and o1(1) > 1− t2(1), hence a switch is not likely to happen. Note that if n > 2,
the above discussion still holds, as we only ever have to compare values from a
round against those of the immediate previous round, so as to tell if a switch to
the previous round may happen.
To illustrate this schematically, consider Figure 3.15. We make use of a line
diagram to explain what happens to the strategies of both sides as evolution
progresses. In the figure, the horizontal axis represents the round of play and the
vertical axis, time. The boxes shown for time t and t + 1 contain the strategies
of both sides (offers on the table during negotiation) from the point of view of
Player 1. This means that if Player 2 wanted an amount x, then the diagram will
show how much x means for Player 1. In our simple example where we consider a
linear relationship between the utility functions of both players, this would mean
1−x is being given to Player 1 by Player 2. Let us call the line joining the offers
across rounds as the strategy line. Note that the sortedness property assures that
Player 1’s strategy line slopes downwards whereas Player 2’s slopes upwards.
We can see that Player 1, at some point, positions its strategy line such that
Player 2 rejects Player 1’s offer (0.015) and offers back more (0.02) than what
it just rejected in the previous round (the box at time t, where the agreement
happens in Round 2). This allows Player 2 to change its strategy such that at
t+1, it accepts the offer of Player 1 in the previous round (the box at time t+1,
where the agreement happens in Round 1). Player 2’s fitness has thus increased,
which is why it changed its strategy in the first place, whereas, since the fitness
is now evaluated at Round 1, Player 1’s fitness for the same old strategy has
decreased (note that a new strategy that may have resulted in lower fitness than
before, would not have been accepted by the evolutionary algorithm). A crucial
result to note here is that sortedness alone is not enough for the co-evolutionary
process to converge to optimality.
Sortedness implies that the search space is restricted to strategies with this
monotonicity property. The algorithm is not allowed to get lost with the loss in
selection pressure at local sites within a strategy due to local evaluation. In so
doing, we prevent the algorithm from diverging (by letting strategies switch their
agreement rounds) to some extent. The less the randomness when reaching the
equilibrium, the more easy it is to understand why it may not stay there. The
99
3.6 Possible Solution: Engineering Co-evolution




 
















 



Figure 3.15: Line diagram for divergence with the ‘sortedness’ property in place,
for n = 2.
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line diagram (Fig 3.15) clearly shows the problem that still remains. Note that
limiting the search space introduces some information about the kind of strategies
that we want but the fact that the agents are boundedly rational continues to
hold. They would be rational if they could construct the game tree and ‘reason’
using backward induction. All we have done however, is to restrict the game tree
but not to the extent that only leaves the equilibrium to remain in it. There is
no backward induction that the agents reason with. The algorithm still has to
search the game tree.
Another way of introducing sortedness into evaluation is by penalising un-
sorted strategies before they play for evaluation, as opposed to during the game
as we do, checking until the agreement round or the last round, wherever the
game ends. No matter how we introduce sortedness, it does not solve the above
mentioned problem as can be seen in Figure 3.16. At each evaluation step (when
two individuals play a game with each other), we check if a strategy is sorted.
If it is not, we assign it a negative fitness. If a player is sorted but its opponent
against which it is being evaluated is not, the player gets zero fitness. The rest
of the algorithm remains the same as before the rules version of Section 3.6.3.2.
(a) Diverging run 1. (b) Diverging run 2.
Figure 3.16: Diverging runs for n = 2 with the ‘sortedness’ check in place.
In order to rectify the problem with the sortedness property alone, a third rule
is introduced into the evaluation procedure. This directly tackles the problem as
described in Figure 3.15.
The rule can be stated as:
Rule 3: A player’s current offer’s utility should be greater than or equal to the
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utility rejected (utility from the rejected offer of the opponent) in the pre-
vious round.
Considering Table 3.2, if a player, as a responder, has rejected an offer from
its opponent in a certain round (t2(1) > 1 − o1(1) or o1(1) > 1 − t2(1)), then
in the immediate next round, the player should not want anything less than the
offer just rejected (o2(2) ≥ 1−o1(1), which translates to o1(1) ≥ 1−o2(2)). If the
player does indeed concede more than the offer it could have had in the previous
round, we want the co-evolutionary solution concept to penalise this behaviour,
in a manner, restricting the search space even more, allowing the algorithm to
search better. For either agent, this restriction on the search space is relative to
the opponent, and is suggestive of the kind of opponents it would play with to
construct and move along the gradient towards equilibrium. Note that the agents
have not been given any deliberative abilities, thus their bounds on rationality
have not been modified in any way. The evaluation procedure that helps form a
gradient over the search space is what is being modified. Again, we have restricted
the game tree by making certain moves infeasible from the point of view of the
evaluation procedure, and not given the strategies the ability to reason.
A consequence of introducing this rule in the evaluation procedure is that
the algorithm leads to agents not being able to switch back to agreeing in any
previous round, once agreeing in some round. Figure 3.17 shows the line diagram
that explains this phenomenon. Imagine the agreement happening in Round 1 at
time t (the lower box). Player 1 can change its strategy to the profile shown in
the box for time t+1 and gain in fitness, since Player 2 concedes more in Round
2 (due to the sortedness rules). Note that Player 2 has not changed its strategy.
The only reason why Player 2 will change its strategy is to gain in fitness. It
cannot do anything in Round 1 as it is the responder there, so it gets what it
is given, but it can of course change to disagree in Round 1, in which case the
profile of strategies should look like in the box at time t + 1. Once the strategy
profile is like in the box at time t+1, we can see that, any switch to an agreement
in Round 1 will mean a lowering of fitness for Player 1, and Player 2 will have to
concede more than it concedes in Round 2 (thus lowering its fitness too). This,
in effect, leads to a one way switch towards the higher rounds for any n > 1.
Note that this one way switch becomes effective as soon as there is an agreement
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Figure 3.17: Line diagram showing a one way switch from low to high round, for
n = 2.
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between parental opponents adhering to the rules (both have positive fitness).
Once the algorithm has lead to strategies agreeing in the last round, it is easy
to see that the last responder is on a fitness plateau i.e. any threshold it uses to
respond will have the same fitness, as dictated by the offer of the offerer (as long
as there is an agreement, which is going to be the case). The last offerer will thus
have the advantage and will continue conceding less and less until the responder
reduces (randomly) its threshold to near zero, converging at infinity. In essence,
the last offerer will get everything and the last responder will get nothing, which
is the equilibrium outcome for a game with n ≥ 1 i.e. any number of rounds.
Given our discussion of the solution to the problem of local evaluation, the
evolution of agreement rounds is monotonic, after an agreement in some round
by rules adhering parental opponents is realised, on all the runs for all n > 1.
In order to show that this is indeed the case, we conduct a bookkeeping process
during the course of evolution for all n. For each generation, we set a tag, which
is initialised to n. Considering 10 runs for each n, for every n, we go through
each run and check if the exit round in the previous generation was higher than
the exit round in the current generation (once there is an agreement). If this is
the case then we tag the current generation by subtracting 1 from its current tag
value. Monotonicity deems the tags to remain the same as the initial value i.e.
n, for all n. We plot the tags so obtained and it can be seen in the Figure 3.18,
that monotonicity indeed holds.
Figure 3.19 shows the behaviour of the three rules version of the algorithm
for various values of n (not all are shown for clarity). The trends towards conver-
gence to equilibrium are clear. When n is odd, Player 1 evolves towards getting
everything and Player 2, nothing. When n is even, Player 2, evolves towards
getting everything and Player 1, nothing. As n increases, more time/evaluations
are needed for the players to converge to equilibrium as can be seen in the figure.
This is particularly clear for n = 10. We ran the algorithm for n = 10 for 3
million generations and do indeed see the trend towards convergence better (Fig-
ure 3.20(a)). The evolution of the rounds is monotonic, as can be seen in Figure
3.20(b).
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Figure 3.18: Monotonicity (one way switch) for each n across 10 runs.
Figure 3.19: Convergence/trend towards convergence to the equilibrium with the
three rules in place. Mean fitness for both players across 3 runs, for a million
generations.
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(a) Fitness progression. (b) Agreement round progression.
Figure 3.20: Trend towards convergence to the equilibrium with the three rules
in place for n = 10.
3.6.3.4 Selection and Representation
Selection and representation are the remaining parts of the co-evolutionary so-
lution concept that may be modified. But, since we have achieved convergence
to the equilibrium solution for bargaining games with n ≥ 1 already, we do not
change them. In effect, we have avoided mis-interpreting bounded rationality
using the notion behind co-evolutionary solution concepts, giving us insights into
what it does not mean (in computational or algorithmic terms) within socio-
economic simulations.
This allows us to now take bounded rationality seriously and understand how
it affects co-evolution. In other words, we can now consider quantifying bounded
rationality as an explicit computational or algorithmic entity to understand how
it really affects co-evolution towards specific outcomes so as to leave no room for
it to be mis-interpreted within simulations. In addition, since we are interested
in socio-economic simulations, and reality (as verified by experimental economics
research) does not conform with rational game theoretic equilibria (in reality,
bounded rationality is indeed a cause or at least a reasonable assumption to be a
cause for deviations from rational outcomes), an explicit consideration of bounded
rationality within simulations can only help enable the cause of such simulations.
If bounded rationality could be quantified using the representation of the strategy
alone, and the bounds systematically varied, we could understand the relation-
ship between the bounds and the co-evolutionary process better. Right now we
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can only say that with bounded rational agents the algorithm can converge to
equilibrium. To gain more insights into how bounds affect a converging algo-
rithm, we will be considering the representation of strategies in more detail in
the next Chapter.
We want to do this to show how unassessed assumptions about socio-economic
phenomena within co-evolutionary simulations can further be scrutinised. This
relieves us from mis-interpreting such socio-economic phenomena, giving a firm
algorithmic handle on the phenomena, and thus help further engineer co-evolution
for such mis-interpretations to be methodically avoided. The methodology for
such a treatment of co-evolution is the subject of the next Chapter.
3.7 Generalisation to More Complex Games
For the simple game considered here, we know that previous work was unable
to achieve convergence to the equilibrium solution from Section 3.5. Moreover,
when the game is made more complex by extending it to having breakdowns
during the bargaining process, by introducing a continuation probability p < 1,
selection of equilibrium is still not possible. However, the interpretations of the
simulations and results are still carried out in [59]. The co-evolutionary process is
now interpreted as simulating selection of outcomes in games from experimental
economics research, as well as theoretical equilibrium outcomes for different games
altogether, both for the case where p < 1. It is clear that equilibrium selection in
the games under question [59] was not achieved. Added to this fact, considering
that equilibrium selection in simple games was also not achieved, it can only be
said with little confidence, that the co-evolutionary process considered in previous
work simulates equilibrium selection via socio-economic learning for bargaining
games. We did not learn anything about the way to simulate socio-economic
learning for equilibrium selection, nor anything about the co-evolutionary process
itself in previous work. What we saw was a possible application of co-evolutionary
algorithms to the problem of socio-economic learning for bargaining games, and
the possible socio-economic interpretations that this application suggests. It only
makes sense to understand if a method generalises to more complex games, if it
does what it is meant to for simple games. This discussion is just to re-iterate the
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fact that without the proper consideration of a co-evolutionary solution concept,
ACE may be in danger of going off track, being mislead, and in general remaining
premature as a field.
With our consideration of the co-evolutionary solution concept, we do learn
how to simulate equilibrium selection. We do know how to methodically avoid
mis-interpreting bounded rationality from the point of view of co-evolutionary
solution concepts, but this kind of avoidance is still not satisfying. The reason
for this not being satisfying is that we still do not know exactly what bounded
rationality means within the simulation, i.e we cannot concretely discuss the
relationship between bounded rationality and co-evolution other than knowing
that it does not hinder equilibrium selection, and we want for it not to be mis-
interpreted. If we do not know what it means, we cannot altogether rule out the
possibility of its relationship with co-evolution being mis-interpreted. We thus
want to delve deeper into the algorithm and systematically understand what
bounded rationality could mean, before we try to consider how well it generalises
to more complex games. We leave the latter as future work however. Note that we
do understand that generalisation to more complex games may necessitate more
refinements to the co-evolutionary solution concept implemented in this Chapter.
3.8 How Does Bounded Rationality Affect Co-
evolution?
We now know that selecting infeasible and incompatible players can be explained
by examining, understanding and modifying the variation and selection schemes
in place in the co-evolutionary process. We know that local evaluation of individ-
uals leads to a loss in selection pressure, causing strategies to change randomly,
leading to divergence. Monotonicity, together with a third rule considered in
Section 3.6.3.3 come to the rescue in this case. This loss of selection pressure
can thus be explained by examining, understanding and modifying the evalua-
tion scheme in place in the co-evolutionary process. As also explained throughout
Section 3.6, these modifications still preserve the boundedly rational nature of
the agents. If the agents were fully rational, by definition, we would not need a
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learning mechanism in place for them to emulate rational behaviour. All we can
say for now, is that we get convergence to equilibrium with boundedly rational
agents. So, as can be seen, we still do not understand what bounded rationality
really means for its affects on co-evolution. To consider bounded rationality as
the main argument for deviations in previous work is thus just a misleading guess
and hence, premature. To understand bounded rationality better, a systematic
study of it, provided it can be described quantitatively, is necessary.
Knowing equilibrium selection is possible with our solution concept, one way
to get a firm handle on bounded rationality is by associating bounded rationality
with an element that defines the solution concept, such that it can be system-
atically tweaked. This can allow us to deviate systematically from our baseline
bounded rationality results obtained so far. Agent strategies are a good candi-
date for this, since any agent’s behaviour is dictated by its strategy at any given
time. Bounds can be constructed by understanding the computational capabil-
ities of the agent strategies. These computational capabilities can be quantified
and tweaked to understand the relationship between bounded rationality and
co-evolutionary simulations comprehensively. This is the subject of the next
Chapter.
3.9 Summary
The idea behind this Chapter was to discuss the nature of ACE, as a research field,
as it stands, and try to link it with co-evolutionary solution concepts, a notion of
much importance in understanding co-evolutionary algorithm design. The reason
for understanding this link is that co-evolutionary algorithms have largely been
used off-the-shelf as tools for modelling socio-economic learning. Given their off-
the-shelf usage, we deem a socio-economic interpretation of the elements of the
evolutionary process and the outcomes thereof as potentially misleading.
The objective of this thesis is to lay out and apply a methodical framework,
using which co-evolutionary algorithms may find a better use as simulating socio-
economic learning, the idea being for socio-economic phenomena that get used
in order to explain the co-evolutionary process and outcomes, may not get mis-
interpreted within simulations. We lay out the first part of the methodology in
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this Chapter, by promoting the notion behind co-evolutionary solution concepts.
We then take a particular line of work from ACE literature as a case study and
apply our framework. This line of work uses co-evolution as a socio-economic
learning and adaptation model to learn equilibrium selection in bargaining games.
We show the misleading character of the use of these algorithms. We analyse
and refine the co-evolutionary solution concept so that it does indeed result in
equilibrium selection without resorting to holding a socio-economic phenomenon
like bounded rationality as being responsible for the cause for any deviations
encountered, until convergence results with boundedly rational agents.
Given the fact that bounded rationality generally defines the nature of agents
within ACE, although it may seem attractive to use the term as explaining de-
viations from the theoretical fully rational outcomes, as is done in experimental
economics and in reality, it may not necessarily be the right thing to do in sim-
ulations. This goes for the case study considered, as deviations from theory,
although explained by bounded rationality, also deviate from experimental eco-
nomics results at the same time (where bounded rationality is supposed to cause
deviations too). It is thus very unclear as to what bounded rationality means in
previous work and how it affects co-evolutionary simulations. The first part of our
methodical framework allows us to scrutinise and challenge the usage of bounded
rationality when used as an explanation within simulations in an unassessed man-
ner, allowing us to avoid mis-interpreting it by letting us avoid explanations based
on it, as we show by applying the framework to previous work. We still do not
know what it concretely means within and for (i.e. its role within) the simulations
however, so we cannot altogether rule out the possibility of its relationship with
co-evolution being mis-interpreted. This fact further encourages us to make con-
crete links between ACE and co-evolution. As such, we are interested in showing
how co-evolution can be made more tangible from the point of view of bounded
rationality, or socio-economic phenomena of interest in general, which leads to
the next part of our methodical framework, that we lay out and apply in the next
Chapter.
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Chapter 4
Engineering Co-evolution with
Bounded Rationality
4.1 Introduction
Our agents, in the co-evolutionary solution concept engineered in Chapter 3,
are boundedly rational. This can be confirmed by the fact that agreements are
pushed to the last round. Full rationality entails agreements happening with no
delay, which is clearly not the case. However, we do converge to the equilib-
rium outcomes with our boundedly rational agents. It would be premature to
interpret (and indeed mis-interpret) simulations in socio-economic terms without
attempting to get the simulations to achieve the desired outcomes by challeng-
ing the use of socio-economic terms as interpreting the algorithmic workings of
the simulations, i.e the socio-economic terms are better not left unscrutinised.
We showed how previous work used bounded rationality to prematurely interpret
the simulations for their inability to achieve convergence to the subgame perfect
equilibrium. We then showed how working on the co-evolutionary solution con-
cept can let us achieve the desired outcomes, and challenge the interpretation
of bounded rationality. By doing so, we show how socio-economic phenomena
of interest can be challenged for their soundness within simulations, and under-
stand whether or not they are being mis-interpreted. Interpreting simulations of
reality, where bounded rationality abounds, can only be done justice to, if inter-
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pretations of simulations of theory (reality being a deviation from it) are sound
in the first place i.e. we know, algorithmically speaking, what the simulations are
doing. We saw how the game theoretic solution concept of subgame perfect equi-
librium can be implemented algorithmically. The notion behind co-evolutionary
solution concepts was thus made explicit via the first part of our methodical
framework, helping avoid mis-interpreting bounded rationality. Treating the ele-
ments of the implemented co-evolutionary solution concept with a clear top-down
goal of converging towards the subgame perfect equilibrium, lead to the necessary
refinements to these elements. This showed that bounded rationality was being
min-understood in simulations in previous work [59]. That said, we cannot still
rule out the possibility that bounded rationality may not get mis-interpreted,
because we, for now, only understand what it does not mean within simulations.
To help remove the possibility that it gets mis-interpreted, we have to ask the
question of what it really means for simulations. Thus, the issues addressed in
this Chapter revolve around the theme of the effect bounded rationality has on
co-evolutionary simulations, which necessitates a concrete understanding of what
it means within simulations. This, as we will see in this Chapter, further allows
us to analyse and refine the co-evolutionary solution concept that specifies the
co-evolutionary algorithm (hence, the ACE simulation) from a bottom-up socio-
economic viewpoint, as opposed to subgame perfect equilibrium helping guide
refinements from the top-down. Hence, this Chapter is about laying out and
applying the second part of our methodical framework for analysis and refine-
ments of co-evolutionary algorithms for the purpose of simulating socio-economic
learning such that there is no room left for mis-interpreting socio-economic phe-
nomena of interest which get used to explain the workings of these algorithms.
As such the co-evolutionary process and outcomes are also prevented from being
mis-interpreted in socio-economic terms.
Although we do not intend to match simulation and reality in this thesis, we
propose a methodology that can be undertaken so as to enable practitioners find
matches. A thorough study of co-evolutionary solution concepts for the notion’s
use in ACE from a viewpoint complementary to that in Chapter 3, is the main idea
presented here. This thorough study is made possible by proposing the idea of
what we call reconciliation variables. We engage in understanding socio-economic
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interpretations of co-evolutionary simulations from a bottom-up viewpoint, by as-
sociating phenomena of interest, that may be seen as the cause for deviations from
expected emergent phenomena, with the elements that define the co-evolutionary
solution concept. This association is the first step towards getting a handle on the
phenomena of interest from the viewpoint of co-evolutionary solution concepts.
Once this is done, the elements are parametrised, thus parametrising the phenom-
ena of interest, such that they can be systematically varied, and their effect on
the co-evolutionary emergence studied. The phenomena of interest thus parame-
terised are the reconciliation variables. This methodology results in finding much
deeper connections between the co-evolutionary solution concept implemented
and the socio-economic phenomena (in our case, as a case study used through-
out the thesis, bounded rationality) under investigation, the role of which may
have been mis-interpreted in the ACE literature, from an explicit computational
and quantitative point of view. Moreover, the fact that bounded rationality is
generally assumed as implicit in the simulations, which in fact lead to it being
mis-interpreted in previous work, as shown in Chapter 3, our investigation in
this Chapter allows us to make a concrete link with simulations. This might in
fact be necessary if real world socio-economic learning needs simulating using co-
evolutionary algorithms, because otherwise, we it may be difficult to understand
what degree (which is unknown) of bounded rationality inherently present in off-
the-shelf algorithms may indeed reasonably represent the real world, thus making
the choice of the algorithm for the purpose of the simulation desired limited by
the algorithms available for use.
We essentially promote the idea of having a tangible computational handle
on socio-economic phenomena, by way of actually designing one in the sense of
overlaying reconciliation variables over co-evolutionary solution concepts. There
are socio-economic phenomena which have, erstwhile, only been looked at quali-
tatively or even assumed to be implicit within the field of ACE research, as in our
case of the phenomenon of bounded rationality, and the methodology discussed in
this Chapter enables understanding the connections such phenomena may have
with the co-evolutionary solution concept in a more methodical manner. This, in
turn, allows for a more concrete interpretation of the co-evolutionary algorithms,
which are adopted for simulations, in socio-economic terms.
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By so doing, we open doors for the ACE research community for it to use
the notion behind co-evolutionary solution concepts explicitly and tangibly, such
that mis-interpretations of socio-economic phenomena of interest be avoided from
within simulations methodically. The obvious benefits for ACE research that can
be envisaged are:
• This should enable the practitioner to carry out similar and more detailed
analysis of the simulation.
• This may eventually help the practitioner reconcile simulation and reality.
We first (Section 4.2) lay out the second integral part of our methodical frame-
work, which we then apply in the remainder of the Chapter. This part of the
framework allows for avoiding mis-interpretations of socio-economic phenomena
of interest within simulations from the bottom-up, using the notion behind rec-
onciliation variables that we propose and detail in this Chapter. We then look
at the notion of reconciliation variables in greater detail in Section 4.3. This
is followed by the explication of the methodology used via a case study, taking
bounded rationality as our socio-economic phenomenon of interest that we want
to avoid mis-interpretations of, from within the refined co-evolutionary simula-
tion from Chapter 3. The manner in which bounded rationality is framed as
a reconciliation variable and the co-evolutionary simulation evaluated in terms
of this reconciliation variable is covered in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 exposes the
questions one can imagine investigating using our methodology, in order to guide
our evaluation of the simulation in terms of bounded rationality. We then carry
out a detailed analysis of the manner in which bounded rationality affects the co-
evolutionary simulation (Section 4.6) and how a particular definition of bounded
rationality relates to other definitions (Section 4.7). Section 4.8 comments on
the sensitivity of the co-evolutionary simulation with respect to variations in
the intricacies of the specification of the reconciliation variable. Future research
directions are covered in Section 4.9.
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4.2 Framework Part 2: Avoiding Mis- interpre-
tations From the Bottom-up
4.2.1 Description of the Framework
Carrying on with the objectives of the thesis, we now lay out the second part
of the framework that we want the ACE community to follow in order for the
simulations to not get mis-interpreted in socio-economic terms, i.e the socio-
economic term does not get mis-interpreted in simulation. The second part of
the framework, which also completes the framework, essentially allows for the
avoidance of mis-interpretations of socio-economic phenomena of interest within
simulations from the bottom-up, using the notion behind reconciliation variables
that we propose and detail in this Chapter. These two integral parts together
allow for analyses and refinements of co-evolutionary algorithms for their use
as simulations of socio-economic learning, in order that the causes that lead to
the socio-economic phenomena of interest being mis-interpreted within simula-
tions be altogether removed, and thus mis-interpretations of the phenomena be
avoided in a holistic sense. The following guidelines lay out this second part of
the framework:
1. Associate the socio-economic phenomenon of interest with one or more el-
ements of the co-evolutionary algorithm. This association must be based
on some principles, specifically taking inspiration from socio-economic lit-
erature. If there is a definition of the socio-economic phenomenon in the
literature, we suggest for the definition to be matched with the elements
of the algorithm. If the elements can explicitly express the definition, we
consider the phenomenon of interest associated. This is very important,
because the point of the framework is to have mis-interpretations of the
phenomenon avoided. A good back up for the phenomenon’s definition in
the socio-economic literature provides credibility to the interpretation of
the phenomenon in terms of the associated elements.
2. The associated elements can now be parametrised, the point being for the
phenomenon be expressed such that the flexibility of this expression be
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controlled via explicit quantification of the parameters. As such, varying the
parameter values varies the phenomenon of interest. We thus get a handle
on the phenomenon of interest via parametrised and quantified elements.
We call the phenomenon, thus associated, parametrised and quantified, as
our reconciliation variable.
3. Define evaluation metrics that explicitly lay out the aspects of the co-
evolutionary algorithm we want to understand in relation to the recon-
ciliation variable.
4. Do a statistically sound analysis of the relationship between the reconcilia-
tion variable and the evaluation metrics. This allows us to confidently state
the relationship, consequently helping avoid mis-interpretations of the phe-
nomenon of interest within simulations. Since we explicitly, and indeed
based on socio-economic principles, represent the phenomenon of interest
as a reconciliation variable and are confident about what the reconcilia-
tion variable means in terms of how it affects the simulations, we avoid
mis-interpretations of the phenomenon, from the bottom-up.
We carry on from the case study in Chapter 3, where bounded rationality was the
phenomenon of interest considered as being mis-interpreted within simulations.
Extending that case study within this Chapter, we utilise the above mentioned
framework to show how mis-interpretations of bounded rationality can be avoided
from the bottom-up within simulations, specifically the refined version of the
simulation in previous work [59], from Chapter 3.
4.3 Reconciliation Variables
The object of the exercise is to delve deeper into understanding socio-economic
simulations from the point of view of co-evolutionary solution concepts, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, such that they can be tangibly moulded into the kinds
of simulations desired, within the realm of ACE, specifically in order that mis-
interpretations of socio-economic phenomena of interest used to explain the sim-
ulations be altogether removed from happening. Having analysed and refined
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one particular co-evolutionary simulation using the first part of our methodical
framework in Chapter 3, we know how to approach the understanding of sim-
ulations from the solution concept perspective, taking the elements that define
it one at a time, and refining them until we achieve the desired behaviour (in
our case convergence to the equilibrium). By doing so, we were able to challenge
the assumption of bounded rationality, specifically the role it does not play in
the simulation’s ability to achieve convergence to equilibrium outcomes. But, as
mentioned before, we still do not know what role it actually plays within the
simulations. We believe that being able to methodically mould the elements,
specifically if the elements suggest links with socio-economic phenomena (like
bounded rationality), can help reveal a way of managing socio-economic phe-
nomena with simulations and understand their role, and indeed the relationship
they have with the simulations. Knowing the role in explicit algorithmic terms
removes the possibility that the phenomena get mis-interpreted, and in a manner
satisfying the remaining concerns from Chapter 3, where the possibility of them
being mis-interpreted was not entirely ruled out. We must then devise a way of
methodically moulding the elements from the point of view of socio-economic phe-
nomena of interest, and in turn, help engineer the simulation desired without the
phenomena being interpreted incorrectly within these simulations. In line with
this thought, we suggest one way of managing the elements of the co-evolutionary
solution concept from the socio-economic viewpoint, by proposing the notion of
reconciliation variables.
More specifically, looking at the element or elements of the solution con-
cept a phenomenon of interest can be best associated with, parametrising this
element(s), and analysing the simulation for its closeness to desired outcomes
using this parametrisation, is the suggested idea here. The association of the
phenomenon of interest and the element(s) of the solution concept that has
been parametrised, provides a tangible hold on the phenomenon. We refer to
the phenomenon of interest thus parametrised as a reconciliation variable. This
parametrisation of the element(s) and the associated phenomenon of interest is
a possible route towards the idea of reconciling simulation and expectation ex-
plicitly, by studying the range of possibilities that the parametrisation offers. To
further illustrate with simple examples for this kind of treatment of a simulation,
118
4.3 Reconciliation Variables
we can take the viewpoint of variation, specifically mutation in co-evolution, as
an element of the solution concept that may have societal innovation [39] as a
phenomenon of interest associated with it. Similarly, crossover in co-evolution
has been seen as information exchange [39] amongst co-evolving agents. These
two variation operators are of course easy to parametrise (they already are spec-
ified by parameters) and thus provide a handle on the phenomenon of interest of
innovation and information exchange respectively. But, there are phenomena of
interest that may not have obvious associations, the case in point being bounded
rationality, but studying such phenomena for how they affect simulations may be
unavoidable and necessary (as we know from our discussion in Chapter 3) for the
successful application of co-evolutionary algorithms as simulating socio-economic
learning within ACE. This is where the idea of reconciliation variables becomes
more interesting and a possible way forward into analysing and enabling the sys-
tematic moulding of these simulations towards what is desired or expected of
them. From Chapter 3, we have an algorithm which tells us how to get to the
equilibrium in the presence of implicitly present (within the algorithm) bounded
rationality, so by systematically and explicitly quantifying/expressing and de-
noting bounded rationality as a ‘reconciliation variable’, we can understand how
it really affects socio-economic simulations if we want to address the remaining
concerns about there still being a possibility for it to be mis-interpreted within
simulations.
The fact that we use the term reconciliation variable is simply because we
want to stress the fact that we show how to simulate deviations from equilib-
rium outcomes, by expressing bounded rationality as a variable, wherein, vary-
ing bounded rationality causes deviations. This is because bounded rationality
abounds in reality and socio-economic simulations of real world processes would
then necessitate simulating deviations from equilibrium outcomes (or indeed vari-
ations in the outcomes based on other phenomena of interest which may need to
be matched with desired real world outcomes, if need be) within games, the equi-
librium outcomes only being valid in theory and not in the real world. Note that
having a base line behaviour of the co-evolutionary algorithm understood, as we
did in Chapter 3, by analysing and refining it towards achieving the desired base
line behaviour (of boundedly rational agents converging to equilibrium solutions),
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is important here and lets us figure out the true meaning of the phenomena of
interest. If indeed the phenomena were mis-interpreted or treated superficially
(i.e. taken for granted) previously, we come to know more about how they do not
affect the co-evolutionary process, as we did in Chapter 3. This allows us to ques-
tion how they might affect the process. If, on the other hand, they were treated
with rigour, which was not the case as seen in Chapter 3, we get to understand
what they mean in algorithmic, rather than socio-economic terms, which is going
to help associate them with the algorithmic element or elements of the algorithm
that represent them, and thus help understand the relationship they have with
the behaviour of the algorithm explicitly in any case.
Taking the case of bounded rationality, we worked on the elements of the
co-evolutionary solution concept from [59] in Chapter 3, helping us achieve equi-
librium selection with boundedly rational agents in simulation, whereas previ-
ous work suggested that bounded rationality was the cause for deviations from
equilibrium [59, 148, 149]. This tells us that bounded rationality was taken for
granted in previous work. Moreover, this suggests a lack of a proper under-
standing of bounded rationality in simulation, and not just in previous work, but
indeed, the whole of ACE devoted to using co-evolution simulating learning (since
it is the general practice of taking bounded rationality for granted within sim-
ulations that lead to it being mis-interpreted in [59] in the first place), which
should not be the case (at least in simulation), given bounded rationality is one
of the phenomenon concerning human behaviour widely accepted in economics
since [136, 138], putting more reality into economic theories. The question that
immediately follows is, if bounded rationality is the cause of deviations from
equilibrium in reality, then for the sake of ACE, as a field of research devoted
to simulating socio-economic phenomenon, we must, at the very least, under-
stand how bounded rationality affects co-evolutionary simulations. In so doing,
we will be a step closer to reconciling simulation and reality, but more impor-
tantly from the point of view of the thesis, altogether avoid mis-interpreting it
within simulations. The point is to not be mislead by something designed by
ourselves. Bounded rationality is a phenomenon that is hard to define or specify
in reality, but at least it can be specified and understood in simulation (just like
there are specifications in the socio-economic literature), having designed these
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simulations ourselves. Challenging and understanding assumptions in simulation
is easier than in reality, so we take the stance of ‘why not do it?’. We indeed want
to increase the tangibility of co-evolutionary simulations for them to be more use-
ful for ACE, because it can be done as shown in the previous Chapter and as
we further consider here, and further understanding the assumption of bounded
rationality in simulations in explicit algorithmic terms is how we want to promote
this idea in this Chapter.
In Chapter 3, we did not touch upon the representation of strategies. Here, we
choose bounded rationality as our reconciliation variable. We choose representa-
tion as a reasonable choice, from the various parts of a co-evolutionary algorithm
that can be picked, to associate bounded rationality explicitly with. We define it
quantitatively, and thus concretely specify the malleability of our reconciliation
variable. This choice helps us focus on one element which can be systematically
varied, and has indeed been seen previously as an element which could model
the boundedness of an agent [79, 122]. Moreover, literature in experimental eco-
nomics research on memory [56], and a definition of bounded rationality from one
of the proponents of the term within economics [133], suggests a seamless way for
us to model bounded rationality with the type of representation considered in this
thesis. We discuss these reasons in more detail in Section 4.4.1. The issue then
becomes to tangibly understand how bounded rationality affects co-evolutionary
simulations.
4.4 Methodology
In accordance with the second part of the methodical framework that we lay
out in Section 4.2, to get a better handle on the co-evolutionary solution con-
cept being implemented such that a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of
interest (bounded rationality) be made possible, having already refined the co-
evolutionary solution concept such that boundedly rational agents lead to equi-
librium outcomes, the immediate steps that follow are:
• Defining bounded rationality in simulation, associating the notion with
one or more elements of the co-evolutionary solution concept, such that
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






 
Figure 4.1: The essence of the methodology: associating the phenomenon of
interest (bounded rationality) with an element of co-evolution (representation),
and tangibly exploring the spectrum of bounded rationality made available by so
doing.
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it can be quantified and varied systematically, giving us our reconciliation
variable.
• Defining evaluation metrics that say something about the co-evolutionary
emergence, given a specific bound on rationality.
• Establishing the relationships between the bounds and the metrics, giv-
ing us a deeper and tangible understanding of the bounds (or phenomenon
of interest) as they affect the co-evolutionary solution concept, suggesting
a way to engineer the solution concept tangibly.
Figure 4.1 shows the intention of this research, explicitly associating bounded
rationality with representation and then parametrising and quantifying the rep-
resentation, giving a spectrum of bounds to explore, in order to ascertain the
relationship between the bounds and the co-evolutionary emergence.
Note that the elements defining co-evolution are very much interlinked in var-
ious non-linear ways (i.e. working on one element alone may not be enough, and
may take the simulation away from what is expected from it). It would then be
fair to say that the phenomenon of interest may in fact be better associated with
more than one element defining the co-evolutionary solution concept. However,
the point here is that if one can quantify an element or a set of elements, and rea-
sonably and explicitly associate them with the phenomenon of interest (making
this phenomenon a reconciliation variable), one can then methodically figure out
the role of the phenomenon within co-evolution in explicit algorithmic terms, thus
not allowing the phenomenon to be mis-interpreted within simulations. One can
also relate this variable to a desired emergent phenomenon, or indeed, real world
emergent phenomenon (e.g. actual socio-economic learning and adaptation lead-
ing to real world outcomes), if need be, in a methodical manner. In our case, the
phenomenon of interest is bounded rationality and we carry out a discussion on
the way we quantify it, establishing why representation can be reasonably chosen
as the element it can be associated with, in Section 4.4.1. This is followed by the
actual explicit quantification of bounded rationality. The evaluation metrics that
we are going to look at so as to ascertain the relationship between the bounds on
rationality and the co-evolutionary process are then discussed in Section 4.4.2.
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For the relationship to be empirically sound, we suggest establishing it with con-
fidence considerations in Section 4.4.3. This is important because we now do not
have a top down socio-economic phenomenon like subgame perfect equilibrium
to guide algorithmic refinements. We instead have the phenomenon of bounded
rationality to understand algorithmically (from the bottom up), empirical rigour
thus being the way to validate its role within simulations. If we did have de-
sired real world outcomes to match simulated outcomes with, we would still need
empirical rigour of course, so as to be confident about simulating deviations as
suggested by the real world outcomes, if need be. In any case, the thesis warrants
designing simulations such that mis-interpretations of socio-economic phenomena
be removed from within these simulations at the algorithmic level, so that we get
to know what the phenomena mean within simulations. As such, we do not con-
sider matching simulated outcomes against real world outcomes, because we do
not need to for the purposes of the thesis.
4.4.1 Quantifying Bounded Rationality
We discussed the need to quantify bounded rationality in Section 4.3, once we
have element(s) of the co-evolutionary solution concept associated with it. Recent
work in computational and experimental economics has suggested a way to model
bounded rationality.
From the computational economics side of things, the case in point is [79, 122].
As suggested in [79], bounded rationality can be considered by using the notion
of noise, which can take the form of noisy actions or implementation of actions,
noisy perception, and a combination of the two thereof. Errors in the actions
implemented by the agents have motivations in Selten’s notion of playing with a
trembling hand [133], where an agent can play a strategy different from what it
intended to play, with some probability. Perception errors can be seen as errors
in the transmission of information [79]. Quoting Selten [133]:
“There cannot be any mistakes if the players are absolutely rational.
Nevertheless, a satisfactory interpretation of equilibrium points in ex-
tensive games seems to require that the possibility of mistakes is not
completely excluded. This can be achieved by a point of view which
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looks at complete rationality as a limiting case of incomplete rational-
ity.
Suppose that the personal players in an extensive game Γ with perfect
recall are subject to a slight imperfection of rationality of the following
kind. At every information set1 u there is a small positive probabil-
ity "u for the breakdown of rationality. Whenever rationality breaks
down, every choice2 c at u will be selected with some positive proba-
bility qc which may be thought of as determined by some unspecified
psychological mechanism.”
The work in [79] considers representing agent strategies as finite state ma-
chines, and uses genetic algorithms to understand the kind of machines that may
result over the course of evolution, having evolved with the specific bounds on the
way they function. That work is different from ours in two respects. Firstly, the
game considered therein is the iterated prisoner’s dilemma or IPD game (in nor-
mal form, whereas we use sequential/extensive form bargaining games). Secondly,
the evolutionary algorithm is simply picked off-the-shelf with the idea of seeing
what emerges with boundedly rational agents, whereas we delve deeper down into
understanding how socio-economic simulations may be analysed and refined using
a methodical framework for mis-interpretations of socio-economic phenomena be
avoided within these simulations. Considering the notion of boundedness in [79],
the essential idea is that an agent takes an action, with a chance of this action
being opposite of what the agent intended (implementation error), or an oppo-
nent’s action is reported to be the opposite of what the opponent actually chose
(perception error). This notion is also used in [122] to define bounded rationality,
where it is shown how bounded rationality reduces the number of equilibrium
outcomes in infinitely repeated normal form games. Note that there has been an
independent (from ACE research on simulating socio-economic learning) study
of co-evolutionary algorithms for evolving strategies and understanding the evo-
lution towards co-operation or otherwise in the IPD game, considering noise in
the implementation of actions, within co-evolutionary algorithm design research
1An information set for a player is a set of the possible moves from the start to the current
stage in the game, made by all the players in the game, as observed by the player.
2Move made by the player.
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[29], in order to study co-evolutionary algorithms. Noise however, was not seen
as modelling bounded rationality there, further illustrating the separation of the
two fields (ACE and co-evolutionary algorithm design), doing similar things, yet
not feeding each other.
From the experimental economics side of things, memory limitations in terms
of distortions in learning and forgetting have been looked at as possible routes
to be included as dimensions for a unified treatment of bounded rationality [56].
The suggested idea is that there is a cost of not forgetting, which leads to bound-
edly rational behaviour. The greater the cost, the more bounded the behaviour.
This cost is proportional to vividness of information, amongst other things like
time elapsed since a piece of information entered memory, dynamics of the envi-
ronment, whereby the more it changes, more are the costs, and the importance
of information (information can be informative and useful but has a time frame
within which it is useful, beyond which it becomes useless, and if this is the case,
then it hampers current decision making). Considering vividness of information,
a way of translating this idea into computation, more specifically into our co-
evolutionary algorithm with the current representation, is by having randomness
introduced into the behaviour of strategies.
These ideas motivate our choice of strategy representation to be reasonable as
being the element to be associated with bounded rationality, and thus we have
our reconciliation variable of bounded rationality which can indeed be tangibly
modified, as discussed next. In accordance with the ideas discussed in Section
4.3 and above, we come up with the following definitions of boundedness:
• Implementation errors as bounded rationality: The idea here is that
with a certain probability (which we call trembling probability), the action
implemented or taken by an agent will be erroneous to some degree. This
applies to both the offers and thresholds of an agent. In other words, when
making an offer or when matching an opponent’s offer with a threshold, both
of which, for our case of the bargaining game with one issue are a value in
R within the interval [0.0, 1.0], the agent will have some noise added to it.
Note that this noise must not take the offers outside the interval [0.0, 1.0],
and if it does, we simply generate the noise from the stipulated distribution
again. The reason for the noise to not be outside the interval is simply
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that, although the agent may be boundedly rational, it still cannot offer
more than what is known to be the limit of the surplus being negotiated
on. Moreover, going outside the interval would change the game (by way of
increasing the strategy set available to the players), and so, the equilibrium
solution for the base line bounded rationality case (i.e. equilibrium solutions
considered in the previous Chapter).
• Perception errors as bounded rationality: The idea here is that with a
certain probability (trembling probability), the current offer on the table,
as put forth by an opponent, is perceived erroneously to some degree. Note
that this error only applies to the offer on the table and not to the action of
the opponent, nor the threshold of the agent perceiving the offer erroneously.
Noise from a stipulated distribution is added to the offer on the table before
being evaluated by an agent. This noise should again not take the offer
outside the interval [0.0, 1.0] for the aforementioned reason.
• A combination of implementation and perception errors as bounded
rationality: In this case, not only is an action taken by an agent erroneous,
but the offer on the table is also perceived erroneously. Although the prob-
abilities (trembling probability) with which the errors of both kinds can be
made, can be different, for the purposes of the thesis we keep the probabil-
ities the same.
The above errors defining bounded rationality are specified by 2 parameters:
• Trembling probability (T ): This is the probability with which the agent
will make an error of one of the forms mentioned above. T ∈ {0.005, 0.01,
0.015, 0.02, 0.025, 0.03, 0.035, 0.04}. Note that the values {0.005, 0.01, 0.02,
0.04} were taken directly from [79].
• Randomness in move (r): This is the standard deviation of zero mean
Gaussian noise in the agent’s action (i.e. noise in the offer/threshold) or
perception of an opponent’s action (i.e. perceived noise in the offer of
opponent). r ∈ {0.0, 0.000001, 0.00001, 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1}.
127
4.4 Methodology
The base line algorithm, which we designed in the previous Chapter, is one with
agents that do not take noisy actions nor perceive opponent’s actions in a noisy
fashion. For these agents, r = 0.0. Note however, that these agents are still
boundedly rational, even though they may not make errors as defined above.
The solution concept that we engineered in the previous Chapter makes these
agents converge to the equilibrium solution for the bargaining games considered.
T and r define further degrees of boundedness, helping us understand how agents
with such bounds might behave with the co-evolutionary process as specified,
and compare them with the base line bound on rationality (as we may see the
error free agents to possess). It can be seen why our methodical framework,
promoting the notion of solutions concepts and reconciliation variables, is an
important one for ACE. Using it, we are not only able to engineer co-evolution
towards making boundedly rational agents converge to equilibrium outcomes,
but we can further delve deeper down into and understand the notion of bounded
rationality in itself (by explicitly associating it with an element of co-evolution,
which in this case is the representation of the agent strategies) in a methodical
manner. This allows us to further understand how it may affect agent based
co-evolutionary simulations, in essence, removing the possibility for it being mis-
interpreted within simulations.
Essentially, with probability T , the action or perception will have a Gaussian
noise with variance r2 added to it. Mathematically, for an agent to be making
implementation errors alone would result in the following offers and thresholds:
offer =


offer +N(0, r2) with probability T , and N(0, r2) resampled
unless and until offer +N(0, r2) ∈ [0.0, 1.0],
offer otherwise.
(4.1)
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threshold =


threshold +N(0, r2) with probability T , and N(0, r2) resampled
unless and until threshold+N(0, r2)
∈ [0.0, 1.0],
threshold otherwise.
(4.2)
An agent to be making only perception errors would not change the offers and
thresholds, but instead result in only the offer received from the opponent being
erroneous, as follows:
received offer =


received offer +N(0, r2) with probability T , and N(0, r2)
resampled unless and until
received offer +N(0, r2)
∈ [0.0, 1.0],
received offer otherwise.
(4.3)
For an agent to be making both implementation and perception errors, the
offers, thresholds and the offers received from the opponent will all be erroneous,
following Equations 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.
4.4.2 Evaluation Metrics
Given a certain degree of boundedness, as specified by a particular type of bound
and setting of T and r, bounded rationality being our reconciliation variable,
quantified as in Section 4.4.1, if we want to understand the nature of bounded
rationality as it affects our implemented co-evolutionary solution concept, we
need a way to understand its relationship with the co-evolutionary process.
This relationship can be understood by considering various aspects of the co-
evolutionary process that may be affected and that are wanted to be understood,
in order to engineer the solution concept better, such that it matches the practi-
tioners needs. Establishing a relationship between the reconciliation variable and
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the process is one way to mould the algorithm. At the very least, and indeed, in
accordance with the second part of the framework from Section 4.2, this kind of
treatment of the algorithm provides insights into the role of the phenomenon in
question (that has been associated with an elements of co-evolution) within simu-
lation, making use of the tangible handle we have on it. It explicitly expresses the
phenomenon of interest, which in our case is bounded rationality, within the sim-
ulation, for the phenomenon’s role to be concretely established, so that we do not
mis-interpret it. For example, we may want to understand how bounded rational-
ity affects equilibrium selection, a questions which we are now able to consider,
since we have an explicit specification of it in terms of the parameters specifying
noisy game play, overlaid on top of the agent strategy representation. Recall that
such a question remained a concern at the end of the previous Chapter, since
we were only able to say how bounded rationality does not affect equilibrium
selection until that point. As such, the second part of our methodical framework
complements the first part from the last Chapter, by allowing us to address this
remaining concern.
We take the following metrics as providing insights into the workings of the
co-evolutionary process, with respect to the reconciliation variable:
• Average first hitting time: This is the time it takes on an average (across
multiple runs) for the algorithm to reach within " distance (Euclidean dis-
tance) from the equilibrium solution. In our experiments, we chose " to
be 0.1. This reference distance can easily be any other value or considered
in a different manner, specially if one wants to, say, concentrate on mod-
elling a particular deviation from the equilibrium1. This metric suggests
how quickly the algorithm manages to come close to the equilibrium, given
a limited number of generations. Note that this is the first time the algo-
rithm reaches within " distance from the equilibrium and it may well get
1Instead of simply having an $ as a reference distance from the equilibrium, it may be more
appropriate to consider a pair of reference distances, say $1 and $2, and consider deviations
from the equilibrium to be measured relative to being within these two reference distances
from/above/below the equilibrium. This is not required for the purposes of exposition of our
methodology, hence we do not do this. One can see $1 = $ and $2 = 0 in what we present.
However, we suggest for studies considering specific deviations from the equilibrium solution
to be modelled by the co-evolutionary algorithm (in the presence of bounded rationality) to
consider such a pair of reference distances. This applies to all the metrics that we discuss here.
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away from it at some later generation.
• Average length of stay: This is the length of time in generations that
the algorithm remains within " distance from the equilibrium after the first
hit, on an average across multiple runs. The longer the algorithm stays
within " distance, the less it diverges on an average, but this also depends
on the maximum number of generations considered and the complexity of
the game. It may take much longer for an algorithm to hit " distance,
with more complex games, lowering the stay given the limited number of
generations. There are also times when an algorithm may hit and move
away, never to have another hit, specially for more complex games, with
the limited number of generations. This metric can easily be extended to
lengths of stays over all the hits it gets to being within " distance over the
course of the evolutionary process, but we use this simplest form for the
purposes of exposition of our methodology.
• Average distance from equilibrium: This is the Euclidean distance of
the agents being away from the equilibrium solution on an average, after
the first hit of being within " distance from the equilibrium, across the
total number of generations of evolution after the first hit, further averaged
across multiple runs. This metric captures the convergence characteristics
of the algorithm. If the distance is large, the algorithm generally stays away
from the equilibrium, and the opposite if the distance is small. Again, if
the reference distance of " is varied to a value of choice for some deviation
(from equilibrium) of interest, this metric may be helpful in understanding
the convergence characteristics there. For the purposes of exposition of our
methodology, we keep " = 0.1.
• Average payoff: This is the average fitness of the agents after the first hit,
across the total number of generations since the first hit, further averaged
across multiple runs. This metric also captures the convergence character-
istics of the algorithm in the sense that, we have used fitness to indicate the
payoff in any iteration of the co-evolutionary process, which gives an idea of
the outcomes that the agents revolve around and/or towards, once close to
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the equilibrium. Again, varying the reference distance " (in our case fixed
to 0.1), could be interesting and facilitate a more elaborate study of the
solution concept being engineered, if one is to pick on specific deviations
from equilibrium that one could be interested in.
• Average Maximum/Best payoff: Instead of taking the average fitness
after the first hit, this metric tells the maximum fitness an agent achieves
since the first hit, across the total number of generations since the first hit,
averaged across multiple runs. In conjunction with the minimum average
payoff (defined below), this metric tells the upper limit of the range within
which the algorithm fluctuates or exhibits divergence, and as such, captures
the convergence characteristics of the algorithm from this angle.
• Average Minimum/Worst payoff: As with the maximum average pay-
off, this metric instead tells the minimum fitness an agent achieves since the
first hit, across the total number of generations since the first hit, averaged
across multiple runs. In conjunction with the maximum average payoff,
this metric tells the lower limit of the range within which the algorithm
fluctuates or exhibits divergence, and as such, captures the convergence
characteristics of the algorithm from this angle.
Table 4.1 shows the settings of the parameters for the bargaining games con-
sidered, the converging (to the equilibrium solution) co-evolutionary algorithm
from Chapter 3, and the bounded rationality (which is our reconciliation variable)
experimental setup.
4.4.3 Establishing Relationships with Confidence
The way we define bounded rationality, with a sound/reasonable backing in socio-
economic literature, can still be subject to criticism. The same goes for the
evaluation metrics one wants to consider in order to establish relationships with
respect to the types of bounded rationality defined. Moreover, the bottom up
socio-economic treatment of the co-evolutionary solution concept warrants rigour
in the empirical analysis, for meaningful conclusions to be drawn from this anal-
ysis. We thus stress that a statistically sound analysis is in order. As such, we
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Table 4.1: Parameter settings for the game, the converging co-evolutionary algo-
rithm from Chapter 3, and the bounded rationality (as a reconciliation variable)
experimental setup.
Game Number of issues (m) 1
Parameters Continuation probability (p) 1.0
Maximum number of rounds (n) 10
EA Parental population size (µ) 1
Parameters Offspring population size (λ) 1
Selection scheme (µ+ λ)-ES
Mutation model self-adaptive
Initial standard deviations (σi) 0.1
Minimum standard deviation 0.025
Bounded Trembling probability (T ) ∈ {0.005, 0.01, 0.015, 0.02,
Rationality 0.025, 0.03, 0.035, 0.04}
Experimental Randomness in move (r) ∈ {0.0, 0.000001, 0.00001,
Setup 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1}
Parameters First hit distance
from equilibrium (") 0.1
Runs 50
Generations 100,000
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proposed metrics that may tell the general relationship and behaviour of the co-
evolutionary solution concept with respect to the reconciliation variable (bounded
rationality). We consider multiple runs of the algorithm and the metrics are all
averages (across these runs). We want to be confident that these averages are
indeed useful indicators of the nature of the co-evolutionary solution concept
implemented. In other words, we want to be confident that we can indeed differ-
entiate the behaviour of the algorithm given various bounds on rationality and
across different types of rationality bounds. We assume that the values obtained
from each of the runs of the algorithm (which then make up a sample and thus,
the metric as a sample average), come from a t-distribution, giving us a way to
establish confidence in the metrics. We calculate the standard error given by
sm = s/
√
N , where s is the sample standard deviation, which in turn is given
by s =
√∑
N
i=1
(xi−µ)2
N−1 , µ being the sample average, and N being the number of
runs (50 in our case). We then use the t value of 2.0096, given that the degree of
freedom (N−1) is 49. This gives us a confidence interval of µ±2.0096sm for each
value of the metric with a confidence level of 95%, telling that this value will be
within this interval with a probability of 0.95, considering different samples. The
value 2.0096sm is the extent on either side of the metric that the metric value
will most probably lie in.
In the results that follow, we show general trends of the metrics with respect
to bounds on rationality, as well as across types of rationality bounds. The trends
shown with the metric are statistically treated for a confidence of 95% (Appendix
A). We show the values of the metrics, and the values given by 2.0096sm (errors at
a 95% confidence level), in the graphs in Appendix A. For the sake of appreciating
the scale of the error, we plot the errors with the metrics (on the same scale as
the metric) as well in Appendix A. These errors at a 95% confidence level are
low (see Appendix A), and as a result, the confidence intervals are narrow. We
can thus carry out useful analysis of the simulations with the metrics and indeed
understand the role of bounded rationality, as it varies, within simulations, due
the low errors. The metrics are useful indicators of the general characteristics
of the algorithm, given the rationality bounds. As such, we can carry out an
investigation of the reconciliation variable against the metrics considered. If the
errors were too large, one would not be able to understand the general effect (in
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terms of trends, as we do next) the phenomenon of interest has on co-evolution,
given these metrics. Wherever we say significant in the discussion below, we mean
statistically significant in the sense that the confidence intervals have little or no
overlap. The interested reader is referred to Appendix A for a closer look at the
errors at a 95% confidence shown therein for the metrics in question, given the
games and rationality bounds considered.
4.5 Relationship Between Bounded Rationality
and Co-evolution
There can be a multitude of questions one can investigate, given a handle on
the reconciliation variable, which, by no means is an easy task, and determining
what is it from the process that we are interested in observing, i.e. the evaluation
metric. If one is interested in modelling deviations from the equilibrium, one way
to do it is by fitting emerged/simulated deviations to real world socio-economic
deviations, and explaining the emerged deviations in socio-economic terms, as
has often been the case in ACE research. Although this match may well be cor-
rect, but we do not explicitly gain any insight into the algorithmic workings and
nuances that lead to the match or a mis-match between simulated and real world
outcomes. If ACE is to be a scientific discipline with co-evolution as the tool of
choice for socio-economic learning simulations, fitting socio-economic interpreta-
tions on the algorithm is clearly not advisable, or mis-interpretations are very
likely to happen. We need proper analyses and refinements of the algorithm so
we can systematically narrow down onto possible simulations that may in fact
model the socio-economic phenomena desired. With the explicit consideration of
our socio-economic phenomenon of interest of bounded rationality as our reconcil-
iation variable, in accordance with the second part of our methodical framework
from Section 4.2, we can further this goal of avoiding it being mis-interpreted
within the simulations. Understanding how it affects co-evolutionary simulations
allows us to explicitly state the role it has within co-evolution, which means we
get to know what it means for the simulations. This explicit understanding of
bounded rationality within simulations can be realised by considering questions
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like:
• Does the value of the evaluation metric change monotonically with respect
to the bounds on rationality?
• Is there a threshold along the dimension (or type) of bounded rationality
beyond which there are diminishing returns from the use of lesser bounded
agents?
• On the contrary, it may well be that the less bounded an agent is, the more
time it may take to achieve a certain level of evaluation metric, i.e. a more
bounded agent may end up being more practical and in turn, real. Can this
be true?
• Are there types of bounded rationality that do not affect the evaluation
metric at all?
• Can we identify correlations (positive or negative) between the affects on
the evaluation metrics caused by various types of bounded rationality?
We take the first three as offshoots of one question and the next two as
offshoots of another. These questions being:
• How do changes in the rationality bounds affect co-evolution towards the
equilibrium?
• How does a particular definition of rationality bounds (or type of bounded
rationality) relate to other definitions?
This exercise allows us to look at the co-evolutionary algorithm from the
viewpoint of bounded rationality. The fact that we make the relationship in
explicit algorithmic terms, is to reinforce the fact that we have removed the
possibility of mis-interpretations of bounded rationality within simulations using
the second part of our methodical framework, and at the same time shows a way
to mould simulations from the bottom-up, specifically from the point of view of
bounded rationality. Note that this is being made possible to be done via our
framework due to our proposal of reconciliation variables. Our framework also
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helps us study bounded rationality within simulations, in greater detail, for its
own sake, i.e. other definitions of bounded rationality in socio-economic literature
could also be considered to be matched with the solution concept and a study
similar to this exercise carried out, because our methodology does not rely on
one particular definition of bounded rationality in socio-economic literature. In
Sections 4.6 and 4.7, we take up these questions individually. The list of questions
above is by no means exhaustive. Further investigations can be carried out and
are elaborated on in Section 4.9. The graphs shown in Sections 4.6 and 4.7 depict
the general trends that the bounds on rationality enforce on to the algorithm.
Note that the trembling probability (T ) does not play a significant role in these
trends (see Appendix A for details), hence these graphs show trends averaged
across T . Also, the axis value BL signifies base line, and refers to our converging
algorithm from Chapter 3.
4.6 Change in Rationality Affecting Co-evolution
We want to understand how might our reconciliation variable, and thus bounded
rationality, be related to the co-evolutionary process and the outcomes that re-
sult, if a particular value of the reconciliation variable (concretely specifying one
element of co-evolution, which in our case for bounded rationality is the repre-
sentation) and the other elements having been fixed previously (in Chapter 3),
specify our solution concept.
Note that this kind of treatment of the solution concept using reconciliation
variables does not necessitate the need for there being real world socio-economic
situations (that need simulation) beforehand in order to validate the solution
concept, but instead may help discover hidden or not so obvious situations or
even synthesise new situations (possibly for the benefit of designing computational
agents that may be used for computational problems via taking inspiration from
economics, for example). This is however one future line of investigation and
beyond the scope of this thesis.
Here, we stick to the idea of enabling tangibility to the analysis and design
of the co-evolutionary solution concept such that it provides us with a way to
understand the simulation better in terms of socio-economic phenomena, for it
137
4.6 Change in Rationality Affecting Co-evolution
to be confidently used as a close match to socio-economic phenomena that need
modelling, i.e. help avoid the phenomena being mis-interpreted. We believe
that enabling tangibility so that one can juggle with the algorithm in concrete
socio-economic terms (terms, like bounded rationality, which can easily be mis-
interpreted within simulations due to the ad-hoc application of co-evolution for
simulating socio-economic learning) is something missing from co-evolutionary
algorithm design when channeled towards agent based socio-economic learning
simulations. This thesis, via the description and application of our methodi-
cal framework in the previous and this Chapter, emphasises the need for such
tangibility.
As mentioned in Section 4.4, the metrics we use to evaluate the algorithm, say
something about the process, that may be useful in moulding the implemented
co-evolutionary solution concept towards the simulation desired, and more impor-
tantly for the purposes of this thesis, allow us to establish a concrete algorithmic
link between bounded rationality and co-evolution, telling us to know what it
means within the simulations. We take these metrics one at a time in this sec-
tion.
4.6.1 Average First Hitting Time
4.6.1.1 Implementation Errors
We want to understand how quickly the algorithm can reach the equilibrium and
what role does bounded rationality, defined as implementation errors, play in
this. Figure 4.2 tells us that, across all n (number of rounds in the game), the
first hitting time is low for agents with higher bounds on rationality. That is,
the larger the implementation errors made by an agent, the quicker it will have
a first hit within " distance from the equilibrium on an average. Moreover, as n
increases, or the game becomes more complex, a quicker achievement of reaching
within " distance from the equilibrium is only possible with increasing the bounds
on rationality such that, to get the same level of the metric as for small n, bounds
on rationality will have to be increased. As n increases, the change in the time to
hit increases less severely (and remains lower) for more bounded agents than for
the ones which are more rational. For larger n this results in a sigmoidal shape
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of the curve (as is evident from Figure 4.2) across r, for the metric. We also
note that the trembling probability does little by way of affecting the evaluation
metric. The predominant affect is due to the randomness in the actions of the
players, but of course, randomness in the actions are of no use if T is zero, which
is going to be the same as our base line algorithm (denoted by BL in Figure 4.2).
Since we do not have infinite time at our disposal in the real world, a realistic
shortage in time available to simulate reaching equilibrium, may allow for this
metric helping the design of our implemented solution concept. In other words, if
the game becomes more complex, we know that it will take longer for less bounded
agents, bounded in the implementation error sense, to hit the equilibrium, and
looking at the first hitting time may allow a practitioner to make necessary trade-
offs. On the other hand, this metric alone is not enough to understand these
trade-offs, and a proper understanding of the simulation necessitates studying
other aspects of the algorithm, which we are going to consider in this thesis.
Taking only this metric, one can be mislead into believing that we can reach
equilibrium quicker with more bounded agents, but this is of course at the cost
of not converging, as will be evident with the consideration of other metrics.
4.6.1.2 Perception Errors
Figure 4.3 shows the average first hitting time to being within " distance from
the equilibrium for agents which are boundedly rational in the form of making
perception errors. We can see that co-evolution with such agents shows different
characteristics with respect to r as with agents which only make implementation
errors (Figure 4.2). This suggests that defining bounded rationality in differ-
ent ways can result in differences in the outcomes from co-evolutionary simula-
tions, even when the differences are in the way noise is injected into the offers
and thresholds of agent strategies, suggesting the importance of studying the as-
sumption of bounded rationality in more detail in simulation for the purposes of
ACE research. What we see from Figure 4.3 is that an increase in boundedness
decreases the first hitting time, though a similar decrease happens with greater
bounds on rationality, as compared to the implementation error case, for more
complex games. Also, a decrease in the complexity of the game (i.e. as n de-
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Figure 4.2: Average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of r and n,
averaged further across T (implementation errors). Change minimal across T as
can be seen in the graphs in Appendix A.
creases) generally decrease the first hitting time, with a significant dip at n = 7
(across r).
4.6.1.3 Implementation and Perception Errors
Figure 4.4 shows the average first hitting time to being within " distance from
the equilibrium for agents which are boundedly rational in the form of making
both implementation and perception errors at the same time. We can see that
co-evolution with such agents shows similar characteristics with respect to this
metric, as with agents which only make implementation errors (Figure 4.2), but
differs from agents only making perception errors (Figure 4.3). We discuss these
differences in Section 4.7. What is clear is that an increase in boundedness
causes a decrease in the first hitting time. Similarly a decrease in the complexity
of the game (i.e. as n decreases) generally decreases the first hitting time, with a
significant dip at n = 7 (across r).
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Figure 4.3: Average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of r and n,
averaged further across T (perception errors). Change minimal across T as can
be seen in the graphs in Appendix A.
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Figure 4.4: Average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of r and
n, averaged further across T (implementation and perception errors). Change
minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Appendix A.
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4.6.2 Average Length of Stay
4.6.2.1 Implementation Errors
As n increases, the stay in equilibrium (or within " distance from the equilibrium)
lessens for less boundedly rational agents and this becomes similar to the stay
of more bounded agents. In other words, as the game becomes more complex,
a less boundedly rational agent is as good as a more boundedly rational agent
when it comes to convergence within a stipulated time frame. We know from
the previous Chapter that our base line algorithm converges to the equilibrium.
So, given more time, the surface depicted by Figure 4.5, will look different as the
difference between the base line side of the surface for small n and large n will
get smaller.
Curiously, the stay increases with an increase in n for agents, specifically with
bounds given by 0.000001 ≤ r ≤ 0.00001, and then decreases with a further
increase in n. As randomness increases, for smaller n, though it may be easier to
reach within " distance from the equilibrium (Figure 4.2), it may also be easier to
get away from being within this distance, which, with an increase in n is harder.
The three rules in place, which are part of the evaluation procedure of the agents,
make it harder for a feasible strategy within " distance from the equilibrium to be
taken over by another strategy because of randomness in its moves, than when
n = 1, where these rules do not apply. The stay is longer in harder games,
until the game becomes even harder when it takes much longer to reach within
" distance from the equilibrium (Figure 4.2). So, in the limited time, the stay is
lower. Increasing randomness further makes the stay short although the first hit
(Figure 4.2) takes place quicker.
It can also be seen from Figure 4.5, that agents bounded with r ≥ 0.001 remain
invariant to changes in n. Comparing this with Figure 4.2 suggests that more
bounded agents essentially reach and get out of the equilibrium quick, suggesting
a threshold in r that makes agents behave similarly.
In general, there is a decrease in the length of stay with increasing bounds
on rationality and this decrease becomes less severe as the game becomes more
complex. This can be seen from the exponential turning into sigmoidal shape of
the surface in Figure 4.5 as n increases, going flat towards larger n.
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Note that if a simulation does not reach within " distance from the equilibrium
in the stipulated time, and may converge given longer time, the stay is zero, which
is frequent in case of large n, hence the low value for this metric.
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Figure 4.5: Average length of stay in equilibrium after first hit, across 50 runs for
all values of r and n, averaged further across T (implementation errors). Change
minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Appendix A.
4.6.2.2 Perception Errors
The stay within " distance from the equilibrium after the first hit is longer with
perception errors defining bounded rationality, as per Figure 4.6, than with just
implementation errors, specifically for lower n and with r = 0.0001. The effects
on the stay are slightly different in this sense as compared to the implementation
error alone, but the same trend across n and r as with the implementation errors
alone, apply here.
4.6.2.3 Implementation and Perception Errors
We again see that having agents with both implementation and perception errors
is similar to having agents with just the implementation errors alone defining their
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Figure 4.6: Average length of stay in equilibrium after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (perception errors). Change
minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Appendix A.
boundedness in rationality, for this metric too. Figure 4.7 is similar in character-
istics to Figure 4.5. The effects on the stay are similar as with the implementation
error alone, and the same trend across n and r as with the implementation errors
alone, apply here. As such, the stay is shorter for low n and r = 0.0001 when
compared with perception errors alone. We discuss these differences between the
three types of bounds with regard to this metric in Section 4.7.
4.6.3 Average Distance from Equilibrium
4.6.3.1 Implementation Errors
The average distance from the equilibrium suggests how far the algorithm, given
an agent with a certain bound of a certain kind, remains from the equilibrium
over time, after the first hit within " distance from it. We can take this metric as
suggesting the convergent nature of the algorithm. The algorithm may fluctuate
after hitting within " distance from the equilibrium and greater fluctuation will
show up as a large value for this metric. A greater distance but less fluctuation
will also receive a high value for the metric. But, as we know, we should use this
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Figure 4.7: Average length of stay in equilibrium after first hit, across 50 runs for
all values of r and n, averaged further across T (implementation and perception
errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Appendix A.
metric in conjunction with other metrics in order to understand how a certain
bound on rationality affects the co-evolutionary process and our implemented
solution concept. From Figure 4.8 we can see that the distance from equilibrium
decreases with an increase in rationality when the bounds are defined as imple-
mentation errors. Thus, as n increases, a closer match to the equilibrium can
only be achieved by reducing the bounds on rationality. We note that the metric
indeed has a high value with more bounded agents because the algorithm diverges
or fluctuates more with increasing randomness. The distance also increases for
less bounded agents with an increase in n because the algorithm still fluctuates,
although less than for more bounded agents, in addition to staying further away
from the equilibrium as compared to more bounded agents (which may reach
closer yet fluctuate more).
Interestingly, as can be seen in Figure 4.8 the decrease in distance with de-
creasing bounds follows a sigmoidal trend, with the inflection point decreasing
along r, as n increases. Moreover, with small n (≤ 5), and agents with r ≤ 0.0001,
the metric is largely invariant to changes in n and r, whereas with larger n (≥ 6),
and agents with r ≥ 0.001, the metric is largely invariant to changes in n and r.
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Since we know the base line case converges but takes longer, we can say that it
needs more time to shorten the distance with increasing n. As the game becomes
more complex, the amount of computation required to shorten the distance to
equilibrium increases (length of stay is less with more rational agents and the first
hit takes a lot longer, often not hitting at all, thus not staying either as suggested
by Figures 4.2 and 4.5), so in some sense, having lesser bounds still suffers com-
putational limits (or bounds). This suggests some links with the CIDER theory
[147], with a difference that our analysis only deepens it. The theory suggests
that computational intelligence (the algorithm per se) models effective bounded
rationality (much the same as ACE research devoted to simulating socio-economic
learning assumes for bounded rationality to be present in the algorithms from the
outset), but what we have is a computational intelligence approach with a handle
on the elements of the approach in terms of a concrete specification of bounded
rationality for the purpose of equilibrium selection in the bargaining games con-
sidered. Saying computational intelligence gives effective rationality is one thing
but proposing the idea and case of tangibly moulding the computational intelli-
gence approach, challenges the assumption of bounded rationality and allows for
it to not be mis-interpreted within simulations, i.e. is a step further in concretely
specifying what bounded rationality may mean within simulations. Again, look-
ing at Figure 4.8, the curve at the base line with increasing n suggests that the
distance increases exponentially with game complexity (n). This is very inter-
esting and is hard to capture with the other metrics we have covered so far viz.
first hitting time and length of stay within " distance, essentially because distance
takes the outcomes of strategies into account rather than a computational term
(viz. generations, as with the previous two metrics). Given a limited number
of generations in the first place, distance provides a computational viewpoint by
proxy to suggest the complexity of the algorithm in handling the game. Of course,
one can increase the number of generations till one gets convergence and minimal
distance with respect to the equilibrium but with increasing n, one will have to
further increase the number of generations, and that may be impractical.
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Figure 4.8: Average distance from the equilibrium after first hit, across 50 runs for
all values of r and n, averaged further across T (implementation errors). Change
minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Appendix A.
4.6.3.2 Perception Errors
The average distance from the equilibrium after the first hit with agents with
perception errors alone can be seen in Figure 4.9. The distance increases with
the increase in complexity of the game. It also increases with an increase in
boundedness. The affect on the metric that the complexity of the game has di-
minishes with an increase in boundedness, hence the shape of the surface which
changes from an exponential rise in the distance at the base line side of bound-
edness to being sigmoidal with increasing boundedness. This effect is much more
prominent with having agent with implementation errors alone (Figure 4.8).
4.6.3.3 Implementation and Perception Errors
As with the first hitting time and length of stay in the equilibrium, the average
distance from the equilibrium after the first hit with agents with both implemen-
tation and perception errors follows a similar trend across n and r (Figure 4.10),
as agents with just implementation errors defining their bounds.
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Figure 4.9: Average distance from the equilibrium after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (perception errors). Change
minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Appendix A.
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Figure 4.10: Average distance from the equilibrium after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (implementation and percep-
tion errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Appendix
A.
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4.6.4 Average Payoff
4.6.4.1 Implementation Errors
From the start, we have considered the fitness of the agent to indicate its payoff
in any iteration of the co-evolutionary process. Note that we modified the fitness
function, as part of the exercise of modifying the implemented co-evolutionary
solution concept in the previous Chapter, to assign negative values to agents
which do not adhere to the three rules discussed therein. This however does
not change the game. As discussed in the previous Chapter, this change in the
evaluation procedure forbids the algorithm from searching certain parts of the
game tree, and in so doing, relieves the agents from some computational effort.
We still want the fitness over time to evolve towards the desired outcomes which,
in our case, are equilibrium outcomes or deviations thereof.
The average fitness after the first hit to being within " distance from the
equilibrium gives an idea of the outcomes that the algorithm revolves around and
evolves towards, once it has come close to the equilibrium. Varying " could be an
interesting and a more systematic study in order to pick on the deviations from
equilibria one may be interested in, but we leave that study for future work.
According to Figure 4.11, which shows the average fitness of Player 1 across
generations since first hit, across 50 runs, for various bounds on the rationality of
an agent, we can see that when n is odd, the more bounded agents get less than
less bounded agents, eventually being caught up by the less bounded agents as n
increases. When n is even, the more bounded agents get more than less bounded
agents, eventually being caught up by the less bounded agents as n increases.
The equilibrium outcome, when n is odd, is for Player 1 (being the last offerer)
to receive everything (and Player 2 nothing), and when n is even, for Player 1
(being the last responder) to receive nothing (and Player 2 everything). We can
see that as the bounds increase, the deviation from this equilibrium outcome
increases. Figure 4.12 shows the average fitness of Player 2, and as expected,
with n odd, the more bounded agents get more than the less bounded agents,
eventually being caught up by the less bounded agents as n increases. And, with
n even, the more bounded agents get less than the less bounded agents, eventually
being caught up by the less bounded agents as n increases. Being caught up by
149
4.6 Change in Rationality Affecting Co-evolution
less bounded agents is just a visual observation and given more time (generations)
the less bounded agents (specifically for r = 0.0) will have their average fitness
more closer to the equilibrium payoff mentioned above.
In a narrow sense of just this metric, we may say that on an average, greater
bounded rationality leads to more fairer/equitable/symmetric outcomes, but that
may be misleading. We say this to stress the point that when considering algo-
rithms like co-evolution for socio-economic simulation, the simulations should not
be considered justified without the proper definition and consideration of eval-
uation metrics. If one is interested in trying to model realistic behaviour (e.g.
fair outcomes), considering only the average payoff does not give a complete view
of the algorithm. Other metrics need proper definition and consideration, and
the algorithm evaluated against those for a better match with the required socio-
economic situation. A case in point is previous work [59], where, although the
algorithm seemingly results in equilibrium selection (an extension of which also
suggests simulating fair outcomes) on an average across multiple runs, it wildly
fluctuates (i.e. does not converge, as we saw in Chapter 3), but convergence is
not looked at in conjunction with payoffs. This is of course, in addition to the
proper definition of the implemented solution concept, as described by the first
part of our methodical framework in the previous Chapter. As a word of caution,
if we want convergence to real world outcomes where bounded rationality were
to result in such outcomes, it may have to be specified in a different way, possi-
bly with a different strategy representation (which may induce changes in other
elements of the co-evolutionary process), than it is in this thesis. But this does
not make our work irrelevant, essentially because we are interested in showing
a methodology to analyse and design simulations, by specifically challenging the
generally unassessed (hence, mis-interpreted) assumption (within simulations) of
bounded rationality, and understanding what it really means for the simulations.
This methodology can indeed be used with other socio-economic phenomena of
interest for them to not get mis-interpreted within simulations.
Moreover, it is possible that changing our negative fitness assignments to much
smaller values than considered in Chapter 3 may bias the results. However, fitness
assignment is part of the whole computational method and tangibly designing it
or engineering it to achieve what we want is the object of the exercise. The
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way we carry out the modifications to the implement co-evolutionary solution
concept, element by element, is one way to engineer the process. A better way
can no doubt replace this engineering process. The point here is to go systematic
by considering elements and reconciliation variables, giving us a tangible handle
on the process.
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Figure 4.11: Average fitness of Player 1 across generations since first hit, averaged
across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (implementation
errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Appendix A.
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Figure 4.12: Average fitness of Player 2 across generations since first hit, averaged
across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (implementation
errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Appendix A.
4.6.4.2 Perception Errors
From Figures 4.13 and 4.14, it is evident that for odd n, where Player 1 should
get everything in equilibrium (and Player 2 nothing), with increasing bounds on
rationality, specially for greater values of n or more complex games, the agent
deviates further from the equilibrium outcomes on an average. Player 2 suffers
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the same deviations lending an average payoff higher than the equilibrium with
increasing bounds on rationality and increasing n. In the case where n is even,
the payoffs and deviations are reversed for both players as can be seen in Figures
4.13 and 4.14. The deviations with increasing bounds on rationality are smaller
for agents with perception errors than they are for agents with implementation
errors (specifically for 3 ≤ n ≤ 8 and 0.0001 ≤ r ≤ 0.1), as can be seen comparing
the surfaces shown in Figures 4.11, 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14.
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Figure 4.13: Average fitness of Player 1 across generations since first hit, averaged
across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (perception
errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Appendix A.
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Figure 4.14: Average fitness of Player 2 across generations since first hit, averaged
across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (perception
errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Appendix A.
4.6.4.3 Implementation and Perception Errors
As with the previous metrics, considering agents with both implementation and
perceptions errors shows similar characteristics for this metric across n, r and T ,
as for agents with implementation errors alone (see Appendix A).
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4.6.5 Average Maximum and Average Minimum Payoff
4.6.5.1 Implementation Errors
Considering Figures 4.15 and 4.16, which depict the average (across runs) maxi-
mum fitness obtained by an algorithm after the first hit to being within " distance
from the equilibrium and with the agents bounded with a certain value of r, there
is generally an increase with increase in bounds. Beyond r ≥ 0.001 the algorithm
is essentially fluctuating in full swing such that even for n being even, Player 1 can
get everything (and for odd n, Player 2 can get everything) though its equilibrium
outcome is zero (as is for Player 2 when n is odd). With an increase in n, the
affected algorithms are the ones with bounds r ≤ 0.001. The average maximum
fitness tends to move away from the equilibrium fitness with increasing n in gen-
eral. Across n, the Figures 4.15, 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18 suggest that the range within
which the algorithm fluctuates are similar towards more boundedness, becoming
different with lesser bounds i.e. n plays a role with respect to these metrics for
more rational agents. Lowering the bounds suggests a smaller range within which
the algorithm fluctuates. Figures 4.17 and 4.18 also suggest that the average min-
imum fitness decreases with an increase in bounds and goes negative. This tells
us that the chances of infeasible solutions being selected are higher with greater
bounds on the rationality of agents. Essentially, selected strategies for agents
making different errors (given the type of bounded rationality considered in this
thesis) the next time they play may cause players to become infeasible if they
violate the rules in place (see Chapter 3), and the chances of this happening are
higher with more bounded agents. For n = 1, note that the rules do not apply
(i.e. the minimum will hence be non-negative), and so the algorithm does not
suffer from players becoming infeasible due to violations of the rules, hence the
fitnesses are generally higher as compared to other n. However, the players can
still disagree by making different errors than they would have, if selected, which
is the main cause of fluctuations for n = 1 here.
4.6.5.2 Perception Errors
The effect of perception errors on the maximum and minimum average fitness
of the agents (Figures 4.19, 4.20, 4.21 and 4.22) are similar across the spectrum
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Figure 4.15: Average maximum fitness of Player 1 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(implementation errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs
in Appendix A.
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Figure 4.16: Average maximum fitness of Player 2 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(implementation errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs
in Appendix A.
of boundedness, however less prominent, when compared with agents with im-
plementation errors alone (Figures 4.15, 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18). It is of interest
that the minimum fitness goes negative with perception errors even though the
rules that we put in place in Chapter 3 would normally apply if the strategies
that agents play with, when checked, violate them, which is very likely if the
implemented actions possess random noise (implementation errors). With only
perception errors, the agent actions do not change. One cause of fluctuations in
the co-evolutionary process are the disagreements in bargaining that may happen
because of perceiving the offer of the opponent differently, thus making a good
strategy seem bad. This follows the selection of strategies that indeed violate the
rules, hence a negative fitness. Moreover, if the round in which the agreement
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Figure 4.17: Average minimum fitness of Player 1 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(implementation errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs
in Appendix A.
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Figure 4.18: Average minimum fitness of Player 2 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(implementation errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs
in Appendix A.
for the agents was previously happening changes (due to a disagreement in that
round) and they need to play another round (within the limit of n), perfectly fine
agents, which were not violating the rules, now can violate the rules in these new
rounds. This leads to a negative fitness too.
4.6.5.3 Implementation and Perception Errors
As with the previous metrics, considering agents with both implementation and
perceptions errors shows similar characteristics for this metric across n, r and T ,
as for agents with implementation errors alone (see Appendix A).
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Figure 4.19: Average maximum fitness of Player 1 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(perception errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in
Appendix A.
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Figure 4.20: Average maximum fitness of Player 2 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(perception errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in
Appendix A.
4.7 Relationship Between Types of Bounded Ra-
tionality
Considering different types of rationality, and comparing the effect they have on
the evaluation metric being looked at can shed light on the relationships between
the types of bounds. We take three types of rationality in the previous Section
where one is a combination of the other two. Simply doing this can help deepen
our understanding of the impact that a certain kind of boundedness may have
as compared to other kinds, deepening our understanding of the assumption of
bounded rationality that ACE makes. This further provides insights into what
it could mean in simulation, allowing us to further challenging and explicitly
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Figure 4.21: Average minimum fitness of Player 1 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(perception errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in
Appendix A.
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Figure 4.22: Average minimum fitness of Player 2 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(perception errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in
Appendix A.
expressing it within simulations.
Taking just the case of the average first hitting time and comparing the three
types of bounds (Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4), we can see that adding implementa-
tion errors to the agents with perception errors results in similar characteristics
as for the case of agents with implementation errors alone. A closer look suggests
that the kind of bounded rationality (essentially injecting randomness) consid-
ered, results in a bound specifying perception error type of (as compared to the
same bound for the implementation errors) injection of randomness still causing
significant deviations from the base line algorithm, for more bounded agents. If
one looks at the definition of these errors, as laid out in Section 4.4.1, one can
see that both implementation errors and perception errors result in agents per-
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ceiving the opponents’ actions with some degree of error (as determined by T
and r), though for the implementation error case this perception of error in the
opponent’s actions is due to the opponent actually making errors in actions. Im-
plementation errors, in addition, result in the agent perceiving its own actions,
even when it is a responder, erroneously. In some sense, randomness injected
with implementation errors may subsume simply having perception error type
randomness, though the effect of perception errors is significant for this met-
ric, towards larger bounds. This significance can be seen by comparing Figures
4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 (see Appendix A for further details). Perception errors cause
significant deviations from the base line, suggesting randomness injected when
considering implementation errors alone adds little to the randomness injected
when considering perception errors alone, for larger bounds. On the other hand,
there is a significant difference between perception errors alone and implementa-
tion errors alone within 0.0001 ≤ r ≤ 0.001, and for n ≥ 7. Moreover, for cases
where only implementation errors already show maximum deviation from the
base line, perception errors do not add much, suggesting they cannot add more.
This suggests implementation errors as they are may be too harsh, and a lower
value and finer granularity with them may cover various deviations that percep-
tion errors alone covers. A cross between implementation errors and perception
errors (using them with different probabilities) may also show more deviations.
We leave this investigation for future work.
Considering the average stay within " distance from the equilibrium metric,
Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 suggest that perception errors again cause significant devi-
ations from the base line with increasing bounds. Compared to when agents with
both implementation and perception errors are considered, a significant impact
is already created by perception errors at r = 0.00001, yet implementation and
perception errors together lead to a similar impact (against the base line). For
r > 0.00001, the impact when compared with the base line is harsher with imple-
mentation and perception errors together, and with only implementation errors,
than with only perception errors. This suggests implementation errors, beyond a
threshold do not get affected by perception errors, when both are taken together.
This also suggests the implementation errors, below a threshold of boundedness,
do not get affected by perception errors, when both are taken together. Imple-
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mentation errors alone (Figure 4.5) suggest the same kinds of deviations as when
both implementation and perception errors are taken together (Figure 4.7). The
randomness injected into the strategies by implementation errors may, in effect,
subsume the randomness injected by perception errors, but in a non-linear way,
the relationship being something that needs dealing with in future work.
Now taking the case of the average distance from the equilibrium after the first
hit as the metric, Figures 4.8 and 4.9 further confirm that implementation errors
subsume perception errors, but to what degree is still a question. What we can
say is that the distances from the equilibrium achieved by implementation errors
(Figure 4.8) and when taking both implementation and perception errors (Figure
4.10) are similar (as with the earlier two metrics), and that the perception errors
do not seem to add anything extra to the trends exhibited by simply having
agents with implementation errors. On the other hand, perception errors do
lead to significant changes in the metric for more complex games and for higher
levels of boundedness, as do the other two types (compared to lower levels of
boundedness).
When comparing the average payoffs of the players (Figures 4.11, 4.12, 4.13
and 4.14), it is evident, as previously shown, that the deviations with increasing
bounds on rationality are smaller for agents with perception errors than they
are for agents with implementation errors or for agents with both implementa-
tion and perception errors. This again suggests that perception errors do little
over having agents with implementation errors already, though perception errors
alone do indeed cause changes in the co-evolutionary process and outcomes, and
so, do specify a useful notion of bounded rationality, whereas implementation
errors alone may do little beyond a certain degree of boundedness (an interesting
issue for future research). The effect of perception errors on the maximum and
minimum average fitness of the agents are similar across the spectrum of bound-
edness, however less prominent when compared with agents with implementation
errors alone, and agents with both implementation and perception errors.
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4.8 Sensitivity of Co-evolution Against Recon-
ciliation Variable Specification
The current specification of our reconciliation variable allows us to explicitly
express bounded rationality and understand its role within co-evolutionary sim-
ulations, helping us remove the possibility of it being mis-interpreted within sim-
ulations, which is the point of the second part of our methodical framework.
However, it may still be necessary to understand how sensitive our simulation
is, if noise, which partly specifies bounded rationality, and thus the reconcilia-
tion variable, were modelled differently. The less sensitive the simulation with
respect to variations of the intricacies of the specification, the more generic our
specification and conclusions drawn using it may be. Note that our framework
does not however rely on studying the sensitivity of simulations in order to help
draw general conclusions of how bounded rationality may affect co-evolution. It
is still a good exercise, and indeed necessary, if bounded rationality is to be mod-
elled within co-evolution when one may want to match simulation and reality.
The framework asks the ACE practitioner to avoid mis-interpretations of socio-
economic phenomena of interest within simulations by way of understanding ex-
plicitly what the phenomena means within simulations. If indeed co-evolution is
sensitive to the specification of the socio-economic phenomena of interest (which
is in terms of reconciliation variables), the practitioner must be aware of this.
We consider specifying the randomness in move (r) parameter, which partly
specifies bounded rationality in our case, differently. Instead of Gaussian noise,
whereby we considered noise equivalent to N(0, r2) injected in the actions, per-
ception, or both, of the agents, depending on the type of their rationality bounds,
we now consider the Uniform distribution to generate noise.
Essentially, with probability T , the action or perception will have Uniformly
distributed noise within the interval [−r√3, r√3]1 added to it. Mathematically,
1We consider r2 to represent the variance, as for the Gaussian noise model. For a Uniform
distribution U(a, b), defined within the interval [a, b], the variance is given by 1
12
(b− a)2. Since
our interval has to lie around zero, because an equal amount of noise may be added to or
subtracted from the actions or perception, a = −b. This results in a = −r√3, and b = r√3,
which then defines the interval within which uniformly distributed noise with variance r2, must
lie in.
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for an agent to be making implementation errors alone would result in the fol-
lowing offers and thresholds:
offer =


offer + U(−r√3, r√3) with probability T , and U(−r√3, r√3)
resampled unless and until
offer + U(−r√3, r√3) ∈ [0.0, 1.0],
offer otherwise.
(4.4)
threshold =


threshold+ U(−r√3, r√3) with probability T , and
U(−r√3, r√3) resampled
unless and until
threshold + U(−r√3, r√3)
∈ [0.0, 1.0],
threshold otherwise.
(4.5)
An agent to be making only perception errors would not change the offers and
thresholds, but instead result in only the offer received from the opponent being
erroneous, as follows:
received offer =


received offer + U(−r√3, r√3) with probability T , and
U(−r√3, r√3) resampled
unless and until
received offer+
U(−r√3, r√3) ∈ [0.0, 1.0],
received offer otherwise.
(4.6)
For an agent to be making both implementation and perception errors, the
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offers, thresholds and the offers received from the opponent will all be erroneous,
following Equations 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6.
We observe that the values and the trends in the values of the evaluation
metrics across r, T and n are, in general, not significantly different to those
observed for the case with Gaussian noise modelling randomness in moves. This is
true for all three types of rationality bounds considered in this Chapter. As such,
the relationship between the types of rationality bounds, given the evaluation
metrics, is the same as for Gaussian noise. Our co-evolutionary simulation is
thus not sensitive to specifying randomness in moves using either a Gaussian
distribution or a Uniform distribution. For the interested reader, the graphs from
the experiments with a Uniform distribution specifying randomness in moves can
be found in Appendix B. The experimental setup is exactly the same as for the
Gaussian noise case, the only difference being the manner in which r is used, as
specified above.
4.9 Future Research Directions
Given our treatment of co-evolutionary simulations in this Chapter, with a tangi-
ble handle on them by way of reconciliation variables such that mis-interpretations
of socio-economic phenomena be explicitly ruled out from within simulations,
there are a multitude of questions and issues that can be raised and directions
this research can be taken into. Some of these, and by no means exhaustive, can
be listed as follows:
• What does heterogeneity in agent rationality bounds tell us? Heterogene-
ity can be introduced by considering differences within a type of bound or
across types of bounds. For example, one could consider agents with differ-
ent T or r or both, but the same type of errors in their functioning. One
could also consider agents making different types of errors. Heterogeneity
is indeed seen as one advantage of using agent based simulations in compu-
tational economics, helping model more realistic socio-economic situations,
and exploring this idea with our co-evolutionary simulation is one direction
for future research.
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• Are implementation errors so severe that they become less useful in terms
of a change in them changing their effect on the metric in question? Are
there diminishing returns on our understanding of how bounded rationality
affects co-evolution, from considering implementation errors with greater
degrees of randomness?
• Endogenous emergence towards a certain kind of rationality bound(s)?
With the way we have quantified bounded rationality, specified by the two
parameters T and r, one can easily augment the representation of agents
with these parameters, and let evolution take its course, leading to the en-
dogenous emergence of certain kinds or even evolutionary trends on the
bounds.
• One can also consider other definitions of bounded rationality, since our
methodology does not rely on any one particular definition, e.g. mem-
ory use, processing power, historical knowledge, accuracy of foresight [143],
knowledge of the other player etc. These may entail the need for a different
representation of strategies as compared to the representation considered in
this thesis. Furthermore, other representations, e.g. finite state machines
where number of states suggests a bound [79], can also be investigated for
their effect on co-evolution.
• The actual matching of the solution concept implemented, considering the
use of reconciliation variables as suggested here, to specific real world socio-
economic situations, for bargaining and other games, is a good candidate
for being the immediate next step.
• Can the explicit treatment of bounded rationality using the notion of recon-
ciliation variables lead to simulations that may not have been envisaged but
are still interesting? The idea here is for the discovery of simulations that
may achieve some desirable computational outcomes, where these outcomes
would have been hard to have been thought of as goals towards which the
solution concept is to be engineered. The point here would be to facilitate
design of co-evolutionary algorithms inspired by socio-economic processes,
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to solve computational problems, for example, facilitating the design of
algorithms for market based control [30].
4.10 Summary
We propose the notion of reconciliation variables, by matching the phenomenon
of interest to an element of co-evolutionary solution concept. This enables a
systematic treatment of the phenomenon of interest, which is necessary for ACE
research if one is to put a socio-economic interpretation on simulations. We stress
that it is premature to interpret simulations in socio-economic terms without
challenging the use of and understanding the concerned socio-economic phenom-
ena explaining the co-evolutionary process and outcomes, or else they can get
mis-interpreted. A case that we study throughout the thesis is how bounded
rationality can be interpreted in a sound manner within simulations. The second
part of the framework, which allows for understanding the role of socio-economic
phenomena within simulations in explicit algorithmic terms, is what is described
and applied in this Chapter. We establish the relationship between the phe-
nomenon of bounded rationality and the co-evolutionary process and outcomes,
thus revealing the actual algorithmic meaning of the phenomenon, which can
guide the explanation of simulations in socio-economic terms. A simple way to
look at this is, that if we know what a certain value of the phenomenon of interest,
given our tangible hold on it, does to the simulation, the task of explaining the
workings of the simulations in terms of the phenomenon boils down to explaining
the relationship discovered, and prevents avoidable assumption from becoming
explanations.
It makes sense to methodically refine a simulation once we have a base line
behaviour for it established, as we do by introducing the notion of co-evolutionary
solution concepts to ACE research in Chapter 3, unveiling further tangibility by
way of reconciliation variables in this Chapter, instead of forcing reality tuned
interpretations (thus mis-interpreting socio-economic phenomena within simula-
tions) on the method that does not even achieve the base line behaviour. The
explicit treatment of elements as compared to intuition, as reality tuned inter-
pretations or indeed mis-interpretations may be called if not challenged for their
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validity, will only help advance the field, and makes available a particular kind of
scientific lens that ACE research can be looked through. We provide an explicit
framework for analysing and refining simulations such that socio-economic phe-
nomena of interest explaining the simulations may not get mis-interpreted within
these simulations, from the bottom-up point of view of reconciliation variables
in this Chapter, in addition to the top-down point of view of co-evolutionary
solution concepts in the previous Chapter, and see this as one next step in ACE
simulation research, which must not be overlooked.
An important point that we raise in this Chapter is that of engaging in the
question of why be mislead by something designed by ourselves. Bounded ratio-
nality is a phenomenon that is hard to define or specify in reality, but at least it
can be specified and understood in simulation (just like there are specifications in
the socio-economic literature), having designed these simulations ourselves. Chal-
lenging and understanding the phenomenon in simulation is easier than in reality,
so we take the onus of showing how to do it via our methodical framework. We
increase the tangibility of co-evolutionary simulations, because it is possible, as
shown in this Chapter. The notion behind solutions concepts and reconciliation
variables make the simulations tangible from the point of view of bounded ratio-
nality. As such, systematic juggling with simulations, with explicit avoidance of
mis-interpretations of bounded rationality within them, becomes possible.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Summary of Contributions
Looking back at the main point of establishing a link between co-evolutionary
algorithm design research and ACE via laying out a methodical framework allow-
ing for the avoidance of mis-interpretations of the algorithms (in socio-economic
terms), we now reiterate the contributions that have come about in the pro-
cess. The first major contribution of this thesis is the framework in itself, that
allows for a detailed and holistic look at the socio-economic phenomena being
mis-interpreted in simulations. The framework consists of two integral parts that
describe it. The descriptions of the integral parts and their application to previ-
ous work are contributions of the thesis as well. We state the main idea behind
these parts and summarise what we discovered on applying these to previous
work, one at a time:
5.1.1 Part 1 of the Framework
The main idea behind this part of the framework can be stated as follows:
Analysing and refining co-evolution for ACE, using the notion be-
hind co-evolutionary solution concepts, empowered by the existence of
top-down solutions, from co-evolutionary algorithm design research.
Socio-economic phenomena which may have been mis-interpreted within
simulations, can be challenged using this notion, and their mis-interpre-
tation revealed. As such, analysis and refinements of co-evolutionary
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simulations, guided by the presence of top-down solutions, allow for a
top-down avoidance of mis-interpretations of socio-economic
phenomena of interest within simulations.
The application of the above to previous work is now summarised:
The implemented co-evolutionary solution concept from previous work [58]
was looked at. This co-evolutionary solution concept took bounded rationality,
a socio-economic phenomenon, for granted, assuming it to be causing deviations
from the expected behaviour of the algorithm, without scrutiny. We showed that
by working on the elements of the implemented co-evolutionary solution concept
systematically, and scrutinising as to what may have caused the deviations from
the expected behaviour algorithmically, we could say the following:
• The deviations were being caused by the improper implementation of the
co-evolutionary solution concept. We considered the elements of the co-
evolutionary solution concept one at a time. We found that the variation
operator was being implemented incorrectly. Selection of infeasible oppo-
nents was being carried out, which became clear by looking at the interac-
tion details of the agents. Moreover, local evaluation of the strategies, lead
to disruptions in the strategies due to the localisation of selection pressure.
These are algorithmic details which were being overlooked and termed as
bounded rationality.
• Changing the elements of the solution concept, more specifically, correct-
ing the variation operator, correcting for infeasible opponent selection at
the interaction level and establishing three rules that govern the evalu-
ation of strategies, we were able to address the issues mentioned above.
We were also able to show that monotonicity in the concessions made by
agents was not enough for the algorithm converging to the equilibrium. A
closer and systematic look at the co-evolutionary solution concept thus lead
to the algorithm converging to the subgame perfect equilibrium solution,
while the agents remained boundedly rational. We thus obtained a new
implemented co-evolutionary solution concept that did indeed achieve the
envisaged goals, with boundedly rational agents.
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In essence, we understood in explicit algorithmic terms, what the assumption
of bounded rationality actually meant in previous work. Moreover, we showed
that for bargaining games with one issue and n ≥ 1, the algorithm would, practi-
cally speaking, indeed converge to the equilibrium solution, though the function
evaluations needed would indeed increase with increasing n. In what way these
evaluations increase is something we will consider understanding in the future.
More importantly, this investigation of the algorithm through the lenses of co-
evolutionary solution concepts allows us to say that previous work was not im-
plementing the envisaged solution concept. The importance of the notion behind
co-evolutionary solution concepts for ACE research thus became clear.
In addition, we discovered what bounded rationality did not mean in the con-
text of socio-economic simulations using co-evolutionary algorithms. We stress
that, although we discover the issues and propose remedies within the realm of
bargaining games and the co-evolutionary algorithms considered in this thesis, the
method of understanding the simulations through the lenses of co-evolutionary so-
lution concepts (our first part of the framework) is generally applicable. We show
that challenging unassessed assumptions about socio-economic phenomenon, car-
ried in to co-evolutionary simulations, using the notion behind co-evolutionary so-
lution concepts, is indeed a methodology worth considering for ACE research. The
general practice within ACE of implicitly assuming bounded rationality within
simulations, thus leaving it unscrutinised, is also called into question. We believe
that these revelation are significant enough for ACE practitioners to re-think
current practice and pay heed to our framework. In fact, going one step fur-
ther, and leaving no room for mis-interpretations of socio-economic phenomena,
in our case bounded rationality, by explicitly considering its relationship with the
co-evolutionary simulations, leads to the next part of our methodical framework.
5.1.2 Part 2 of the Framework
The main idea behind this part of the framework can be stated as follows:
Analysing and refining co-evolution for ACE, using the notion behind
reconciliation variables proposed in the thesis. Reasonably associating
mis-interpreted socio-economic phenomena of interest with the ele-
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ments of the implemented co-evolutionary solution concept, parametris-
ing and quantifying the elements, we obtain our reconciliation vari-
ables. Systematically analysing the simulation for its relationship with
the reconciliation variables or for its closeness to desired behaviour,
using this parametrisation, is the suggested idea. Analysis and re-
finements based on such an explicit expression of the socio-economic
phenomena of interest, allow for a bottom-up avoidance of mis-
interpretations of the phenomena within simulations.
The application of the above, to the co-evolutionary simulation refined using
the first part of the framework, is now summarised:
We wanted to understand what bounded rationality really meant to socio-
economic simulations, since we discovered what it did not mean (algorithmically)
and that the agents were still boundedly rational. It turned out that phenomenon
of interest like bounded rationality do not have an obvious algorithmic represen-
tation within co-evolutionary simulations. This is in contrast to phenomena like
information exchange or innovation for instance, wherein, variation operators,
viz. crossover and mutation respectively, have been used to interpret them in the
past [1]. However, if we are indeed interested in simulating socio-economic learn-
ing where phenomena of interest like bounded rationality do play a role in the real
world, specifically if we want to avoid their mis-interpretation within simulations,
then we need to have a way to tangibly understand them, rather than saying that
co-evolutionary algorithms simulate bounded rationality by definition (which is
general practice). From the point of view of ACE research, if a simulation has
to have predictive power, it needs to be designed in a methodical manner, as op-
posed to having mis-understood characteristics (mis-interpreted socio-economic
phenomena) from the outset.
Our goal was to see if the implemented co-evolutionary solution concept can
indeed be related to socio-economic phenomena of interest such that the phe-
nomena may not get mis-interpreted and a systematic study of the relationship
that the phenomena have with the co-evolutionary algorithm, be carried out. In
other words, we wanted to make co-evolutionary algorithms tangible from the point
of view of the socio-economic phenomena under question. The notion behind co-
evolutionary solution concepts allowed us to view the algorithm as elements which
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could be tangibly handled. The question then was, as to how to associate the
phenomena of interest with the elements.
We showed how bounded rationality can be associated with the elements of
the implemented co-evolutionary solution concept. This was done by finding
reasonable explanations of the phenomenon in socio-economic literature, and the
elements that were most likely to implement those explanations. We thus had
a link. We associated bounded rationality with the representation, given that
socio-economics literature suggests what is known as a trembling hand, with which
agents make moves. The trembling hand suggests that, with some probability, the
agents will make errors in the moves they make. This could directly be associated
with the representation of strategies. We were thus able to define three types of
bounded rationality: implementation errors, perception errors and a combination
of the two. We modelled these using two parameters, viz. trembling probability
(T ) and randomness in moves (r), within the representation. As such, we got
a firm hold on the malleability of bounded rationality in explicit quantitative
and algorithmic terms. Bounded rationality thus becomes, what we call, our
reconciliation variable.
We then defined the characteristics of the implemented co-evolutionary solu-
tion concept that we were interested in understanding, given the range within
which bounded rationality could now be systematically varied. These included
characteristics like: the average first hitting time of reaching within " distance
from the equilibrium, the average stay within " distance from the equilibrium,
the average distance from the equilibrium over time after the first hit, the average
payoff, the average maximum and average minimum payoffs.
A methodology was thus presented, which allowed for a tangible and system-
atic handling of the co-evolutionary algorithm from the point of view of bounded
rationality (our phenomenon of interest), i.e. tangibly varying bounded rational-
ity (varying T and r, given one of the three types of bound), and analysing the
relationship that the algorithm had with it was thus made possible. With this
methodology, we could then say:
• One view of bounded rationality is not necessary to be used with the
methodology, as long as one can reasonably associate bounded rational-
ity with the elements of the co-evolutionary solution concept. One could
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work out the associations a particular view of bounded rationality in eco-
nomics has with the elements of the co-evolutionary solution concept, and
understand how this view affects the process and outcomes. As such, the
methodology does not rely on one view or explanation of the socio-economic
phenomena of interest.
• Multiple metrics or characteristics of the algorithm are necessary to be
scrutinised if one is interested in understanding how a phenomenon of in-
terest affects the simulations. For example, only considering payoffs (and
not considering another metric related to convergence characteristics), is
not enough to conclude about how the phenomenon of interest affects the
simulations, and may lead to misleading conclusions about the relationship.
• One can compare different views of bounded rationality and carry out fur-
ther investigation as to which view may be more relevant to the kind of
simulation wanted. For instance, we show that perception errors may be
subsumed by implementation errors. Perception errors do not seem to add
anything extra to the trend exhibited by simply having implementation er-
rors, though they form a useful notion of bounded rationality, as they do
change the base line behaviour of the algorithm significantly. Implementa-
tion errors may do little beyond a certain degree of boundedness and is a
line of work worth considering in the future.
• Even a difference like the amount of noise injected into the strategies (as
done with implementation errors, perception errors and a combination of
the two) results in differences in the outcomes of the co-evolutionary algo-
rithm, suggesting the importance of studying the phenomena of interest in
a methodical and explicit manner (and not assuming it within simulations)
for the purposes of ACE research.
• As the problem or game becomes more complex, a change in bounds changes
the behaviour of the algorithm. A systematic study can provide with further
information as to what regions of bounds may be useful for the ACE appli-
cation at hand (for example, which regions may not change the behaviour
of the algorithm with increasingly complex games), specially if the idea is
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to ensure predictive content from the algorithm as the problem becomes
more complex.
The explicit consideration of bounded rationality within the simulation and
understanding how it affects the simulation, in itself, is an exercise missing from
ACE literature and thus a contribution. It is worth considering because we can
now be clear about the algorithmic meaning of the phenomenon of interest and
the way it affects co-evolutionary simulations instead of making unassessed as-
sumption about the phenomenon. The fact that makes the explicit consideration
of the phenomenon a reasonable thing to do, is our proposal of reconciliation vari-
ables, which suggests for the phenomenon to be reasonably associated with the
elements of the co-evolutionary solution concept that specifies the simulation, i.e.
must have a backing in socio-economic literature (in our case it is literature on
bounded rationality) and then associated with the elements. Given this backing,
one can at least be sure of the inner workings of the phenomenon, and this can
follow a systematic study.
5.2 Further Observations Regarding Our Frame-
work
Our methodology can also be seen as complementing a lot of the significant re-
search efforts in the direction of disciplining the use of co-evolutionary algorithms
within ACE. Taking the significant efforts in disciplining co-evolutionary algo-
rithms within ACE one at a time, we now show how our methodology can inform
the ACE community in the following complementary ways:
• The fundamental methodology for designing co-evolutionary simulations
needs attention, as mentioned in [2], and is one alternative to understand-
ing and improving the quality of simulations for socio-economic problems.
In [2], evolutionary algorithm parameters that do not have a direct socio-
economic interpretation were investigated in order to understand the robust-
ness of two co-evolutionary solution concepts, when these parameter values
are varied. However, we focus on a methodology that helps parametrising
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socio-economic phenomena of interest by associating them with the algo-
rithm, and parametrising the elements that make up the algorithm, i.e. we
parametrise the algorithm in terms of the socio-economic phenomena. This
enables understanding the relationship between the socio-economic phe-
nomenon of interest and the simulation, which may further guide moulding
the algorithms for socio-economic simulations in a methodical manner, if
needed. In effect, [2] helps removes the influence of algorithmic parameters,
which cannot be understood in socio-economic terms, on simulations, and
we introduce algorithmic parameters, which allow socio-economic terms to
be understood, in simulations.
• Unaware of the existence of the notion behind co-evolutionary solution con-
cepts, a study was undertaken in [8]. There, the main issue dealt with was to
understand the changes in the genetic algorithm learning model [5] needed,
so that it can be refined towards selecting a particular type of equilibrium,
which was otherwise not possible. Systematically changing the genetic algo-
rithm setup, guided by another co-evolutionary solution concept i.e. classi-
fier systems, resulted in the genetic algorithm converging to the equilibrium.
This work essentially echoes the need for viewing co-evolutionary algorithms
through the lenses of co-evolutionary solution concepts. Whereas they mod-
ified the co-evolutionary solution concept, working on the fitness evaluation
systematically, guided by the conflicting results obtained using another solu-
tion concept, we simply look at the elements of the co-evolutionary solution
concept systematically, and obtain equilibrium selection. Co-evolutionary
solution concepts, if explicitly examined, are thus a powerful way of refining
the algorithm.
• The need for a mathematical theory which may explain the results of simu-
lations using genetic or more generally, evolutionary algorithms, is stressed
in [39]. Without it, predicting the behaviour of evolutionary algorithms
without actual simulations becomes impossible. Using Markov chains [105],
a study was indeed carried out in [39] along these lines. Whereas this is
interesting from the point of view of understanding what a chosen evolu-
tionary algorithm may result in when used as a simulation, we lay out a
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framework for making a methodical choice of the evolutionary algorithm.
Whereas an off-the-shelf evolutionary algorithm is treated theoretically in
[39], we envisage our methodology being used to help narrow down on to
an algorithm first, by way of analysing and refining the algorithm as sug-
gested by our framework, which may be followed by a theoretical analysis
for further confidence.
The main weakness in our methodology is that it is entirely empirical, and
so, may lead to further confidence considerations in the resultant refined co-
evolutionary solution concept. Although the methodology shows how to under-
stand the effects of socio-economic phenomena on co-evolution in a methodical
manner, a proper validation against real experimental data for socio-economic
games is required so that actual simulations of real socio-economic situations be
derived. If the scrutinised phenomenon of interest warrants the simulation to
match reality, which is a necessity for real world application, the validation must
indeed be carried out. From the point of view of our methodology, this should
be done once we have an algorithm designed towards achieving a base line be-
haviour, and we have the reconciliation variables identified to allow for moulding
the co-evolutionary solution concept being implemented by the algorithm.
In this thesis, in essence, we lay out an explicit holistic framework for studying
socio-economic phenomena of interest such that they may not get mis-interpreted
within simulations, and thus analysing and refining simulations from the point of
view of co-evolutionary solution concepts and reconciliation variables. In effect,
we show how socio-economic phenomena of interest can be scrutinised and in-
deed understood within co-evolutionary algorithms from the top down and from
the bottom up respectively, in a methodical manner. For the top-down avoid-
ance of mis-interpretations of the phenomena, we showed how the notion behind
co-evolutionary solution concepts can be used by the ACE research community
to challenge the phenomena within simulations and simulate socio-economic out-
comes of interest (convergence to the equilibrium). For the bottom-up avoidance
of mis-interpretations of the phenomena, proposing the notion behind reconcili-
ation variables, we showed how the phenomena of interest can be explicitly ex-
pressed within these algorithms such that a systematic study of such phenomena
be carried out in algorithmic terms (understanding the effect of bounded ratio-
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nality on co-evolution). From the ACE simulation research perspective, this is
one next step which must not be overlooked.
5.3 Future Work
Using the methodology described in this thesis, given the problem of simulating
learning and adaptation in bargaining games, there are lots of research questions
and directions that can further be explored, some of which are:
• What does heterogeneity in agent rationality bounds tell us? We can fur-
ther explore bounded rationality along the lines of agents being differently
bounded. Real life bargaining falls into this category and heterogeneity is
one of the strong motivations behind the usefulness of ACE.
• What can the endogenous emergence towards a certain kind of rationality
bound(s) tell us? Again, further exploration of the co-evolutionary solu-
tion concept can be carried out in order to understand if there are stable
rationality bounds that may emerge, or if not, then to understand how the
bounds evolve over time.
• What can other definitions of bounded rationality tell us? We can use other
explanations of bounded rationality in the literature and understand how
those explanations affect the co-evolutionary solution concept to further our
understanding of bounded rationality in socio-economic simulations.
• Can we discover what-if simulations? It may be that we may discover
what-if simulations that allow for their usage in the computational realm
(instead of being models of socio-economic learning) e.g. computational
resource allocation that warrant certain desirable outcomes, which may be
hard to engineer otherwise.
• How well does the implemented co-evolutionary solution concept generalise
to more complex games? Scalability of socio-economic simulations to games
where it is cumbersome or even intractable to come up with an analytical
solution is an important motivation behind ACE, and researching into the
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scalability of the implemented co-evolutionary solution concepts to more
complex games is indeed an important research direction.
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Appendix A
Empirical Results From Chapter
4: Randomness in Moves (r)
Specified Using a Gaussian
Distribution
A.1 Overview
In Chapter 4, we lay out a methodology for a proper consideration of co-evolution-
ary solution concepts within ACE, by proposing what we call, reconciliation vari-
ables. There are socio-economic phenomena which may not have an obvious
relationship with the co-evolutionary algorithm or indeed, the co-evolutionary
algorithm may not have an obvious socio-economic (in terms of the phenomena)
interpretation. Generally though, for socio-economic phenomena, even if they
have an obvious or intuitive link with the algorithm, one should approach (scru-
tinise and understand) this link in a systematic way, simply for the simulation to
be a good approximation to the socio-economic situation being simulated.
We show the link that bounded rationality has with the co-evolutionary algo-
rithm in Chapter 4. We do this by associating it with an element (representation)
of the co-evolutionary solution concept, parametrising and quantifying the ele-
ment thus associated. This follows the understanding of the relationship between
the, now algorithmically tangible phenomenon of bounded rationality (our rec-
onciliation variable), and the characteristics (in the form of certain evaluation
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metrics) of the co-evolutionary algorithm one may be interested in investigating
with respect to bounded rationality. Here, we show the empirical results in detail
that were obtained when establishing this relationship, given that the graphs in
Chapter 4 were summary graphs.
We consider the types of bounded rationality, showing the results for each
evaluation metric, given the game (specified by a value of n ∈ [1, 10], where n is an
integer), and the bound on the rationality. Section A.2 shows the averages across
50 runs, together with the standard error at a 95% confidence level. Note that
in the graphs, both the averages and standard error values are shown as colour,
where the colour of the ‘+’ sign shows the standard error (95% confidence).
The colour can be referred to using the colour map on the left of each graph
to understand the values for these two. Section A.3 shows the magnitude of the
standard errors (95% confidence) again, but separately for each metric, game and
bound on rationality, given the type of bounded rationality. The ‘+’ indicators
in the graphs in Section A.2 are essentially shown to get an idea of the error on
the same scale as the metric.
A.2 Averages with Confidence
We show the values for various metrics considered in Chapter 4, which were all
averages, for the three types of bounded rationality investigated. For each type
and for each evaluation metric, we show these values for the evaluation metric on
a graph, that caters for all the rationality bounds and games investigated in that
type. Note that each type of rationality was quantified by two parameters T and
r, which are the trembling hand probability and the randomness in move. These
two, together with n are the axes in the graphs.
Assuming that the values for each metric, from the N = 50 runs/samples
of the algorithm, for each game and rationality bound setting came from a t-
distribution, we can calculate the standard error and the confidence intervals for
the average to lie within 95% of the area under the distribution, around the
sample average.
The standard error is given by sm = s/
√
N , where s is the sample standard
deviation, which in turn is given by s =
√∑
N
i=1
(xi−µ)2
N−1 , µ being the sample average.
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A t value of 2.0096 gives the amount of standard error on either side of the mean
µ that could be expected, for the average to lie within 95% of the area under
the distribution with sample average µ. This is given by µ± 2.0096sm. We show
the amount of standard error i.e. 2.0096sm for each game and rationality bound
setting in the graphs as well, indicated by the colour of the ‘+’ sign. The errors
are low. They are similar when seen at the scale of the metric, and thus appear
to be of the same colour. To get a better idea of these, Section A.3 plots the
magnitude of each on graphs similar to the ones considered in this Section. The
graphs are presented in the same order as in this Section for ease in referring
them.
To guide the eye, and for easy of use of these graphs, we suggest looking at the
‘+’ indicators on the squares (squares representing the values of the metric) on
the graphs in this Section by determining their value from the colour bar beside
each graph (graphs in Section A.3 will give a more precise value for the interested
reader). Adding and subtracting the value to the value of the square (determined
using the colour bar again) gives the confidence interval. Comparing two such
squares for significance amounts to seeing whether or not their confidence intervals
overlap. If they do not overlap, the difference is significant with a confidence of
95%.
A.2.1 Implementation Errors
Average first hitting time
Figure A.1 shows the average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of r,
T and n, for implementation errors.
Average stay in equilibrium
Figure A.2 shows the average stay within " distance from equilibrium, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation errors.
Average distance from equilibrium
Figure A.3 shows the average distance from equilibrium, after first hit, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation errors.
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Figure A.1: Average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n
(implementation errors). See Figure A.46 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.2: Average stay within " distance from equilibrium, across 50 runs for all
values of r, T and n (implementation errors). See Figure A.47 for the magnitudes
of errors in detail.
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Figure A.3: Average distance from equilibrium, after first hit, across 50 runs for all
values of r, T and n (implementation errors). See Figure A.48 for the magnitudes
of errors in detail.
Average payoff
Figures A.4 and A.5 show the average payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across
50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively, for
implementation errors.
Figures A.6 and A.7 show the average payoff for Player 2, after first hit,
across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for implementation errors.
Average maximum payoff
Figures A.8 and A.9 show the average maximum payoff for Player 1, after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for implementation errors.
Figures A.10 and A.11 show the average maximum payoff for Player 2, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even
respectively, for implementation errors.
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Figure A.4: Average payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs for all values
of r, T and for n being odd (implementation errors). See Figure A.49 for the
magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.5: Average payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs for all values
of r, T and for n being even (implementation errors). See Figure A.50 for the
magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.6: Average payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs for all values
of r, T and for n being odd (implementation errors). See Figure A.51 for the
magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.7: Average payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs for all values
of r, T and for n being even (implementation errors). See Figure A.52 for the
magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.8: Average maximum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation errors). See Figure
A.53 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.9: Average maximum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation errors). See Figure
A.54 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.10: Average maximum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation errors). See Figure
A.55 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.11: Average maximum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation errors). See Figure
A.56 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
186
A.2 Averages with Confidence
Average minimum payoff
Figures A.12 and A.13 show the average minimum payoff for Player 1, after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for implementation errors.
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Figure A.12: Average minimum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation errors). See Figure
A.57 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
Figures A.14 and A.15 show the average minimum payoff for Player 2, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even
respectively, for implementation errors.
A.2.2 Perception Errors
Average first hitting time
Figure A.16 shows the average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of
r, T and n, for perception errors.
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Figure A.13: Average minimum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation errors). See Figure
A.58 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.14: Average minimum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation errors). See Figure
A.59 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.15: Average minimum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation errors). See Figure
A.60 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.16: Average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and
n (perception errors). See Figure A.61 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Average stay in equilibrium
Figure A.17 shows the average stay within " distance from equilibrium, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n, for perception errors.
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Figure A.17: Average stay within " distance from equilibrium, across 50 runs for
all values of r, T and n (perception errors). See Figure A.62 for the magnitudes
of errors in detail.
Average distance from equilibrium
Figure A.18 shows the average distance from equilibrium, after first hit, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n, for perception errors.
Average payoff
Figures A.19 and A.20 show the average payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across
50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively, for
perception errors.
Figures A.21 and A.22 show the average payoff for Player 2, after first hit,
across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for perception errors.
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Figure A.18: Average distance from equilibrium, after first hit, across 50 runs for
all values of r, T and n (perception errors). See Figure A.63 for the magnitudes
of errors in detail.
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Figure A.19: Average payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs for all
values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors). See Figure A.64 for the
magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.20: Average payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs for all
values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors). See Figure A.65 for the
magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.21: Average payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs for all
values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors). See Figure A.66 for the
magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.22: Average payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs for all
values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors). See Figure A.67 for the
magnitudes of errors in detail.
Average maximum payoff
Figures A.23 and A.24 show the average maximum payoff for Player 1, after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for perception errors.
Figures A.25 and A.26 show the average maximum payoff for Player 2, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even
respectively, for perception errors.
Average minimum payoff
Figures A.27 and A.28 show the average minimum payoff for Player 1, after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for perception errors.
Figures A.29 and A.30 show the average minimum payoff for Player 2, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even
respectively, for perception errors.
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Figure A.23: Average maximum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors). See Figure A.68 for
the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.24: Average maximum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors). See Figure A.69
for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.25: Average maximum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors). See Figure A.70 for
the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.26: Average maximum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors). See Figure A.71
for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.27: Average minimum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors). See Figure A.72 for
the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.28: Average minimum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors). See Figure A.73
for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.29: Average minimum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors). See Figure A.74 for
the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.30: Average minimum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors). See Figure A.75
for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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A.2.3 Implementation and Perception Errors
Average first hitting time
Figure A.31 shows the average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of
r, T and n, for implementation and perception errors.
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Figure A.31: Average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and
n (implementation and perception errors). See Figure A.76 for the magnitudes
of errors in detail.
Average stay in equilibrium
Figure A.32 shows the average stay within " distance from equilibrium, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation and perception errors.
Average distance from equilibrium
Figure A.33 shows the average distance from equilibrium, after first hit, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation and perception errors.
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Figure A.32: Average stay within " distance from equilibrium, across 50 runs for
all values of r, T and n (implementation and perception errors). See Figure A.77
for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.33: Average distance from equilibrium, after first hit, across 50 runs for
all values of r, T and n (implementation and perception errors). See Figure A.78
for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Average payoff
Figures A.34 and A.35 show the average payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across
50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively, for
implementation and perception errors.
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Figure A.34: Average payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs for all values
of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and perception errors). See Figure
A.79 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
Figures A.36 and A.37 show the average payoff for Player 2, after first hit,
across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for implementation and perception errors.
Average maximum payoff
Figures A.38 and A.39 show the average maximum payoff for Player 1, after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for implementation and perception errors.
Figures A.40 and A.41 show the average maximum payoff for Player 2, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even
respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
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Figure A.35: Average payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs for all values
of r, T and for n being even (implementation and perception errors). See Figure
A.80 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.36: Average payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs for all values
of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and perception errors). See Figure
A.81 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.37: Average payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs for all values
of r, T and for n being even (implementation and perception errors). See Figure
A.82 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.38: Average maximum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure A.83 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.39: Average maximum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure A.84 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.40: Average maximum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure A.85 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.41: Average maximum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure A.86 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
Average minimum payoff
Figures A.42 and A.43 show the average minimum payoff for Player 1, after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for implementation and perception errors.
Figures A.44 and A.45 show the average minimum payoff for Player 2, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even
respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
A.3 Confidence Across 50 Runs
For each type of bounded rationality, we plot the standard error (95% confidence)
for each evaluation metric, for each game and rationality bound setting. This is
in the same order as the graphs in Section A.2 for easy reference.
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Figure A.42: Average minimum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure A.87 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.43: Average minimum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure A.88 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
205
A.3 Confidence Across 50 Runs
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.0 (BL)0.000001
0.000010.0001
0.0010.01
0.1
1
3
5
7
9
 
Tr
em
bli
ng
 pr
ob
ab
ilit
y (
T)
Randomness in move (r)
 
Nu
m
be
r o
f r
ou
nd
s (
n)
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Figure A.44: Average minimum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure A.89 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure A.45: Average minimum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure A.90 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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A.3.1 Implementation Errors
Error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time
Figure A.46 shows the error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time,
across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation errors.
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Figure A.46: Error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n (implementation errors).
Error at 95% confidence for average stay in equilibrium
Figure A.47 shows the error at 95% confidence for average stay within " distance
from equilibrium, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation
errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilibrium
Figure A.48 shows the error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilib-
rium, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation
errors.
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Figure A.47: Error at 95% confidence for average stay within " distance from
equilibrium, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n (implementation errors).
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Figure A.48: Error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilibrium, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n (implementation errors).
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Error at 95% confidence for average payoff
Figures A.49 and A.50 show the error at 95% confidence for average payoff for
Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd
and even respectively, for implementation errors.
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Figure A.49: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 1), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation
errors).
Figures A.51 and A.52 show the error at 95% confidence for average payoff
for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being
odd and even respectively, for implementation errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff
Figures A.53 and A.54 show the error at 95% confidence for average maximum
payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for implementation errors.
Figures A.55 and A.56 show the error at 95% confidence for average maximum
payoff for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for implementation errors.
209
A.3 Confidence Across 50 Runs
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.0 (BL)0.000001
0.000010.0001
0.0010.01
0.1
2
4
6
8
10
 
Tr
em
bli
ng
 pr
ob
ab
ilit
y (
T)
Randomness in move (r)
 
Nu
m
be
r o
f r
ou
nd
s (
n)
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
Figure A.50: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 1), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation
errors).
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Figure A.51: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 2), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation
errors).
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Figure A.52: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 2), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation
errors).
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Figure A.53: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation errors).
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Figure A.54: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation errors).
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Figure A.55: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation errors).
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Figure A.56: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation errors).
Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff
Figures A.57 and A.58 show the error at 95% confidence for average minimum
payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for implementation errors.
Figures A.59 and A.60 show the error at 95% confidence for average minimum
payoff for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for implementation errors.
A.3.2 Perception Errors
Error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time
Figure A.61 shows the error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time,
across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for perception errors.
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Figure A.57: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation errors).
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.0 (BL)0.000001
0.000010.0001
0.0010.01
0.1
2
4
6
8
10
 
Tr
em
bli
ng
 pr
ob
ab
ilit
y (
T)
Randomness in move (r)
 
Nu
m
be
r o
f r
ou
nd
s (
n)
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Figure A.58: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation errors).
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Figure A.59: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation errors).
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Figure A.60: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation errors).
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Figure A.61: Error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n (perception errors).
Error at 95% confidence for average stay in equilibrium
Figure A.62 shows the error at 95% confidence for average stay within " distance
from equilibrium, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for perception errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilibrium
Figure A.63 shows the error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilib-
rium, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for perception
errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average payoff
Figures A.64 and A.65 show the error at 95% confidence for average payoff for
Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd
and even respectively, for perception errors.
Figures A.66 and A.67 show the error at 95% confidence for average payoff
for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being
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Figure A.62: Error at 95% confidence for average stay within " distance from
equilibrium, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n (perception errors).
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Figure A.63: Error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilibrium, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n (perception errors).
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Figure A.64: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 1), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors).
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Figure A.65: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 1), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors).
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odd and even respectively, for perception errors.
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Figure A.66: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 2), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors).
Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff
Figures A.68 and A.69 show the error at 95% confidence for average maximum
payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for perception errors.
Figures A.70 and A.71 show the error at 95% confidence for average maximum
payoff for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for perception errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff
Figures A.72 and A.73 show the error at 95% confidence for average minimum
payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for perception errors.
Figures A.74 and A.75 show the error at 95% confidence for average minimum
payoff for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for perception errors.
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Figure A.67: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 2), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors).
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Figure A.68: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception
errors).
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Figure A.69: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception
errors).
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Figure A.70: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception
errors).
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Figure A.71: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception
errors).
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Figure A.72: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception
errors).
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Figure A.73: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception
errors).
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Figure A.74: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception
errors).
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Figure A.75: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception
errors).
A.3.3 Implementation and Perception Errors
Error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time
Figure A.76 shows the error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time,
across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation and perception
errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average stay in equilibrium
Figure A.77 shows the error at 95% confidence for average stay within " distance
from equilibrium, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation
and perception errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilibrium
Figure A.78 shows the error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilib-
rium, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation
and perception errors.
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Figure A.76: Error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n (implementation and perception errors).
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Figure A.77: Error at 95% confidence for average stay within " distance from
equilibrium, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n (implementation and
perception errors).
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Figure A.78: Error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilibrium, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n (implementation and perception
errors).
Error at 95% confidence for average payoff
Figures A.79 and A.80 show the error at 95% confidence for average payoff for
Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd
and even respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
Figures A.81 and A.82 show the error at 95% confidence for average payoff
for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being
odd and even respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff
Figures A.83 and A.84 show the error at 95% confidence for average maximum
payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
Figures A.85 and A.86 show the error at 95% confidence for average maximum
payoff for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
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Figure A.79: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 1), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and
perception errors).
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Figure A.80: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 1), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation
and perception errors).
227
A.3 Confidence Across 50 Runs
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.0 (BL)0.000001
0.000010.0001
0.0010.01
0.1
1
3
5
7
9
 
Tr
em
bli
ng
 pr
ob
ab
ilit
y (
T)
Randomness in move (r)
 
Nu
m
be
r o
f r
ou
nd
s (
n)
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Figure A.81: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 2), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and
perception errors).
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Figure A.82: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 2), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation
and perception errors).
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Figure A.83: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
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Figure A.84: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
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Figure A.85: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
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Figure A.86: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
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A.3 Confidence Across 50 Runs
Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff
Figures A.87 and A.88 show the error at 95% confidence for average minimum
payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
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Figure A.87: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
Figures A.89 and A.90 show the error at 95% confidence for average minimum
payoff for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
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Figure A.88: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
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Figure A.89: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
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Figure A.90: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
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Appendix B
Results for Randomness in Moves
(r) Specified Using a Uniform
Distribution in Chapter 4
We defined three types of rationality bounds in Chapter 4, viz. implementation
errors, perception errors, and a combination of the two. This Appendix shows
the results obtained when the r (randomness in moves) parameter that partly
specifies the bounds in terms of Gaussian noise, now specifies the bounds in
terms of Uniformly distributed noise. This results in the action or perception
of an agent to have Uniformly distributed noise within the interval [−r√3, r√3]
added to it.
We show three types of graphs in this Appendix. The first type, in Section B.1,
show the general trends of the evaluation metrics that we considered in Chapter
4, with respect to variations in r, for the three types of rationality bounds. The
second type, in Section B.2, show the values of the evaluation metric, together
with errors at a 95% confidence level, with respect to variations in r, T and n.
These graphs are of the same form as those plotted for the Gaussian noise case in
Appendix A (Section A.2), but for Uniformly distributed noise. The third type,
in Section B.3, show the errors at a 95% confidence level separately as well, again
with respect to variations in r, T and n. These graphs are of the same form as
those plotted for the Gaussian noise case in Appendix A (Section A.3), but for
Uniformly distributed noise. Please read Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.3) to learn how
to refer to the graphs in Section B.1, and Appendix A to learn how to refer to
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B.1 Averages Showing Trends
graphs in Sections B.2 and B.3.
B.1 Averages Showing Trends
B.1.1 Implementation Errors
Average first hitting time
Figure B.1 shows the average first hitting time, across 50 runs, averaged further
across T , for all values of r and n, for implementation errors.
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Figure B.1: Average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of r and n,
averaged further across T (implementation errors). Change minimal across T as
can be seen in the graphs in Sections B.2 and B.3.
Average stay in equilibrium
Figure B.2 shows the average stay within " distance from equilibrium, across 50
runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r and n, for implementation
errors.
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Figure B.2: Average length of stay in equilibrium after first hit, across 50 runs for
all values of r and n, averaged further across T (implementation errors). Change
minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Sections B.2 and B.3.
Average distance from equilibrium
Figure B.3 shows the average distance from equilibrium, after first hit, across 50
runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r and n, for implementation
errors.
Average payoff
Figure B.4 shows the average payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs,
averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd and even, for
implementation errors.
Figure B.5 shows the average payoff for Player 2, after first hit, across 50
runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd and even,
for implementation errors.
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Figure B.3: Average distance from the equilibrium after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (implementation errors).
Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Sections B.2 and B.3.
Average maximum payoff
Figure B.6 shows the average maximum payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across
50 runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd and
even, for implementation errors.
Figure B.7 shows the average maximum payoff for Player 2, after first hit,
across 50 runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd
and even, for implementation errors.
Average minimum payoff
Figure B.8 shows the average minimum payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across
50 runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd and
even, for implementation errors.
Figure B.9 shows the average minimum payoff for Player 2, after first hit,
across 50 runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd
and even, for implementation errors.
237
B.1 Averages Showing Trends
1
3
5
7
9
0.0 (BL)0.000001
0.000010.0001
0.0010.01
0.1
0
0.5
1
Nu
mb
er o
f ro
und
s (n
)
Randomness in move (r)
Av
er
ag
e 
fitn
es
s (
Pl
ay
er
 1
)
(a) n odd.
2
4
6
8
10
0.0 (BL)0.000001
0.000010.0001
0.0010.01
0.1
0
0.5
1
Nu
mb
er o
f ro
und
s (n
)
Randomness in move (r)
Av
er
ag
e 
fitn
es
s (
Pl
ay
er
 1
)
(b) n even.
Figure B.4: Average payoff of Player 1 across generations since first hit, averaged
across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (implementation
errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Sections B.2
and B.3.
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Figure B.5: Average payoff of Player 2 across generations since first hit, averaged
across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (implementation
errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Sections B.2
and B.3.
B.1.2 Perception Errors
Average first hitting time
Figure B.10 shows the average first hitting time, across 50 runs, averaged further
across T , for all values of r and n, for perception errors.
Average stay in equilibrium
Figure B.11 shows the average stay within " distance from equilibrium, across 50
runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r and n, for perception errors.
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Figure B.6: Average maximum payoff of Player 1 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(implementation errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs
in Sections B.2 and B.3.
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Figure B.7: Average maximum payoff of Player 2 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(implementation errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs
in Sections B.2 and B.3.
Average distance from equilibrium
Figure B.12 shows the average distance from equilibrium, after first hit, across 50
runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r and n, for perception errors.
Average payoff
Figure B.13 shows the average payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs,
averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd and even, for
perception errors.
Figure B.14 shows the average payoff for Player 2, after first hit, across 50
runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd and even,
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Figure B.8: Average minimum payoff of Player 1 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(implementation errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs
in Sections B.2 and B.3.
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Figure B.9: Average minimum payoff of Player 2 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(implementation errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs
in Sections B.2 and B.3.
for perception errors.
Average maximum payoff
Figure B.15 shows the average maximum payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across
50 runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd and
even, for perception errors.
Figure B.16 shows the average maximum payoff for Player 2, after first hit,
across 50 runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd
and even, for perception errors.
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B.1 Averages Showing Trends
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Figure B.10: Average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of r and n,
averaged further across T (perception errors). Change minimal across T as can
be seen in the graphs in Sections B.2 and B.3.
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Figure B.11: Average length of stay in equilibrium after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (perception errors). Change
minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Sections B.2 and B.3.
241
B.1 Averages Showing Trends
12
34
56
78
910
0.0 (BL)
0.000001
0.00001
0.0001
0.001
0.01
0.1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Ran
dom
nes
s in
 mo
ve (
r)
Number of rounds (n)
Av
er
ag
e 
dis
ta
nc
e 
fro
m
 e
qu
ilib
riu
m
Figure B.12: Average distance from the equilibrium after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (perception errors). Change
minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Sections B.2 and B.3.
Average minimum payoff
Figure B.17 shows the average minimum payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across
50 runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd and
even, for perception errors.
Figure B.18 shows the average minimum payoff for Player 2, after first hit,
across 50 runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd
and even, for perception errors.
B.1.3 Implementation and Perception Errors
Average first hitting time
Figure B.19 shows the average first hitting time, across 50 runs, averaged further
across T , for all values of r and n, for implementation and perception errors.
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B.1 Averages Showing Trends
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Figure B.13: Average payoff of Player 1 across generations since first hit, averaged
across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (perception
errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Sections B.2
and B.3.
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Figure B.14: Average payoff of Player 2 across generations since first hit, averaged
across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (perception
errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Sections B.2
and B.3.
Average stay in equilibrium
Figure B.20 shows the average stay within " distance from equilibrium, across 50
runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r and n, for implementation and
perception errors.
Average distance from equilibrium
Figure B.21 shows the average distance from equilibrium, after first hit, across 50
runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r and n, for implementation and
perception errors.
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Figure B.15: Average maximum payoff of Player 1 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(perception errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in
Sections B.2 and B.3.
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Figure B.16: Average maximum payoff of Player 2 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(perception errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in
Sections B.2 and B.3.
Average payoff
Figure B.22 shows the average payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs,
averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd and even, for
implementation and perception errors.
Figure B.23 shows the average payoff for Player 2, after first hit, across 50
runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd and even,
for implementation and perception errors.
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Figure B.17: Average minimum payoff of Player 1 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(perception errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in
Sections B.2 and B.3.
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Figure B.18: Average minimum payoff of Player 2 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(perception errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in
Sections B.2 and B.3.
Average maximum payoff
Figure B.24 shows the average maximum payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across
50 runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd and
even, for implementation and perception errors.
Figure B.25 shows the average maximum payoff for Player 2, after first hit,
across 50 runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd
and even, for implementation and perception errors.
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Figure B.19: Average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of r and
n, averaged further across T (implementation and perception errors). Change
minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Sections B.2 and B.3.
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Figure B.20: Average length of stay in equilibrium after first hit, across 50 runs for
all values of r and n, averaged further across T (implementation and perception
errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in Sections B.2
and B.3.
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Figure B.21: Average distance from the equilibrium after first hit, across 50
runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (implementation and
perception errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in
Sections B.2 and B.3.
Average minimum payoff
Figure B.26 shows the average minimum payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across
50 runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd and
even, for implementation and perception errors.
Figure B.27 shows the average minimum payoff for Player 2, after first hit,
across 50 runs, averaged further across T , for all values of r, and for n being odd
and even, for implementation and perception errors.
B.2 Averages with Confidence
B.2.1 Implementation Errors
Average first hitting time
Figure B.28 shows the average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of
r, T and n, for implementation errors.
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Figure B.22: Average payoff of Player 1 across generations since first hit, averaged
across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (implementation
and perception errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in
Sections B.2 and B.3.
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Figure B.23: Average payoff of Player 2 across generations since first hit, averaged
across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T (implementation
and perception errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen in the graphs in
Sections B.2 and B.3.
Average stay in equilibrium
Figure B.29 shows the average stay within " distance from equilibrium, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation errors.
Average distance from equilibrium
Figure B.30 shows the average distance from equilibrium, after first hit, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation errors.
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Figure B.24: Average maximum payoff of Player 1 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(implementation and perception errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen
in the graphs in Sections B.2 and B.3.
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Figure B.25: Average maximum payoff of Player 2 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(implementation and perception errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen
in the graphs in Sections B.2 and B.3.
Average payoff
Figures B.31 and B.32 show the average payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across
50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively, for
implementation errors.
Figures B.33 and B.34 show the average payoff for Player 2, after first hit,
across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for implementation errors.
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Figure B.26: Average minimum payoff of Player 1 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(implementation and perception errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen
in the graphs in Sections B.2 and B.3.
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Figure B.27: Average minimum payoff of Player 2 across generations since first
hit, averaged across 50 runs for all values of r and n, averaged further across T
(implementation and perception errors). Change minimal across T as can be seen
in the graphs in Sections B.2 and B.3.
Average maximum payoff
Figures B.35 and B.36 show the average maximum payoff for Player 1, after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for implementation errors.
Figures B.37 and B.38 show the average maximum payoff for Player 2, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even
respectively, for implementation errors.
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Figure B.28: Average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n
(implementation errors). See Figure B.73 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.29: Average stay within " distance from equilibrium, across 50 runs for all
values of r, T and n (implementation errors). See Figure B.74 for the magnitudes
of errors in detail.
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Figure B.30: Average distance from equilibrium, after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and n (implementation errors). See Figure B.75 for the
magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.31: Average payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs for all
values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation errors). See Figure B.76 for
the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.32: Average payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs for all values
of r, T and for n being even (implementation errors). See Figure B.77 for the
magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.33: Average payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs for all
values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation errors). See Figure B.78 for
the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.34: Average payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs for all values
of r, T and for n being even (implementation errors). See Figure B.79 for the
magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.35: Average maximum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation errors). See Figure
B.80 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.36: Average maximum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation errors). See Figure
B.81 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.37: Average maximum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation errors). See Figure
B.82 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.38: Average maximum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation errors). See Figure
B.83 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
Average minimum payoff
Figures B.39 and B.40 show the average minimum payoff for Player 1, after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for implementation errors.
Figures B.41 and B.42 show the average minimum payoff for Player 2, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even
respectively, for implementation errors.
B.2.2 Perception Errors
Average first hitting time
Figure B.43 shows the average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of
r, T and n, for perception errors.
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Figure B.39: Average minimum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation errors). See Figure
B.84 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.40: Average minimum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation errors). See Figure
B.85 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.41: Average minimum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation errors). See Figure
B.86 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.42: Average minimum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation errors). See Figure
B.87 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.43: Average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and
n (perception errors). See Figure B.88 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
Average stay in equilibrium
Figure B.44 shows the average stay within " distance from equilibrium, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n, for perception errors.
Average distance from equilibrium
Figure B.45 shows the average distance from equilibrium, after first hit, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n, for perception errors.
Average payoff
Figures B.46 and B.47 show the average payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across
50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively, for
perception errors.
Figures B.48 and B.49 show the average payoff for Player 2, after first hit,
across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for perception errors.
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Figure B.44: Average stay within " distance from equilibrium, across 50 runs for
all values of r, T and n (perception errors). See Figure B.89 for the magnitudes
of errors in detail.
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Figure B.45: Average distance from equilibrium, after first hit, across 50 runs for
all values of r, T and n (perception errors). See Figure B.90 for the magnitudes
of errors in detail.
260
B.2 Averages with Confidence
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.0 (BL)0.000001
0.000010.0001
0.0010.01
0.1
1
3
5
7
9
 
Tr
em
bli
ng
 pr
ob
ab
ilit
y (
T)
Randomness in move (r)
 
Nu
m
be
r o
f r
ou
nd
s (
n)
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Figure B.46: Average payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs for all
values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors). See Figure B.91 for the
magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.47: Average payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs for all
values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors). See Figure B.92 for the
magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.48: Average payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs for all
values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors). See Figure B.93 for the
magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.49: Average payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs for all
values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors). See Figure B.94 for the
magnitudes of errors in detail.
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B.2 Averages with Confidence
Average maximum payoff
Figures B.50 and B.51 show the average maximum payoff for Player 1, after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for perception errors.
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Figure B.50: Average maximum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors). See Figure B.95 for
the magnitudes of errors in detail.
Figures B.52 and B.53 show the average maximum payoff for Player 2, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even
respectively, for perception errors.
Average minimum payoff
Figures B.54 and B.55 show the average minimum payoff for Player 1, after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for perception errors.
Figures B.56 and B.57 show the average minimum payoff for Player 2, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even
respectively, for perception errors.
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Figure B.51: Average maximum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors). See Figure B.96
for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.52: Average maximum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors). See Figure B.97 for
the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.53: Average maximum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors). See Figure B.98
for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.54: Average minimum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors). See Figure B.99 for
the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.55: Average minimum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors). See Figure B.100
for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.56: Average minimum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors). See Figure B.101
for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.57: Average minimum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors). See Figure B.102
for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
B.2.3 Implementation and Perception Errors
Average first hitting time
Figure B.58 shows the average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of
r, T and n, for implementation and perception errors.
Average stay in equilibrium
Figure B.59 shows the average stay within " distance from equilibrium, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation and perception errors.
Average distance from equilibrium
Figure B.60 shows the average distance from equilibrium, after first hit, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation and perception errors.
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Figure B.58: Average first hitting time, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and
n (implementation and perception errors). See Figure B.103 for the magnitudes
of errors in detail.
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Figure B.59: Average stay within " distance from equilibrium, across 50 runs for
all values of r, T and n (implementation and perception errors). See Figure B.104
for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
268
B.2 Averages with Confidence
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.0 (BL)0.000001
0.000010.0001
0.0010.01
0.1
2
4
6
8
10
 
Tr
em
bli
ng
 pr
ob
ab
ilit
y (
T)
Randomness in move (r)
 
Nu
m
be
r o
f r
ou
nd
s (
n)
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Figure B.60: Average distance from equilibrium, after first hit, across 50 runs for
all values of r, T and n (implementation and perception errors). See Figure B.105
for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
Average payoff
Figures B.61 and B.62 show the average payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across
50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively, for
implementation and perception errors.
Figures B.63 and B.64 show the average payoff for Player 2, after first hit,
across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for implementation and perception errors.
Average maximum payoff
Figures B.65 and B.66 show the average maximum payoff for Player 1, after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for implementation and perception errors.
Figures B.67 and B.68 show the average maximum payoff for Player 2, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even
respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
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Figure B.61: Average payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs for all values
of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and perception errors). See Figure
B.106 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.62: Average payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs for all values
of r, T and for n being even (implementation and perception errors). See Figure
B.107 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.63: Average payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs for all values
of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and perception errors). See Figure
B.108 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.64: Average payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs for all values
of r, T and for n being even (implementation and perception errors). See Figure
B.109 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.65: Average maximum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure B.110 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.66: Average maximum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure B.111 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.67: Average maximum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure B.112 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.68: Average maximum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure B.113 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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B.3 Confidence Across 50 Runs
Average minimum payoff
Figures B.69 and B.70 show the average minimum payoff for Player 1, after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even respectively,
for implementation and perception errors.
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Figure B.69: Average minimum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure B.114 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
Figures B.71 and B.72 show the average minimum payoff for Player 2, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd and even
respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
B.3 Confidence Across 50 Runs
For each type of bounded rationality, we plot the standard error (95% confidence)
for each evaluation metric, for each game and rationality bound setting. This is
in the same order as the graphs in Section B.2 for easy reference.
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Figure B.70: Average minimum payoff (Player 1), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure B.115 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.71: Average minimum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure B.116 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
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Figure B.72: Average minimum payoff (Player 2), after first hit, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation and perception errors).
See Figure B.117 for the magnitudes of errors in detail.
B.3.1 Implementation Errors
Error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time
Figure B.73 shows the error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time,
across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average stay in equilibrium
Figure B.74 shows the error at 95% confidence for average stay within " distance
from equilibrium, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation
errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilibrium
Figure B.75 shows the error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilib-
rium, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation
errors.
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Figure B.73: Error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and n (implementation errors).
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Figure B.74: Error at 95% confidence for average stay within " distance from
equilibrium, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n (implementation errors).
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Figure B.75: Error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilibrium, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n (implementation errors).
Error at 95% confidence for average payoff
Figures B.76 and B.77 show the error at 95% confidence for average payoff for
Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd
and even respectively, for implementation errors.
Figures B.78 and B.79 show the error at 95% confidence for average payoff
for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being
odd and even respectively, for implementation errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff
Figures B.80 and B.81 show the error at 95% confidence for average maximum
payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for implementation errors.
Figures B.82 and B.83 show the error at 95% confidence for average maximum
payoff for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for implementation errors.
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Figure B.76: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 1), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation
errors).
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Figure B.77: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 1), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation
errors).
279
B.3 Confidence Across 50 Runs
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.0 (BL)0.000001
0.000010.0001
0.0010.01
0.1
1
3
5
7
9
 
Tr
em
bli
ng
 pr
ob
ab
ilit
y (
T)
Randomness in move (r)
 
Nu
m
be
r o
f r
ou
nd
s (
n)
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
Figure B.78: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 2), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation
errors).
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Figure B.79: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 2), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation
errors).
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Figure B.80: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation errors).
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Figure B.81: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation errors).
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Figure B.82: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation errors).
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Figure B.83: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation errors).
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Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff
Figures B.84 and B.85 show the error at 95% confidence for average minimum
payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for implementation errors.
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Figure B.84: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation errors).
Figures B.86 and B.87 show the error at 95% confidence for average minimum
payoff for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for implementation errors.
B.3.2 Perception Errors
Error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time
Figure B.88 shows the error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time,
across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for perception errors.
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Figure B.85: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation errors).
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Figure B.86: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation errors).
284
B.3 Confidence Across 50 Runs
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.0 (BL)0.000001
0.000010.0001
0.0010.01
0.1
2
4
6
8
10
 
Tr
em
bli
ng
 pr
ob
ab
ilit
y (
T)
Randomness in move (r)
 
Nu
m
be
r o
f r
ou
nd
s (
n)
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
Figure B.87: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation errors).
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Figure B.88: Error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time, across 50 runs
for all values of r, T and n (perception errors).
285
B.3 Confidence Across 50 Runs
Error at 95% confidence for average stay in equilibrium
Figure B.89 shows the error at 95% confidence for average stay within " distance
from equilibrium, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for perception errors.
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Figure B.89: Error at 95% confidence for average stay within " distance from
equilibrium, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n (perception errors).
Error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilibrium
Figure B.90 shows the error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilib-
rium, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for perception
errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average payoff
Figures B.91 and B.92 show the error at 95% confidence for average payoff for
Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd
and even respectively, for perception errors.
Figures B.93 and B.94 show the error at 95% confidence for average payoff
for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being
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Figure B.90: Error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilibrium, after
first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n (perception errors).
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.0 (BL)0.000001
0.000010.0001
0.0010.01
0.1
1
3
5
7
9
 
Tr
em
bli
ng
 pr
ob
ab
ilit
y (
T)
Randomness in move (r)
 
Nu
m
be
r o
f r
ou
nd
s (
n)
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Figure B.91: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 1), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors).
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Figure B.92: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 1), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors).
odd and even respectively, for perception errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff
Figures B.95 and B.96 show the error at 95% confidence for average maximum
payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for perception errors.
Figures B.97 and B.98 show the error at 95% confidence for average maximum
payoff for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for perception errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff
Figures B.99 and B.100 show the error at 95% confidence for average minimum
payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for perception errors.
Figures B.101 and B.102 show the error at 95% confidence for average mini-
mum payoff for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and
for n being odd and even respectively, for perception errors.
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Figure B.93: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 2), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception errors).
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Figure B.94: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 2), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception errors).
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Figure B.95: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception
errors).
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Figure B.96: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception
errors).
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Figure B.97: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception
errors).
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Figure B.98: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception
errors).
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Figure B.99: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception
errors).
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Figure B.100: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception
errors).
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Figure B.101: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (perception
errors).
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Figure B.102: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (perception
errors).
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B.3.3 Implementation and Perception Errors
Error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time
Figure B.103 shows the error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time,
across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation and perception
errors.
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Figure B.103: Error at 95% confidence for average first hitting time, across 50
runs for all values of r, T and n (implementation and perception errors).
Error at 95% confidence for average stay in equilibrium
Figure B.104 shows the error at 95% confidence for average stay within " distance
from equilibrium, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation
and perception errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilibrium
Figure B.105 shows the error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilib-
rium, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n, for implementation
and perception errors.
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Figure B.104: Error at 95% confidence for average stay within " distance from
equilibrium, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n (implementation and
perception errors).
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Figure B.105: Error at 95% confidence for average distance from equilibrium,
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and n (implementation and
perception errors).
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Error at 95% confidence for average payoff
Figures B.106 and B.107 show the error at 95% confidence for average payoff for
Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd
and even respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
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Figure B.106: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 1), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and
perception errors).
Figures B.108 and B.109 show the error at 95% confidence for average payoff
for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being
odd and even respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff
Figures B.110 and B.111 show the error at 95% confidence for average maximum
payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
Figures B.112 and B.113 show the error at 95% confidence for average maxi-
mum payoff for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and
for n being odd and even respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
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Figure B.107: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 1), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation
and perception errors).
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Figure B.108: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 2), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (implementation and
perception errors).
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Figure B.109: Error at 95% confidence for average payoff (Player 2), after first
hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (implementation
and perception errors).
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Figure B.110: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
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Figure B.111: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff
Figures B.114 and B.115 show the error at 95% confidence for average minimum
payoff for Player 1, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n
being odd and even respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
Figures B.116 and B.117 show the error at 95% confidence for average mini-
mum payoff for Player 2, after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and
for n being odd and even respectively, for implementation and perception errors.
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Figure B.112: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
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Figure B.113: Error at 95% confidence for average maximum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
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Figure B.114: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
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Figure B.115: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 1),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
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Figure B.116: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being odd (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
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Figure B.117: Error at 95% confidence for average minimum payoff (Player 2),
after first hit, across 50 runs for all values of r, T and for n being even (imple-
mentation and perception errors).
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Glossary
ad-hoc Not methodical or on an as needed basis, chosen as is from the available
tools and techniques which have been developed independently of ACE,
specifically when chosen for simulating socio-economic learning. Also called
off-the-shelf in the thesis. 3, 324
agents An agent, in this thesis, is a notion that describes a player in a socio-
economic game, which uses or is associated with a strategy to play the socio-
economic game (e.g. a player playing a bargaining game using a bargaining
strategy). 2
bounded rationality Bounded rationality is a concept within the Social Sci-
ences that takes into consideration the cognitive limitations that humans
face, in conformance with which they solve problems or make decisions,
that lead to outcomes which are unclear or uncertain. The limitations that
make one unable to gather, retain, transmit, and/or process information,
and the limitations on the amount of time they have to gather, retain, trans-
mit, and/or process information, on route to solving a problem/making a
decision, can be seen as limits on rationality, or bounded rationality. For
example, a decision maker may not have the resources to find the optimal
solution to a problem at hand, which leads to the decision maker mak-
ing assumptions about the problem in order to arrive at a solution, thus
greatly simplifying the problem/possible choices of solutions to the prob-
lem. In computational terms, this limitation can translate into an agent
being incapable of gathering, retaining, transmitting, and/or processing
the information or having limited time to gather, retain, transmit, and/or
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process the information that ideally can lead an agent to behaving as if it
possessed complete information and unlimited processing capabilities. As
such, an agent tries to satisfice rather than optimise its payoff (from a world
within which it is situated), i.e. aim for a satisfactory rather than an opti-
mal solution, subject to the information it has been able to gather, retain
and/or process, and the time it has to do so. Fully rational behaviour is
only possible if decisions can be made such that they lead to outcomes that
are clear/certain during the time of processing making such decisions, and
that these outcomes do not change whilst processing. In agent based simu-
lations, where agents have limited computational capabilities, such agents
are deemed boundedly rational from the outset. 2
co-evolutionary simulations See socio-economic simulations. 10
complete knowledge See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2. 8
disciplining Providing a methodology for co-evolutionary algorithm analysis
and refinements, in turn enabling engineering the algorithm for the purposes
of adopting them as socio-economic simulations, is termed as disciplining
in the thesis. 8
elements See solution concept. 70
engineering The analysis and refinements of co-evolutionary algorithms for the
purposes of modelling socio-economic situations, thus being used as socio-
economic simulations, particularly for the case of modelling socio-economic
learning within ACE, is termed as engineering in the thesis. 9, 321
equilibrium selection Finding the equilibrium in a game, specifically when it
may have multiple equilibria, and thus, one of the many equilibria may have
to be chosen as the desired equilibrium, is known as equilibrium selection.
8, 325
evolution strategies An evolution strategy (ES) is an evolutionary search/opti-
misation algorithm for real valued search, i.e. the candidate solutions to
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the search problem are usually represented by a string of real numbers. An
objective fitness measure that needs optimising is used in order to evaluate
the fitness of candidate solutions. The algorithm usually starts with a pop-
ulation of randomly generated candidate solutions (for example, a string
of real numbers), their fitness evaluated using the objective fitness mea-
sure. In any generation, individuals are usually selected at random from
the pool of candidate solutions and mutated (usually by the addition of a
Gaussian distributed noise), to generate a pool of offspring. After evaluat-
ing the pool of offspring using the objective fitness measure, the offspring
replace the candidate solutions to become the candidate solutions in the
next generation, normally via one of the two selection schemes: (µ+ λ)-ES
or (µ,λ)-ES, where µ is the candidate solution pool size and λ, the offspring
pool size. In (µ+ λ)-ES, the fittest µ individuals, amongst both candidate
solutions and offspring, become the next generation of candidate solutions.
In the (µ,λ)-ES, the fittest µ offspring replace the entire candidate solution
pool to be the next generation. This process carries on until a termination
condition is satisfied (e.g. a certain number of generations is reached). A
detailed discussion of these algorithms is carried out in [17], to which the
interested reader is referred to. We are however concerned with the case
where these algorithms may be used without an objective fitness measure,
i.e. as co-evolutionary algorithms, for the purposes of socio-economic simu-
lations, the particular algorithm covered in this thesis described in Chapter
3, Section 3.5.1.2. 47
evolutionary learning Sub-field of evolutionary computation dealing with us-
ing evolutionary algorithms for the purposes of evolving learning machines
rather than optimising. 3
genetic algorithms A genetic algorithm (GA) is an evolutionary search/opti-
misation algorithm inspired by the process of natural evolution. A can-
didate solution to the search problem is traditionally/canonically repre-
sented/encoded as a bit string, but the algorithm is not limited to bit
string representations of candidate solutions. An objective fitness measure
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that needs optimising is used in order to evaluate the fitness of candidate
solutions. The algorithm usually starts with a population of randomly gen-
erated candidate solutions (for example, randomly generated bit strings),
their fitness evaluated using the objective fitness measure. The fitness val-
ues are then used to ascertain the chances (using one of the various selection
schemes in the literature [64]) of the candidate solutions being selected for
reproduction via variation operators like cross-over and mutation, and this
reproduction process leads to the next generation of candidate solutions.
The process of evaluation, selection and reproduction usually carries on un-
til a termination condition is satisfied (e.g. a certain number of generations
is reached). The interested reader is referred to [64] for more details. There
have been many variants of genetic algorithms presented in the literature
to date. We are however concerned with the case where these algorithms
may be used without an objective fitness measure, i.e. as co-evolutionary
algorithms, for the purposes of socio-economic simulations. 3
individual learning A class (also called known as level of learning in ACE)
of evolutionary algorithms considered for socio-economic simulations. The
defining characteristic of this class is that the evolving population as a whole
constitutes a solution (individual being partial solutions) to the problem
under question, i.e. the set of individuals (or could be just one individual)
within the population represents one agent alone, for example, a learning
classifier system. When used as simulations, each agent is thus represented
by a set of (or one) individuals (or strategies) which together describe the
overall strategy of the agent. For example, if the agent were to represent
a socio-economic entity like a bargaining agent or a firm, the population
of individuals (or strategies) belong only to the bargaining agent or the
firm and only exchanges information within itself. As such, one bargain-
ing agent or firm could be one learning classifier system. Previous work
that has been used as a case study in this thesis (described in Chapter
3, Section 3.5.1.2) also falls into this category, but instead of a learning
classifier system, an evolution strategy is used by the bargaining agent. If
there are many agents in the simulations, then each agent is represented by
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such a set of individuals (or strategies). This is similar to the Michigan ap-
proach to evolutionary learning from evolutionary computation literature.
See social learning for the other class of algorithms generally used in ACE
for socio-economic learning simulations. 3, 326
learning classifier systems A learning classifier system (LCS) is an evolution-
ary learning algorithm. The system in itself is seen as a learning entity, and
has a set of rules that suggest actions given an input stimulus. The rules
within the set are matched upon an input stimulus, and the corresponding
actions from the matched up rules (there can be multiple matched rules)
combined in some manner, giving a resultant action for the LCS to take.
Whenever an action is taken, a payoff is received by the LCS from the envi-
ronment. This payoff is transformed into an accuracy value for the matched
up rules, specifically those rules that were more influential in producing the
resultant action. Thus, each rule has an accuracy value associated with it,
which in fact acts as a fitness value for a genetic algorithm. This genetic
algorithm works towards searching for better rules, for example more accu-
rate rules. In essence, the genetic algorithm acts on the set of rules that
map stimulus and action, to search for better rules, whilst the rules are
credited with a fitness via interacting with the environment the LCS is put
in. This is the Michigan approach based learning classifier system. Usually,
the Michigan approach to evolutionary learning is what is popularly used to
describe learning classifier system. A detailed discussion of these algorithms
can be found in [74]. The use of the term ‘learning classifier system’ in the
thesis is to describe a system where each agent may in fact be an LCS of
this form, and the environment is described by the agents it interacts with,
which then co-adapt, or indeed co-evolve. 47
off-the-shelf Not methodical or on an as needed basis, chosen as is from the
available tools and techniques which have been developed independently of
ACE, specifically when chosen for simulating socio-economic learning. Also
called ad-hoc in the thesis. 2, 320
pareto-efficient The outcome from a game, which would be a payoff pair in
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the two play games considered in this thesis, lying on the pareto-efficient
frontier, is said to be a pareto-efficient outcome. 25
pareto-efficient frontier When playing a game, the involved players are said
to be on the pareto-efficient frontier, if and only if they cannot make mutual
gains in their payoffs by individually changing their respective game playing
strategies. In a two person game, as considered in this thesis, when players
are on the pareto-efficient frontier, if one player individually changes its
strategy such that it gets a higher payoff than when using the old strategy,
then the other player, who does not change its strategy, will necessarily
have its payoff reduced. So, the payoff pairs which have this property are
said to lie on the pareto-efficient frontier. 325
perfect rationality See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2. 8
prisoner’s dilemma A two player game, where the players can make one of
the two moves, viz. cooperate or defect. The payoff structure of the game
is such that the payoff if the player defects, whilst the other cooperates
(this other player is then called the sucker), is higher for the defector, than
if both players cooperate. However, if both players defect, it results in a
lower payoff for both, as compared to if they cooperated, but still higher
than the sucker payoff. They make their moves at the same time, thus not
knowing what move the other might make. This leads to the dilemma that
the players face, for each is better off defecting (both against a sucker and
against a defector), leaving aside the mutual gains from cooperation, which
are possible. This is the single round or one shot prisoner’s dilemma game.
The iterated or repeated form of this game is where the players engage in
multiple rounds of this game. The Nash Equilibrium, for the case of both
the single and iterated version of the game, is to always defect, i.e. defect
in every round being played. 23
selected Nash Equilibrium See equilibrium selection. 8
social learning A class (also called known as level of learning in ACE) of evolu-
tionary algorithms considered for socio-economic simulations. The defining
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characteristic of this class is that each individual in the evolving population
constitutes a solution to the problem under question, i.e. one individual
within this population, represents one agent. Genetic algorithms, where
one individual in the population may represent one agent, is an example
of this class. If an agent were to represent a socio-economic entity like a
bargaining agent or a firm, then the population in the algorithm would be
representing a population of bargaining agents or firms, with each individ-
ual in the population being the overall strategy of the bargaining agent or
firm, which may then exchange information amongst each other, say for
example, via the cross-over operator in genetic algorithms. This is similar
to the Pittsburg approach to evolutionary learning from evolutionary com-
putation literature. See individual learning for the other class of algorithms
generally used in ACE for socio-economic learning simulations. 3, 324
socio-economic learning The process of learning and adaptation by trial and
error when a player or agent is made to play or interact within socio-
economic environments, for example, interacting, learning and adapting
to play bargaining games. In the context of this thesis, the process of co-
evolution is seen as modelling this learning and adaptation process, whist
the agents play bargaining games. The terms ‘socio-economic learning’ and
‘socio-economic learning and adaptation’ are used interchangeably within
the thesis and mean the same thing. 2, 326
socio-economic phenomena Socio-economic terms that may get mis-interpreted
within co-evolutionary simulations, and as such, the co-evolutionary algo-
rithm may in turn get mis-interpreted based on these terms, are referred to
as socio-economic phenomena in the thesis. 3, 326
socio-economic simulations Simulating socio-economic phenomena and so-
cio-economic situations are termed as socio-economic simulations. In the
thesis, we are primarily interested in modelling socio-economic learning via
co-evolutionary algorithms. So, we primarily mean socio-economic simula-
tions to mean simulating socio-economic learning via co-evolutionary algo-
rithms in the thesis. When we say co-evolutionary simulations, we mean
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socio-economic simulations modelling socio-economic learning based on co-
evolutionary algorithms. 13, 321, 327
socio-economic situations Situation that may need modelling via socio-eco-
nomic simulations, for example modelling socio-economic interactions as
games and modelling game play using agents that learn and adapt towards
various game playing behaviours. Thus, situations which involves socio-
economic interaction and socio-economic learning/adaptation, are referred
to as socio-economic situations in the thesis. 7, 326
solution concept A game theoretic term that explicitly specifies the nature of
the solution one is interested in as being the solution to the game in ques-
tion. For example, the equilibrium within a game can be seen as a type of
solution to the game. For players of the game to be in equilibrium, they
have to adhere to game playing strategies with some properties. The specific
nature of these strategies that in fact puts the game players in equilibrium
with each other, can be seen as the solution concept. In axiomatic game
theory, one would state various axioms that should apply to the solution
to the game, respecting which might put the players in equilibrium. In
strategic game theory, one specifies the general properties one would want
in the strategies of the players, and these might put them in equilibrium
with each other. Nash Equilibrium is one widely studied solution concept
in game theory. In a game like Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Nash Equilibrium
is for players to defect. The solution concept of Nash Equilibrium for the
game thus needs to specify what leads to players defecting. If one puts
strategies from within the strategy space of a game through a hypothetical
filter such that only the Nash Equilibrium strategy separates out, the filter
specifies the solution concept of Nash Equilibrium. The filter searches by
way of separating out the desired solution from within the solution space.
Similarly, a search algorithm searches through the space of possible solu-
tions to land on to the desired solution. Co-evolutionary algorithms are
indeed search algorithms, but due to the nature of these algorithms, in
that, the evaluation of strategies at any given time is relative to the op-
ponent strategies discovered thus far, the secondary search problem of the
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discovery of opponents comes into play as well. A co-evolutionary solution
concept is essentially the specification of the algorithm, such that it ex-
pends the necessary effort on the primary and secondary search problems,
in its search for the desired solution from the game (e.g. Nash equilibrium
solution) when used for finding game playing strategies. Thus, in the the-
sis, the individual elements (evaluation, interaction, selection, variation and
representation) that specify a co-evolutionary algorithm, together specify
the co-evolutionary solution concept. 5, 321
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